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I. INTRODUCTION
The Congressional Research Service ("CRS") is part of the legislative
branch of the federal government. It is a department of the Library of
Congress that works exclusively as a nonpartisan analytical, research, and
reference arm for the United States House of Representatives and Senate,
and its mission is to support an informed national legislature.'
In July 2004, in the midst of House debate over a bill that would restrict
federal court jurisdiction, CRS issued a memorandum stating its staff was
unaware of any precedent for a law that would deny the inferior federal
courts original jurisdiction or the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to
review the constitutionality of a law of Congress. However, the next
month, in response to a letter from the House Judiciary Committee, CRS
admitted its previous memorandum was in error, stating, "'This
memorandum responds to your request that we reassess an earlier
memorandum of ours .. . [§ 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789] did operate to
preclude any Federal court from deciding the validity of a Federal statute
from 1789 to 1875. Accordingly, our earlier memorandum was incorrect.""
That the official research arm of Congress missed such an important
precedent in the history of Congress's power over the federal courts-the
Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted during the First Congress-demonstrates
how, in current times, it is all too easy to forget the vital origins of the
federal judiciary and how those origins inform a historically accurate
understanding of Congress's authority to limit federal court jurisdiction.
This is especially true in light of the recognition that, today, "[n]umerous
esteemed legal scholars have emphasized that it would be a constitutional
violation of separation of powers principles for Congress to completely strip
federal courts of jurisdiction over constitutional claims."A

1. See generally About CRS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfolwhatscrs.html.
2. See 150 CONG. REC. H6600 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Nadler, opposing the
bill under consideration) ("Mr. Speaker, I place into the RECORD a memo from the Congressional
Research Service that says that Congress has never passed any legislation that denies to the Federal
courts the jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of an act of Congress."). The debate on the
House floor concerned H.R. 3313, a bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to limit federal court
jurisdiction over questions under the Marriage Protection Act of 2004. See id. at H6580.
3. H.R. REP. No. 108-691, at 14-15, n.39 (2004) (citing Johnny H. Killian, Senior Specialist,
American Constitutional Law, American Law Division, Memorandum to House Committee on the
Judiciary re: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction of Federal Courts (Aug. 16, 2004)).
4. Id. at 96 (dissenting views) (emphasis added); see also id. (citing Henry Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362 (1953) and Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle Ill: Separatingthe Two Tiers
ofFederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985)).
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The members of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the
Constitution, including those who were elected to serve in the First
Congress, had a much more robust view of Congress's powers over the
federal courts than prevails today. The modem Supreme and lower federal
courts' involvement in virtually every detail of national policy has resulted
in the common presumption that such a situation is constitutionally required.
Yet the Constitution provides that the lower federal courts are entirely
creatures of Congress, as is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
excluding only cases within the Supreme Court's original jurisdictionthose "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be Party."5 By the terms of the Constitution, then, it is
up to Congress to decide whether and how to grant any of the federal courts
jurisdiction to decide cases, including those involving constitutional issues.
The sole exception is that the Constitution requires the Supreme Court to
hear cases within its very limited original jurisdiction.
That was also the understanding of the First Congress, as demonstrated
by its enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789,6 which provided that the
Supreme Court, regarding constitutional challenges to federal law, could
review only those final decisions of the state courts that held "against [the]
validity" of a federal statute or treaty.7 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, if
the highest state court held a federal law constitutional, no appeal was
allowed to any federal court, including the Supreme Court.
Not only did the Act limit federal court jurisdiction, but it did so in a
way that was specifically designed by Congress to effect a specific resultthe increased chance that federal laws would be upheld. If the highest state
court upheld a federal provision, there could be no appeal to federal court,
and the decision upholding the federal provision would stand.9 For the first
125 years of our nation's existence, the only state court judgments
reviewable in the Supreme Court or by any federal court absent diversity
jurisdiction were those in which the highest state courts had denied federal
claims or defenses.' 0 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, a denial of a federal

5. U.S. CONsT. art III, §2, cl. 2.
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
7. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 352 (1816); see also ROBERT L. STERN ET
AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 31 n.81 (7th ed. 1993) ("The 1914 legislation [substantively
amending the relevant portion of section 25 for the first time] gave the Supreme Court power to
review by certiorari state court decisions in favor of rights claimed under federal law; previously,
only state court decisions denying a federal right had been reviewable.") (citation omitted).
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
9. Id.

10. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 189 (1928) ("For one hundred and twenty-five years this
jurisdiction [created by the Judiciary Act of 17891 remained, in effect, as it was molded by the First
Congress. Even the powerful centralizing impulses of the Civil War left it unchanged.").
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claim or defense by the highest state court would result in another
opportunity for federal courts to reverse such state court decisions and
uphold the federal claims or defenses." On the other hand, if the highest
state court upheld a federal claim or defense, that was the end of the matter,
and no federal court would have the opportunity to hold otherwise and deny
such federal claims or defenses.12 The Judiciary Act of 1789 significantly
restricted the range of issues that could be decided by the newly-created
federal courts and the Supreme Court in other ways as well, 3 leaving a huge
variety of cases involving constitutional, tort, and contract issues beyond the
reach of any federal court.
The principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was Senator Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut, a greatly influential founder who had served as
one of five members of the Committee of Detail that issued the first draft of
the Constitution and who would later serve as the third Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.14 As Ellsworth wrote when he served on the Court, the
federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789 had "cognizance, not of cases
generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small
proportionof the cases which an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace.""
Senator Ellsworth was also the principal drafter of two other statutes
enacted in the First Congress: legislation that required certain process and
procedures to be used by the federal courts, including the Supreme Court;
and legislation defining federal crimes to include a provision that would
immediately remove a federal judge from office through means independent
of impeachment, namely conviction of bribery in federal court.16
Like the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Process Act of 1789 and the Crimes
Act of 1790, having been passed by the First Congress, are perhaps the
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
12. Id.
13. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 10 at 4, 12 ("We pay Oliver Ellsworth and his
associates ample homage by calling their handiwork [the Judiciary Act of 1789] a great law," while
noting that "[t]he content of jurisdiction conferred on the new judiciary was very limited in
comparison with what it now exercises.").
14. See William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN

MARSHALL 297 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) [hereinafter Casto, Oliver Ellsworth].
15. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11(1799) (emphasis added).
16. See WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 197 (1905) ("Three other
laws were passed by the first Congress to supplement the judiciary act [of 1789], and two of these
also were apparently from Ellsworth's hand; for he headed the committees which severally reported
an act additional to the judiciary act and an act to define crimes and offenses cognizable under the
authority of the United States [the Act of April 30, 1790]. He also helped to frame the third
supplementary law, which regulated process in the courts [the Act of September 29, 1789].") (citing
Senate Journals, 2d Sess., 12, 16, 17, 63 and Senate Journals, Ist Sess., 153).
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statutes most informative of an original understanding of Congress's
constitutional power over the federal judiciary. As has been observed by the
authors of the leading treatise on federal court jurisdiction, "the first
Judiciary Act is widely viewed as an indicator of the original understanding
of Article III and, in particular, of Congress' constitutional obligations
concerning the vesting of federal jurisdiction."" And as the Supreme Court
itself has recognized, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was "passed by the first
Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had
taken part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty
evidence of its true meaning.""
More recently, the Supreme Court has declared itself the "ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution,"' 9 which implies that it-and not Congressis also the ultimate arbiter of the powers of Congress over the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction. If that is true, then the Court alone is the master of its
own domain. The Supreme Court has also stated, albeit in dicta, that Article
III courts are "presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to
removal by impeachment." 2 0 However, both statements, in many ways, are
placed in doubt by the enactments of the First Congress and the actions of
the former members of the Constitutional Convention who served in the
First Congress.
This Article explores what the First Congress, speaking through three
foundational pieces of enacted legislation, had to say about the full extent of
Congress's power over the federal judiciary, and what today's Congress and
federal courts can learn from that understanding. It also explores how the
legislation passed by the First Congress reflects the traditional understanding
of the deference federal courts should give to the acts of the national
legislature-a deference that should give way only when such acts are
clearly unconstitutional. 21 Finally, this Article explores how the modem
Supreme Court's deviation from that traditional understanding threatens its
popular legitimacy today.22
In doing so, this Article attempts to present a picture of the bookends
that sit at either end of the Supreme Court's decisions throughout American
history. On one end sits the three statutes enacted by the First Congress,

17. RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, AND DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28 (4th ed. 1996).
18. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888).
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969) ("[I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.");
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution.").
20. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. I1, 16 (1955) (emphasis added).
21. See infra Part XIII.
22. See infra Part XIV.
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which served to anchor the federal judiciary to a limited jurisdiction in order
to provide robust protections for the acts of the legislature. On the other end
sits a modem Supreme Court whose tenuous 5-4 decisions striking down
democratically enacted legislation increasingly untether the Court from the
core concepts that framed the creation of the federal courts. With such
imbalanced bookends, it remains to be seen whether the volumes between
them can cohere much longer.
II.

JAMES MADISON AND THE CONVENTION DEBATES

The new Constitution provided the backdrop for the actions of the new
Congress, and any inquiry into Congress's power must start with the
constitutional text and the debate that preceded it.
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison, as a delegate from
Virginia, sought to confer upon Supreme Court judges an independent and
concurrent power to veto legislative enactments.23 However, Madison's
proposal made clear that if the Supreme Court were ever to veto legislation,
Congress could override that veto by a super-majority vote 24 in order to
maintain the legislature as the final arbiter of a law's constitutionality. Even
Mr. Mercer, who supported Madison's motion, did so on the grounds that he
preferred a judicial veto subject to a legislative override to an unchecked
power of the judiciary to declare laws void with no means of reversing such
decisions.25 In the end, Madison's motion was overwhelmingly defeated by
a vote of 3-826 after "Mr. Pinkney opposed the interference of the Judges in
the Legislative business ....

"2

Consequently, even Madison's proposal to

allow the Supreme Court to strike down legislation subject to the protection
of a Congressional override was rejected because it was perceived as
granting too much power to the Court.
The rejection of Madison's proposal that the Supreme Court should
have a definitive role in striking down legislation came even after the
jurisdiction of the Court was determined to be significantly confined. The
Committee of Detail had provided that "[t]he jurisdiction of the supreme
tribunal shall extend . .. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the

23. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 294-95 (1911)

(Journal) [hereinafter FARRAND].
24. Id. at 298 (Madison's Notes).
25. See id. ("Mr. Mercer heartily approved the motion ... [but] disapproved of the Doctrine that
the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have [final] authority to declare a law void.").
26. Id. at 295 (Journal); see also id. at 298 (Madison's Notes).
27. Id. at 298 (Madison's Notes).
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general (Legislature)."2 8 Mr. Johnson moved to insert the words "this
Constitution and the" so the phrase would read "the jurisdiction of the
supreme tribunal shall extend . .. to all cases, arising under this Constitution
and the laws passed by the general (Legislature)." 2 9 But Madison thought
this authority would be far too broad. Madison's own records of the debates
state:
[I] doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the
Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases
not of this nature ought not to be given to that [Judicial]
Department.30
Madison's doubts were apparently assuaged by assurances that it was
"generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to
cases of a JudiciaryNature."" Only subsequent to that assurance was the

vote on the motion unanimous. 32 What Madison meant by "cases of a
Judiciary Nature" is unclear, but it implies a limited set of issues over which
courts traditionally had authority, most likely the narrow issues of
punishment for contempt and the regulation of lawyers and juries. In any

28. Id. at 146.
29. Id. at 430 (Madison's Notes), 423 (Journal).
30. Id. at 430 (Madison's Notes) (emphasis added).
31. Id (emphasis added).
32. See id at 431 (Madison's Notes).
33. Early discussions of inherent authority in the federal courts reiterate familiar modern
understandings of the areas over which courts have inherent power. Such early discussions regard
the limited powers of courts to enforce sanctions for contempt and to regulate lawyers and juries.
See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United States v.
Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997) (claiming that, in holding defendant in
contempt, "[wie confine ourselves within the ancient limits of the law, recently retraced by
legislative provisions and judicial decisions"); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F. Cas. 359, 363-64
(C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 6616) (argument of counsel). State courts also asserted inherent authority to
punish contempt. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 3 S.C.L. (I Brev.) 155, 158 (S.C. 1802) (per curiam)
("Justices of peace have a power derived from the common law, and necessarily attached to their
offices, of committing and confining for gross misbehaviour in their presence . . . ."). Regarding the
regulation of lawyers, see, for example, King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.D. Pa.
1810) (No. 7814) (characterizing the right to inquire by what authority an attorney acted on his
client's behalf as one "inherent in all courts," but acknowledging that this inherent power "may be
taken away, or qualified by express statute; or additional cautions may be superadded"). Early state
courts also asserted authority over court personnel. See, e.g., Yates v. New York, 6 Johns. 337, 37273 (N.Y. 1810) (argument of counsel) (asserting that courts, including chancery courts, possess
inherent authority to direct and control court officers, including clerks, in the discharge of their
functions), overruled by Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861). Early federal courts
also asserted authority to regulate jurors. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579,
580 (1824) (explaining that "the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a
jury from giving any verdict" when justice requires it); United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622,
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case, the phrase "cases of a Judiciary Nature" certainly encompassed
something much less broad than all constitutional and federal legal issues.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

Having assured itself of the very limited nature of the Supreme Court's
inherent authority under the Constitution,34 the Convention approved a final
text.
Under that approved text, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
covers those cases it can hear in the first instance. The Constitution provides
that only two types of cases are within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court35 : Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 provides that "[i]n all
cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction."3 6

623 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858) (asserting the power to withdraw a juror if, while a party is
on trial before a jury, something occurs that "will occasion a total failure of justice if the trial
proceed"); Offutt v. Parrott, 18 F. Cas. 606, 607 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 10,453) (fining jurors who
escaped from the jury room). State courts asserted similar authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 494, 495 (1813) (recognizing inherent authority of a court to withdraw a
juror); Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Binn. 238, 242-43 (Pa. 1812) (asserting inherent authority of a court
to regulate what jurors take into the jury room). Also, Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the
Constitution,wrote that:
[T]here are certain incidental powers, which are supposed to attach to them, in common
with all other courts, when duly organized, without any positive enactment of the
legislature. Such are the power of the courts over their own officers, and the power to
protect them and their members from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1768

(Boston,

Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
34. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
35. However, the Constitution does not grant the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction.
See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
93 (1972); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930). Consequently, lower federal
courts can also hear such cases if Congress desires.
36. U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2, cl. 2. Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 2's reference to cases in which "a
State shall be Party" does not include suits by citizens against states. See United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621, 643-44 (1892) ("The words in the Constitution, 'in all cases . .. in which a state shall
be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction,' . . .do not refer to suits brought
against a State by its own citizens or by citizens of other States, or by citizens or subjects offoreign
States, even where such suits arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
because the judicial power of the United States does not extend to suits of individuals against
states.") (first emphasis added). The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Regarding the federal courts below the Supreme Court, Article III,
Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
37
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

Consequently, the Constitution grants Congress the rights to create lower
federal courts, to not create them, or to abolish them once created.
Regarding exceptions that might be made to federal court appellate
jurisdiction, the Constitution provides, in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2,
that "[i]n all the other Cases [other than those in which the Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction] ... the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make."3 Consequently, the Constitution

provides that Congress has plenary control over what cases might be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
IV. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (ALEXANDER HAMILTON)
Following the final drafting of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton,
along with James Madison and John Jay, wrote a series of newspaper articles
to convince the people of New York State to support the Constitution's
ratification. These articles became collectively known as the Federalist
Papers, and they contain some of Hamilton's views regarding the meaning
of the Constitution's text. These views are consistent with the understanding
that the federal judiciary was comparatively powerless under the
Constitution.
As Hamilton wrote in FederalistNo. 81, the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction under the Constitution was very limited, as "the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be confined to two classes of cases
[cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and cases in which a
State is a party], and those ofa nature rarely to occur."39
In FederalistNo. 80, Hamilton also defended the proposed Constitution
against claims that it would allow Congress to create an overly powerful
system of federal courts.40 In doing so, he emphasized the broad nature of
Congress's authority to amend federal court jurisdiction to remedy any
perceived abuses by the federal judiciary that might arise after their creation.
Hamilton wrote:

37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
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From this review of the particular powers of the federal
judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are
all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the
structure of that department and which were necessary to the
perfection of the system. If some partial inconveniences should
appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into
the plan it ought to be recollectedthat the national legislature will
have ample authorityto make such exceptions and to prescribesuch
regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these
inconveniences.4 1

It is important to note that Hamilton understood himself in Federalist
No. 80 to be discussing "the judicial authority of the Union," that is, the
judicial power generally and not just the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction.42 As a result, Hamilton's statement means that Congress can
exclude entire categories of cases from federal court review.
These statements regarding the constitutional text followed Hamilton's
clear statements that the Constitution would create only an extremely weak
judicial branch. He famously wrote in Federalist No. 78 that the federal
judiciary would have "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment" 43 and
that he viewed the federal judiciary as "the least dangerous" branch of
government." He also used yet stronger words, stating that the federal
judiciary is "beyond comparison the weakest of the three"A5 branches and
that of the three, "the JUDICIARY is next to nothing."46

41. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
42. Id. at 480. Hamilton reiterated this point in Federalist No. 81, this time focusing on the
Supreme Court: "To avoid all inconveniencies, it will be safest to declare generally that the Supreme
Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction [that] shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as
the national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify it in such a
manneras will best answer the ends ofpublicjustice and security." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 489
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (second emphasis added); see also id at 485
("[A]ppeals may be safely circumscribed within a narrow compass [by Congress].") (emphasis
added).
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
44. Id
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 186 (1802)).
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V. THE "JUDICIAL POWER" INTHE BROADER CONTEXT
OF THE CONVENTION

In fact, it was because the Founders understood the federal judiciary as
by far the weakest branch that they did not spend much time debating the
powers of the federal judiciary at the Constitutional Convention. Not only is
there no discussion of the phrase "judicial Power" in either the Convention
records or any of the four plans submitted to the Convention for
consideration,47 but that phrase was not added to the judiciary article until
very late in the work of the Committee of Detail.48
Regarding Article III's "vesting" clause, Article III, Section 1, Clause 1
of the Constitution vests judicial power in the manner prescribed in the
Constitution.4 9 It does not require Congress to vest complete jurisdiction in
the federal courts. The Constitution "vests" in the Supreme Court only its
limited, original jurisdiction "[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party .. ."s The word "shall" in this provision is not addressed to
Congress, just as the word "shall" in the constitutional clauses vesting the
legislative and executive authorities is not addressed to Congress.5 1
Similarly, where the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall
extend" to certain cases, it can only mean that such power shall extend to
such cases insofar as either the Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court or as the Constitution vests power in Congress to create

47. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, William Patterson of
New Jersey, and Alexander Hamilton of New York each submitted a plan of government to the
Convention. 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 20-22, 242-45, 291-93; 2 id. at 134-37; 3 id. at 595601. The delegates devoted the first half of the Convention to considering the resolutions submitted
by Randolph. See I id.; 2 id. at 1-129. On July 24, 1787, the Convention unanimously agreed not to
take specific action on the Patterson and Pinckney Plans, but to refer them, along with Randolph's
resolutions, to the Committee of Detail. See 2 id. at 98, 106. Hamilton's proposal was never
brought up for extended consideration. See id.
48. See 2 id. at 172, 186. The phrase "judicial Power" was first added to the beginning of Article
III in a late draft of the Committee of Detail in James Wilson's handwriting. See 2 id. at 163, 172.
In that draft, what is now Section 2 begins, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall
extend to all Cases ..... 2 id. at 172. Several weeks after the Committee of Detail issued its report,
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved to substitute the phrase "The judicial Power" for the
phrase "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." See 2 id. at 431. The Convention unanimously
accepted this change without recorded debate. See 2 id.
49. See U.S. CONsT. art. 111,§ 1, cl. I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . . ."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.").
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lower federal courts and Congress has in fact exercised that power by
statute.52
VI. OLIVER ELLSWORTH AND THE FIRST CONGRESS
The members of the First Congress who were most intimately involved
with the drafting of the laws that implemented Article III of the Constitution
and its provisions regarding the federal judiciary acted with the previously
discussed constitutional backdrop in mind.
Because so many Framers were elected to the First Congress, it is
widely accepted, including by the modem Supreme Court, that the
enactments of the First Congress provide "'contemporaneous and weighty
evidence' of the Constitution's meaning .... "" Of particular importance
regarding the creation of the federal judiciary was Oliver Ellsworth, who had
served as a Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional Convention, as one of
Connecticut's first two Senators, and as the third Chief Justice of the United
States.54
Not only was Ellsworth the principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of
1789 while he served in the Senate, but he had also earlier served as one of
only five members55 of the Constitutional Convention's Committee of

52. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 17, at 348 ("Although Article III states that 'the judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested' (emphasis added), Congress possesses significant powers
to apportion jurisdiction among state and federal courts and, in doing so, to define and limit the
jurisdiction of particular courts."); see also Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590,
619-20 (1874) ("[W]e find that this judicial power is by the Constitution vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish. Ofthese courts the Constitutiondefines
the jurisdiction ofnone but the Supreme Court. Of that court it is said, after giving it a very limited
original jurisdiction, that 'in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Congress may prescribe.' This latter clause has been the subject of construction in this court many
times, and the uniform and established doctrine is, that Congress having by the act of 1789 defined
and regulated this jurisdiction in certain classes of cases, this affirmative expression of the will of
that body is to be taken as excepting all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States
extends, than those enumerated.. . . We are under no necessity, then, of supposing that Congress, in
the section we are considering, intended to confer on the Supreme Court the whole power which, by
the Constitution, it was competent for Congress to confer in the class of cases embraced in that
section.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
53. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
790 (1983)); see also Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915, 919
(1988) (observing that the decisions of the First Congress "are viewed as a repository of insight into
the historical intent underlying article III").
54. See Casto, Oliver Ellsworth,supra note 14, at 297, 302.
55. See id. at 297.
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Detail,56 which issued the first draft of the Constitution and was responsible
for adding the phrase "judicial Power" to it.17 His role in subsequent events
strongly indicates Ellsworth may even have been the principal drafter of
Article III of the Constitution itself.58
Serving in the Senate in the First Congress, Ellsworth was both the
primary author of the Judiciary Act of 1789,59 as well as a key drafter of the
So great was the
Process Act of 17896 and the Crimes Act of 1790.
respect that Ellsworth was shown by his Senate colleagues in the First
Congress "that Aaron Burr joked, 'if [Senator] Ellsworth had happened to
spell the name of the Deity with two d's, it would have taken the Senate
three weeks to expunge the superfluous letter."' 62
Because of his combined influence on the creation and development of
the federal judicial branch, historian Frank Gaylord Cook dubbed Ellsworth
the "father of the national judiciary,"63 and historian William Garrott Brown
wrote "if any one man can be called the founder, not of [the Supreme Court]
only, but of the whole system of federal courts. . . Ellsworth is the man."

56. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 97, 106.
57. See id. at 172.
58. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 197 ("Apart from [Ellsworth's] authorship of the law [the
Judiciary Act of 1789], his appointment to the first place on the [Senate Judiciary] committee
strengthens the conjecture that it was he who, on the committee of five in the Constitutional
Convention, had drafted the article on the judiciary.").
59. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 27-53 (1995) [hereinafter CAsTO, EARLY
REPUBLIC]; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 47 (1997). Philip Doddridge of
Virginia in the House of Representatives, years later, incorrectly stated that James Madison was the
author of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See GALES AND SEATON'S REGISTER OF DEBATES IN
CONGRESS 2899 (May 9, 1832). However, Madison subsequently wrote to Doddridge on June 6,
1832 and corrected him, stating that the drafting of the Act "was understood, truly I believe, to have
Letter from James Madison to Phillip Doddridge (June 6,
proceeded from Mr. Ellsworth .....
1832), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 221-22 (J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1865).
60. See CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 27-53; CURRIE, supranote 59, at 47.
61. See Senate Calendar Entry of Jan. 26, 1790, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, at 1741 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) ("Ellsworth
presented a bill defining the crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authorityof the
United States, and their punishment, which was read.").
62. WILLIAM R. CASTO, OLIVER ELLSWORTH AND THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC I
(1997) [hereinafter CASTO, CREATION].
63. See Frank Gaylord Cook, Oliver Ellsworth 1745-1807, in I GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS
335 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907).
64. Id.
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A.

The JudiciaryAct of 1789

During the First Congress, Ellsworth was the chairman of the Senate
committee that was established to craft a bill to create and organize the
federal judiciary. 5 James Madison would later recall that "[i]t may be taken
for certain . .. that the bill organizing the Judicial Department originated in
[Ellsworth's] draft, and that it was not materially changed in its passage into
a law."66
One of the most significant provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
section 25, which Ellsworth authored.6
Section 25 of the Act provided as follows:
[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court .. . of a
State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in
question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or
an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such their validity[;] or where is
drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution,
or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or
exemption specially set up or claimed by either party . .. [such
decision] may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court of the United States ....
In essence, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, if the highest state court
held a federal law constitutional, no appeal was allowed to any federal court,
including the Supreme Court. 69 Thus, the Act denied the inferior federal

65. See BROWN, supranote 16, at 184.
66. Letter from James Madison to Joseph Wood (Feb. 27, 1836), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 428 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
67. See CHARLENE BANGS BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE

FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 46 (1989) ("Sections ten through twenty-five [of the
Judiciary Act of 1789], which relate to jurisdictional issues, were Ellsworth's creation.... Ellsworth
was the main architect of the bill. .. . He also authored the extremely important Section 25 . . . .").
68. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257).

69. The Supreme Court described the operation of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in
detail in 1840. See Kentucky v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56, 57-58 (1840) ("The question depends
altogether upon the construction of the second clause of the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789,
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courts original jurisdiction and the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to
review the constitutionality of potentially thousands of Congressional laws
when the highest state court had upheld its constitutionality.
Ellsworth and the First Congress used its powers over federal court
jurisdiction very aggressively, 70 and that decision has vestiges in current law
even today. As a leading treatise pointed out, "Beginning with the first
Judiciary Act in 1789, Congress has never vested the federal courts with the
entire 'judicial Power' that would be permitted by Article II." 7 As scholars
of federal court jurisdiction have observed:
[T]he 1789 [Judiciary] Act ... made no use of the grant of judicial
power over cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . In the category of cases arising under federal law,

Congress provided no general federal question jurisdiction in the
lower federal courts. Nor, under section 25, did the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction extend to cases originating in the state
courts in which the federal claim was upheld.72
As another commentator has written, "Under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
cases could arise that clearly fall within the judicial power of the United
States but that were excluded from the combined appellate and original
jurisdiction of the federal courts[,]" including cases in which a state court
erroneously voided a state statute for violating the Federal Constitution. In
sum, "the first Congress's allocation of jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act is
inconsistent with the thesis that the Constitution requires the entire judicial

which provides that the final judgment or decree of the highest Court of Law or Equity in a state, in
which a decision could be had, may be re-examined in this Court upon a writ of error, 'where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground
of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is
in favour of such their validity.' Under this clause of the act of Congress, three things must concur
to give this Court jurisdiction. 1. The validity of a statute of a state, or of an authority exercised
under a state, must be drawn in question. 2. It must be drawn in question upon the ground that it is
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. 3. The decision of the state Court
must be in favour of their validity.") (quoting The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257)).
70. see CASTO, CREATION, supra note 62, at 65 ("[T]he Constitution provided a mechanism for
limiting the Supreme Court's potentially immense appellate power. The Court's appellate
jurisdiction was subject to 'such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.'
Ellsworth had been a member of the Committee of Detail that added this clause to the Constitution,
and he fully understood the clause's potential reach. He made extensive use of this grant of
legislative authority.").
71. FALLON ET AL., supra note 17, at 349.
72. See id. at 29.
73. William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understandingof Its Authority Over the Federal
Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C.L. REv. 1101, 1118 (1985) [hereinafter Casto, First Congress's
Understanding].
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power of the United States to be vested in the aggregate in the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts."74
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reflected the view Ellsworth
expressed during the ratification debates. Advocating for Connecticut's
adoption of the Constitution, Ellsworth wrote that "nothing hinders ... that
all the cases, except the few in which it [the Supreme Court] has original and
not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first instance be had in the state
courts."75 Also during those debates, Ellsworth wrote that a review of cases
beyond the state courts would be subject to regulation by Congress, stating,
"We are further told 'that the judicial departments, or those courts of law, to
be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive.' . . . [Yet such] courts are not

to intermeddle with your internal policy, and will have cognizance only of
those subjects which are placed under the control of a national

Ellsworth further wrote that the judiciary under the
legislature."76
Constitution "extends only to objects and cases specified" by authorities
other than the judiciary itself, namely the Constitution and Congress.
Section 25 also reflected the views of William Paterson of New Jersey,
who, along with Ellsworth, was a principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of
So clear was the power of Congress over the jurisdiction of the
1789.
federal courts in 1789 that Paterson wrote that "[e]ver since the Adoption of
the Const[itution] I have considered federal Courts of subordinate
Jurisd[iction] ... inevitable."9

Section 25 reflected the views of Roger Sherman as well. Sherman,
who served alongside Ellsworth as one of Connecticut's first two Senators,
and whom eminent historian Clinton Rossiter considered one of the most
80
influential members of the Constitutional Convention, wrote that:

74. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
75. Oliver Ellsworth, Letter to the Landholders and Farmers (Dec. 10, 1787) in THE
FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 575, 578 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
76. Oliver Ellsworth, Letters of a Landholder, V, in ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, at 159 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (emphasis added).
77. Oliver Ellsworth, Letters of a Landholder, VI, in ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, supra note 76, at 164.
78. Casto, First Congress's Understanding,supra note 73, at 1105 (noting that "Paterson acted
as [Ellsworth's] principal lieutenant" in drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789).
79. Id. at 1133 (reprinting in Appendix C Paterson's notes for a speech given on the Senate floor
on June 23, 1789) (emphasis added). Johnson's Dictionary, first published in 1755 and one of the
most influential dictionaries of the English language, defined "subordinate" as "inferiour in order,
subject." JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 328 (Charles J. Hendee ed., 1836).
80. See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION, ch. 10 (1966).
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It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of
the Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among the
states, to extend the judicial powers of the United States to the
enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such exceptions
as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce them to
cases of such magnitude and importance as cannot safely be trusted
to the final decision of the courts of particular states . . . .81
B.

The Pro-FederalGovernment Policy ofSection 25 of the JudiciaryAct
of l789

Not only did section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 prohibit federal
court review of a certain class of cases, but it did so pursuant to a policy that
explicitly protected federal statutory law and other federal claims from
attack by state and federal courts. As historian William Casto has observed,
"the drafters of the Judiciary Act viewed the federal courts as a tool to effect
specific substantive results.... To a significant degree, they shaped the

federal courts' jurisdiction to assure that specific parties would prevail in
specific categories of litigation." 8 2
Section 25 comported with Ellsworth's expressed views during the
ratification debates, where he made clear that the proposed Constitution was
necessary to create a more energetic system that could enforce national
interests, especially those national powers required for "raising and
supporting armies [to] protect the people against the violence of wicked and
overgrown citizens, and invasion by the rest of mankind.... This power is
also necessary to restrain the violence of seditious citizens.

. .

. A people

cannot long retain their freedom, whose government is incapable of
protecting them."" Ellsworth also argued that "[i]n all these matters and
powers given to Congress, their ordinances must be the supreme law of the
land, or they are nothing."84

81. Roger Sherman, Observationson the New FederalConstitution (A Citizen of New Haven, II)
(Dec. 25, 1788), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 76,
at 240-41 (emphasis added). Sherman also clearly recognized that Congress need not create any
lower federal courts at all, writing, "[T]he constitution does not make it necessary that any inferior
tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done, if found necessary...." Id. at 241 (emphasis
added).
82. CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 52 (emphasis added).
83. Oliver Ellsworth, Letters of a Landholder, V, in ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, supranote 76, at 156-57.
84. Id. at 160. The safety valve created by section 25-in which federal courts would have an
opportunity to overturn state court decisions that ruled against assertions of rights under federal law
but not to overturn state court decisions that upheld assertions of rights under federal law-was
foreshadowed by James Madison during the ratification debates, in which he stated he believed the
time had not yet come when state courts could be trusted to wholly decide federal issues. In 1788,
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In a series of early decisions, the Supreme Court made clear its
understanding of the Founders' distrust of state courts' willingness to uphold
federal legislation, as expressed in the Judiciary Act of 1789.85 Chief Justice
Taney wrote in Bank ofKentucky v. Griffith:86

The policy of this distinction [made under section 25] is obvious
enough. The power given to the Supreme Court by this act of
Congress was intended to protect the general government in the free
and uninterrupted exercise of the powers conferred on it by the
Constitution, and to prevent any serious impediment from being
thrown in its way while acting within the sphere of its legitimate
authority. The right was therefore given to this Court to re-examine
the judgments of the state Courts, where the relative powers of the
general and state government had been in controversy, and the
decision had been in favour of the latter. It may have been
apprehended that the judicial tribunals of the states would incline to
the support of state authority, against that of the general
government ....
But when, as in the case before us, the state
authority or state statute is decided to be unconstitutional and void
in the state tribunal, it cannot under that decision come in collision
with the authority of the general government; and the right to reexamine it here is not necessary to protect this government in the
exercise of its rightful powers. In such a case, therefore, the writ of
error is not given; and the one now before us must be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.17
A few decades later, in Murdock v. City of Memphis,"1 the Court

reiterated its understanding of Congress's power to limit federal court
jurisdiction in the manner in which it did in 1789. In that case, the Court
stated:
James Madison said, "It will also be in the power of Congress to vest this [judicial] power [over
federal issues] in the state courts, both inferior and superior. This they will do, when they find the
tribunals of the states established on a good footing." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 536 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed.
1866) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
85. Chief Justice Marshall put it this way: "It would be hazarding too much to assert, that the
judicatures of the States will be exempt from the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are
influenced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 386-87 (1821).
86. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56 (1840).
87. Id. at 58.
88. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).

865

[I]t is only upon the existence of certain questions in the case that
this court can entertain jurisdiction at all. Nor is the mere existence
of such a question in the case sufficient to give jurisdiction-the
question must have been decided in the State court. Nor is it
sufficient that such a question was raised and was decided. It must
have been decided in a certain way, that is, against the right set up
under the Constitution, laws, treaties, or authority of the United
States. The Federal question may have been erroneously decided.
It may be quite apparent to this court that a wrong constructionhas
been given to the Federal law, but if the right claimed under it by
plaintiff in error has been conceded to him, this court cannot
entertainjurisdiction of the case, so very careful is the statute [of
1789] to narrow, to limit, and define the jurisdiction which this
court exercises over the judgments of the State courts.

And seventeen years later, the Supreme Court stated in Missouri v.

Andriano:90

While there is some force in the argument that the right of review in
cases involving the construction of a federal statute should be
mutual, the act limits such right to cases where the state court has
decided against the title, right, privilege or immunity set up or
claimed under the [federal] statute....
The object of the present judiciary act was not to give a right of
review wherever the validity of an act of Congress was drawn in
question, but to prevent the courts of the several States from
impairing or frittering away the authority of the federal government,
by giving a construction to its statutes adverse to such authority. Of
course, if the construction given by the state court to the act under
which the right is claimed be favorable to such right, no such reason
exists for a review by this court.9 '
More recently, Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1939 that "Section 25 of the
First Judiciary Act gave reviewing power to this Court only over state court
decisions denying a claim of federal right. This restriction was, of course,
born of fear of disobedience by the state judiciaries of national authority." 92
The motivation behind the policy embedded in section 25 had long been
acknowledged by state supreme courts as well.93

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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Id. at 626 (second emphasis added).
138 U.S. 496 (1891).
Id. at 499-500.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 466 n.6 (1939).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:

[Vol. 37: 847, 2010]

Congress'sPower to Regulate the FederalJudiciary
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Finally, legal scholars in the twentieth-century also recognized the
substantive preference for federal law embedded in section 25.
[Tihe appellate jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court] extends no further than to cases in
which the judgment is in favour of the legislation or authority to which the federal
constitution, or an Act of Congress, is supposed to be repugnant; in other words, it
extends no further than is necessary to maintain the supremacy of federal [law].
Moore v. Chadwick, 8 Watts & Serg. 49, 53 (Pa. 1844). And as the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court described the views of those who opposed the policy embodied in section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, such opponents:
f[ound] fault with congress for what is said to be a distinction invidious to the state
tribunals made by the statute under consideration, by which it is said that the decision of
the state tribunals, if they are in favor of the validity of a law of congress, [] are presumed
to be right, and no appeal is given, but if such decisions are against the validity of such
law, then they are presumed to be wrong, and therefore an appeal is given.
Abelman v. Booth, 1859 WL 5159, *12 (Wis. 1859).
94. Writing in 1908, before he was elected President in 1912, Woodrow Wilson observed:
A litigant in a state court may contend, for example, that some statute, or even some
constitutional provision, of the state, under which his opponent is suing him or making
defense, is inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. If the court uphold
him in this contention and treat the law which he challenges as null and void because
inconsistent with federal law, there is an end of the matter. The court has upheld federal
law against the law of the state, and no appeal can be taken to a court of the United
States,-which could do no more. But if the court disallow the plea and declare the state
law valid notwithstanding its alleged conflict with the law of the United States, the
defeated litigant may take an appeal to the courts of the United States; for with a federal
tribunal must lie the final determination of the conflict, lest the state court might have
been biased in favor of the law and privilege of the state under whose authority it acted.
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (1917).

The American Bar Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation described the policy behind section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as follows:
The historic reason for the limitation in the original Judiciary Act, to wit, that the writ of
error should only be permitted where the decision in the state court had been adverse to
the claimant, was this: It was thought that the main ground for giving the jurisdiction was
that there might be a jealousy of the federal government on the part of the state courts.
Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent
Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 34 ANN. REP. OF A.B.A. 448, 463 (1911); see also
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 10, at 190-91 ("Fear of disobedience of national authority by
state judiciaries determined this legislation [the Judiciary Act of 1789]. The framers of the Judiciary
Act guarded against the danger of state judges whose inclination towards support of action by their
'sovereign states' would lead them to be unmindful of the national interest as expressed in the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.").
And Professor Wright has observed:
From 1789 to 1914 [when section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was substantively
amended] the jurisdiction over state courts was limited to cases in which the state court
had held some federal act invalid, or had upheld the validity of a state act against a claim
based on the federal Constitution or laws. The Supreme Court could not review a statecourt decision that upheld the federal claim and found a state act invalid.... The reason
for such a distinction was clear enough. When the state court had yielded to the authority
of the federal government, and had held its own statute invalid, appeal to the Supreme

867

C. Supportfor the JudiciaryAct of 1789 in the FirstCongress

In the first Congress, fifty-four members had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention or their state ratification conventions.95 When the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was brought up for a vote in the First Congress,
neither that group nor any other Member of Congress expressed any
concerns that it exceeded Congress's constitutional authority over the federal
courts.
James Madison spoke in favor of the Act during House debate on the
legislation. At the conclusion of the debate, Madison gave the legislation
his endorsement and voted for it.97 Although there is no roll call vote on
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the House recorded in the
Congressional Record,98 "[t]he principal defenders of the [Judiciary Act of
1789 in the House] were the foremost men in the chamber,-Madison,
Sherman, Ames and Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, Benson and Lawrence, of
New York, and William Smith of South Carolina."99 The Act also passed
the Senate by a vote of 14-6, with eight of the ten former delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voting for it. 00

Court was thought unnecessary to protect the federal government in the exercise of its
rightful powers.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 779-80 (5th ed. 1994); see also Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954) ("The prime function
envisaged for judicial review-in relation to federalism-was the maintenance of national
supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states . . . .").
95. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (Richard B. Morris ed., 6th ed. 1982).
96. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 843-44 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (supporting the creation of lower
federal courts on the grounds that "a review of the constitution of the courts in many States will
satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of the Federal laws").
97. See Gazette of the United States, Sept. 19, 1789, at 3, col. 2 ("Mr. Madison and Mr. Benson
made a few observations .... [The bill] is as good as we can at present make it .... [T]he bill had
been in existence many months-had been printed for the inspection of the members, and had been a
long time in their hands.-That it had undergone a lengthy discussion in committee . . .") (also
recording Madison voting "aye" on the bill).
98. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 928-29 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ("The bill for establishing the
Judicial Courts of the United States was read the third time and passed.").
99. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 196.
100. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Bassett, Ellsworth, Few, Johnson,
Morris, Paterson, Read, and Strong voting for, Butler and Langdon voting against). While one
cannot know from such votes whether those voting against it did so because they believed it was
unconstitutional, surely no one who voted for it did so believing it was unconstitutional. Senate
debates were closed to the public during its early years, and no official records of Senate debates
exist prior to the time it passed a motion to make its proceedings a matter of public record in 1794.
See Senate Journals, 3d. Cong., Ist Sess., 33. The debates were not published until after Ellsworth
had left the Senate. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 181.
Shortly after the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted into law, Congress asked Edmund
Randolph, former delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Virginia and the first Attorney
General of the United States, to submit a report and recommendation on "matters relative to the
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D. Cases Dismissed Under Section 25 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789

The Supreme Court dismissed many cases under section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and in doing so it never expressed any concerns
regarding its constitutionality.
Felix Frankfurter and James Landis identified sixteen cases between
1789 and 1914 in which the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction because the
state court had upheld a federal claim or defense.'0 o In many of these cases,
constitutional issues were raised, but the Supreme Court still dismissed them
under section 25.o2 The Court relied on this limitation of its jurisdiction in
administration of justice under the authority of the United States." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1760
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834). In that report, Attorney General Randolph clearly recognized the plenary
power of Congress to control federal court jurisdiction. Describing the amount in controversy
limitation, discussed later, for example, Randolph wrote, "The Supreme Court, though inherent in
the Constitution, was to receive the first motion from Congress; [and] the inferior courts must have
slept forever without the pleasure of Congress. Can the sphere of authority over [amount in
controversy jurisdiction] be more enlarged?" 1 AM. STATE PAPERS (Misc.) 34 n.6 (1834).
101. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supranote 10, at 190 n.20. The cases cited by Frankfurter and
Landis are Baker v. Baldwin, 187 U.S. 61 (1902); Kizer v. Texarkana & Ft. Smith Ry., 179 U.S. 199
(1900); De Lamar's Nev. Gold Mining Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U.S. 523 (1900); Jersey City & Bergen
R.R. v. Morgan, 160 U.S. 288 (1895); Missouri ex rel. Carey v. Andriano, 138 U.S. 496 (1891);
Ryan v. Thomas, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 603 (1866); Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512 (1863);
Reddall v. Bryan, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 421 (1860); Burke v. Gaines, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 388 (1856);
Linton v. Stanton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 423 (1851); Strader v. Baldwin, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 261 (1850);
Walker v. Taylor, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 64 (1847); Fulton v. MAffee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 149 (1842);
Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56 (1840); Montgomery v. Hernandez,25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 129 (1827); Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268 (1806).
102. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, at 1-2, Baker v. Baldwin (claim that "the legal tender
provisions of the Act of Congress of February 28, 1878 ... are unconstitutional and void .... [T]he
answer of the defendant specifically insisted that the legal tender provisions of the Act of February
28, 1878, are not within the power of Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof, and are
in conflict with the provision of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and quoting lower
court judge as stating, "The sole question presented is whether the act in question making the silver
dollar of 412.5 grains troy of standard silver a full legal tender for all debts and dues, public and
private, is constitutional.") (on file with author); Statement of Case, Brief and Argument on behalf of
Plaintiff in Error at 7, Missouri v. Andriano, No. 127 (Oct. 18, 1887) ("[l]t appearing that the
constitutional questions so presented were, by the highest court of the State, decided adversely to
plaintiff in error, the revising power of this Court is properly invoked.") (on file with author); Brief
of Defendant in Error, On Motion to Dismiss the Writ of Error at 3, 5, Roosevelt v. Meyer ("The
plaintiff in error thereupon brings this writ of error under the 25th section of the judiciary act of
1789, and the defendant in error now moves to dismiss the writ on the ground that this Court has no
jurisdiction under the 25th section of said act, inasmuch as the highest court of law and equity of the
State, in which a decision in the suit could be had, decided in favor of the validity of the act of
Congress of 25th of February, 1862, which was the only statute of the United States drawn in
question in the case. ... The question regarding the validity of any act of Congress will always
involve the construction of one or more sections of the Constitution. The validity of an act depends
upon the power of Congress to pass it, and this power depends upon the Constitution, as the source
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its decisions in several other cases as well, 03 and in at least one of those
additional cases constitutional issues had been raised. 1'
Even by 1874, the Supreme Court had dismissed so many cases under
section 25 that it remarked, in Murdock v. City ofMemphis: os

The twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789 has been the subject
of innumerable decisions, some of which are to be found in almost
every volume of the reports from that year down to the present.
These form a system of appellate jurisprudence relating to the
exercise of the appellate power of this court over the courts of the
States. 06

of all its powers. Either party in any suit, where such a question arises, must claim under some
section of the Constitution, for or against the validity of the act.") (on file with author).
103. See, e.g., Iowa v. Rood, 187 U.S. 87, 93-94 (1902) (dismissing writ of error because the
decision below was not adverse to a right claimed under federal law); Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-38 (1874) (relying in part on the rule that its jurisdiction does not
extend to state court judgments upholding federal rights); McIntire v. Wood, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504,
506 (1813) (explaining that limitations on the circuit court's jurisdiction meant that federal questions
would arise in state courts, subject to review in the Supreme Court when the federal right is denied,
noting that Congress thought this "sufficient at present for all the political purposes intended to be
answered" by Article Ill).
104. Iowa, 187 U.S. at 91, 93-94 (1902) ("The real question then is whether the sovereignty of the
State over the beds of its inland lakes rests upon some statute or provision of the Constitution, or
upon general principles of the common law which long antedated the Constitution, and had their
origin in rights conceded to the Crown centuries before the severance of our relations with the
mother country ... Had the decision of the [state] Supreme Court been adverse to the plaintiffs, who
claimed title under the swamp land act, it is possible that a writ of error might have lain from this
court, but we have frequently held that to sustain such writ, the decision must be adverse to a right
claimed under an act of Congress, or to the exercise of an authority granted by the United States.");
see also Brief in Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa at 94, Iowa v. Rood, No. 17,738
(Iowa May 5, 1900) (Transcript of Record) ("The court erred in holding that the Constitution of the
United States . .. prohibited the State of Iowa from questioning the legality of the acts of the Land
Commissioner. . . .") (on file with author).
105. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
106. Id. at 630. Despite the widespread enforcement of the Judiciary Act of 1789's limitation on
the Court's jurisdiction, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that this limitation, which is based on a
distinction between a state decision that denies a federal claim or defense and one that upholds such
a claim or defense "is largely, and perhaps wholly, an optical illusion." Akhil Reed Amar, The TwoTiered Structure of the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1530 (1990). Amar writes
that "[in virtually every case in which one party argues for a federal 'right,' the other side can argue
that it has a federal 'immunity'-which is simply another way of saying that one's opponent has no
federal right." Id. According to this view, the sixteen cases identified by Frankfurter and Landis in
which the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction because the state court had upheld the federal claim or
defense only illustrate that section 25 of the Judiciary Act was "a trap for unwary lawyers, for it
required them to package their claims of error with great care." Id. at 1531. But as Professor Daniel
Meltzer has pointed out, "Amar's usage seems more than a bit unconventional" by viewing an
"immunity" as equivalent to the lack of a claim. Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of
Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1588-89 (1990). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself explicitly
rejected Professor Amar's equivalency argument, explaining in one case that the defendant's
contention was "only a denial of the claim by [the] plaintiff" and that "although denying plaintiffs
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VII. THE POLICY BEHIND THE 1914 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 25 OF THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF

1789

Congress did not grant a more general federal question authority to the
lower federal courts until after the Civil War, 07 and Congress did not grant
the Supreme Court the authority to review state court rulings upholding
claims of federal right until 1914.108 Until 1914, then, neither the Supreme
Court nor the lower federal courts could review the constitutionality of
potentially thousands of federal laws.
Until section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was amended to enlarge
the federal courts' jurisdiction, controversy occasionally surrounded its
unique method of allowing the review of some constitutional and other legal
challenges, but not others. Decisions of state courts striking down popular
legislation under federal constitutional provisions, which could not be
appealed to federal courts, were condemned in states such as Kentucky and

claim, [the] defendant did not pretend to set up any right it had under any statute of the United
States." Jersey City & Bergen R.R. v. Morgan, 160 U.S. 288, 292-93 (1895). Even earlier, in
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874), the Court reiterated that it could not
review state decisions that upheld federal rights under the carefully worded Judiciary Act of 1789:
Nor is it sufficient that [a federal question] was raised and was decided. It must have
been decided in a certain way, that is, against the right set up under the Constitution,
laws, treaties, or authority of the United States. The Federal question may have been
erroneously decided. It may be quite apparent to this court that a wrong construction has
been given to the Federal law, but if the right claimed under it by plaintiff in error has
been conceded to him, this court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the case, so very careful
is the statute, both of 1789 and of 1867, to narrow, to limit, and define the jurisdiction
which this court exercises over the judgments of the State courts.
Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 626. And in 1863, counsel made the following point that counters
Professor Amar's essential argument:
The question regarding the validity of any act of Congress will always involve the
construction of one or more sections of the Constitution. The validity of an act depends
upon the power of Congress to pass it, and this power depends upon the Constitution, as
the source of all its powers. Either party in any suit, where such a question arises, must
claim under some section of the Constitution, for or against the validity of the act. If the
decision is in favor of the validity, it may, in one sense, be said that what the other party
claimed, was disallowed.
If the overruling of such claims could answer the provisions of the 25th section to give
this Court jurisdiction, then thefirst subdivision might be renderednugatory in any case
by a certificate of the court below, similar to that in the present case.
Brief of Defendant in Error, on Motion to Dismiss the Writ of Error at 5, Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68
U.S. (I Wall.) 512 (1863) (emphasis added) (on file with author). In that case, the Supreme Court
agreed with counsel and dismissed the case as beyond its jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of
1789. See Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 512 (1863).
107. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
108. See Judiciary Act of 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (1914).
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New York.'0 9 Proposals were also made to make it more difficult for the
Supreme Court to strike down state statutes or acts of Congress, even when
it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a state court."o By 1859, the Chief
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was led to write, regarding the
debate concerning whether state or federal courts, or some other entity,
should be the final arbiters regarding whether federal provisions violated
state laws, that "we have arrived at a point in our system of double
allegiance, where 'fidelity to the state is treason to the United States, and
treason to her, fidelity to them' . . . ."'"

In the end, commentators agree that the 1914 amendment to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to cover state judgments upholding federal claims and defenses, was
"prompted largely by the decision in Ives v. South Buffalo R[ailwa]y,"ll 2

109. See Charles Warren, Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1913) ("In
1819, to avert complete financial ruin of the debtor classes, the Kentucky Legislature passed various
laws staying levy of executions .... In 1820, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held these statutes
unconstitutional as impairing the [federal] obligation of contract. The decisions were followed by
violent protests.. . . No appeal, however, to the United States Supreme Court was possible."); see
also id. at 2 ("The [1911] decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Ives case invalidating
the New York form of a workman's compensation law [under the federal constitution], has given an
especial impetus to the feeling that some method ought to be found by which an appeal from such a
decision might be taken to the National Supreme tribunal." (citing Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.,
201 N.Y. 276 (1911))).
110. Id. at 27, 33 ("[In 1823] Senator Johnson of Kentucky introduced a resolution to instruct the
Judiciary Committee to inquire into the expediency of amending the Judiciary Act so as to require
concurrence of seven judges in any opinion involving the validity of State statutes or acts of
Congress.... On March 11, 1824, Senator Martin Van Buren reported a bill which, as amended,
provided for concurrences by seven judges out often, and required each judge to express and record
a separate opinion.... [On] January 21, 1829[,] the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives, through Philip P. Barbour of Virginia. . . reported a bill requiring concurrence of
five judges out of seven in holding any legislative act or State constitution to be invalid. The report
was a somewhat vigorous assault on the Supreme Court. .. ."); see also 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 396 n.l (noting Senator Webster's remarks that "I shall call up some
bills reported by our [Judiciary] committee. . . . The gentlemen of the West will propose a clause,
requiring the assent of a majority of all the judges to a judgment, which pronounces a state law void,
as being in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States." (letter from Representative
Daniel Webster to Justice Joseph Story, Apr. 10, 1824)) (alterations in original) (internal quotations
omitted); Letter from Justice Story to His Wife (Jan. 28, 1831), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH
STORY 43 (William W. Story ed., 1851) ("[A] most important and alarming measure [was
introduced to repeal the section 25 of the Judiciary Act]. If it should prevail .. . it would deprive the
Supreme Court of the power to revise the decisions of the State Courts and State Legislatures, in all
cases in which they were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. So that all laws passed,
and all decisions made, however destructive to the National Government, would be utterly without
redress.... [T]he introduction of it shows the spirit of the times."). See generally Warren, supra
note 109, at 3-4 (discussing similar disputes regarding the extent of federal court jurisdiction over
state court decisions in Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, South Carolina, California, and Wisconsin).
111. Abelman v. Booth, 1859 WL 5159, at *2 (Wis. Dec. 14, 1859).
112.

See FALLON, ET AL., supra note 17, at 493; see also ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., FEDERAL

COURTS: THEORY & PRACTICE 1369-70 (1996) ("The amendment was a reaction to Ives.. . .");
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and by the desire to allow federal courts to overturn that and similar
decisions. Just as section 25 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789 was based
on a desire for certain substantive results from the courts-that is, a
preference for upholding federal law-the 1914 amendment that expanded
Supreme Court jurisdiction beyond that granted in section 25 was also based
on a desire for substantive results-the upholding of state workers'
compensation laws.
The story of the achievement of that policy preference is as follows. In
Ives v. South Buffalo Railway,"3 the New York Court of Appeals struck

down the popular New York law that was the first workers' compensation
statute in the country on the grounds that it violated the railroad's rights
under both the New York and U.S. Constitutions.1 4 The decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, however, could not be reviewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court because it was based on a federal defense under the federal
Constitution that had been upheld by the state court." 5 In response, the
citizens of New York amended the state constitution to permit such
legislation and reenacted the statute.'6 But that still did not clear the way
for upholding the New York workers' compensation statute as long as the
New York Court of Appeals maintained its view that the statute violated the
federal Constitution. This was all the more frustrating for the statute's
supporters, because the same year that Ives was decided, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a federal workers' safety law-the Federal
Employers' Liability Act-that gave good reason to believe the Court might
likewise uphold the New York statute." 7 Consequently, the statute's
supporters had to find another way to reverse the New York Court of
Appeals's interpretation of the federal Constitution.
National legal organizations took up the cause. Starting in 1911, the
American Bar Association advocated expansion of the Supreme Court's

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (12th ed. 1991) (remarking that Ives "provoked the
1914 change"); 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4006,

at 121-22 (1977) ("A major expansion occurred in 1914, in reaction to an unpopular decision in
which the New York Court of Appeals had held a state workmen's compensation statute invalid
under both the federal and state constitutions.").
113. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
114. Id.at437.
115. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 10, at 195 ("[A flederal right had been vindicated,
not denied. Under the existing appellate jurisdiction there was no way of reviewing the Ives result
by the Supreme Court.").
116. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1917).
117. See Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
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jurisdiction to address cases such as Ives."'8 The ABA's president, William
Howard Taft, along with Elihu Root, a Republican Senator from New York,
spoke in favor of the expansion of Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear Ives
and similar cases before the House Judiciary Committee in 1914."9
Congress, following the ABA's lead,12 o enacted an amendment to the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The legislative history of the 1914 amendment is
replete with references to the Ives case. The Senate Report stated:
The particular case which best illustrates the reason for [our]
action is the Ives case in New York ....
The people of New York have changed their constitution so as to
permit of a workmen's compensation law and have passed such a
law. They have no means of securing a review by the Supreme
Court of the United States of the question ... because ... the
Judicial Code allows a review by the Supreme Court of the United
States only when the decision is adverse to the claim of right under
the Federal Constitution.121

118. See Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate ProposedLaws to
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 35 ANN. REP. OF A.B.A. 557, 558 (1912)
(reporting that the Committee had "done all in [its] power to procure the passage of these bills").
119. See Elihu Root, Reforms in JudicialProcedure:Address Before the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives (Feb. 27, 1914), in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP

467, 467 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916). As Root explained:
There have been some cases in which the decisions of the courts of last resort in states
have been in favor of the claim, giving to the provisions of the Federal Constitution an
effect which many people think the Supreme Court would not give to those cases. The
notable case in that connection is the Ives case in New York, regarding the workmen's
compensation act. There the Court of Appeals of New York held that the statute which
was before them was in violation, both of the New York state constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Now, there are many people who
think that the Supreme Court of the United States would not have held that that was in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The people of New
York have amended their constitution so as to obviate the objection made regarding that
particular case, but there was no way in which the judgment of the Supreme Court could
be obtained on that question, and the people of the state, many of them, have felt that they
were resting under a decision giving a more drastic effect to the Federal Constitution than
the Supreme Court of the United States, the guardian of that Constitution, itself would
have given, and there has been no way to meet that.
Id. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted).
120. The House Report favorably reporting the 1914 amendment concluded:
A special committee from the American Bar Association appointed to use their
influence in having remedial legislation enacted by this Congress, composed of men
whose eminence in their profession entitle them to be heard by the Committee on the
Judiciary and by this Congress, strongly recommend the passage of this bill.
H.R. REP. NO. 63-1222, at 3 (1914).
121. S.REP.NO.63-161,at2(1914).
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 was finally amended in 1914122 to allow the
Supreme Court to review decisions of state courts that upheld various
provisions of federal law. And in 1917, as predicted, the Supreme Court
upheld the New York workers' compensation law as constitutional.123
It is worth noting that the 1914 amendment to the original Judiciary Act
was not only motivated by an explicit policy of using the federal courts to
obtain specific results, as was section 25 of the original Act, but was also
motivated in part by a desire by some to forestall even more dramatic moves
to obtain politically-oriented results, namely efforts, such as those advocated
by Theodore Roosevelt, to overturn unpopular court decisions by popular
vote. In other words, the 1914 amendment was in part an effort to prevent
even more direct control by voters over constitutional decisions.
Evidence that the 1914 amendment to the Judiciary Act was motivated
by the fear that, without it, the judiciary would be exposed to even stronger
attacks is provided in the House Report on the 1914 amendment.'24 That
report supported enactment of the amendment to forestall demands for even
more "radical changes in our organic law." 2 5 The House report does not
cite any specific proposed "radical changes" it sought to avoid, but surely its
drafters were aware of the causes pressed by Theodore Roosevelt at the time.
The Ives decision was a particular target for Roosevelt's criticism of the
judiciary. As president, Roosevelt "had been critical of the judiciary for
blocking social legislation and was convinced that no comprehensive
program of reform could be achieved unless the courts could be curbed." 26
After deciding not to seek reelection in 1908, Roosevelt continued his
campaign against the courts. In August of 1910, he complained that the
Supreme Court was preventing popular legal change, stating that if the Court
continued its opposition, it 'would upset the whole system of popular
government."'l 27 And in January of 1912, Roosevelt outlined his plan for

122. It might be noted here that Professor Amar's argument that the Ives case could have been
reviewed by the Supreme Court under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 if only litigants had
drafted their pleadings carefully enough, see supra note 106, seems even more implausible in light
of the fact that, in 1914, the American Bar Association, the legal academy generally, and Congress
were all convinced that a statutory amendment was required before that could happen.
123. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917).
124. H.R. REP. No. 63-1222, at 2 (1914).
125. Id.
126. NATHAN MILLER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A LIFE 522 (1992).

127. GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 6 (B.W. Heubsch 1912) (quoting Roosevelt).
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the popular recall of state judicial decisions.'28 Such proposals stalled,
however, after the 1914 amendment was enacted.
In leading to the upholding of popular workers compensation statutes,
the 1914 amendment also had the effect of reducing the drive for additional
reforms that would subject courts to even more direct checks by voters at
large. Such was the ebb and flow of the balance struck by Congress between
the desire for independent courts and the desire for respecting the popular
will. It was a balance Congress had been striking since the original
Judiciary Act of 1789. 129
VIII. OTHER POLICY MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789

Beyond its policy of increasing the chances that federal legislation
would be upheld by the courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789 contained several
other limitations on federal court jurisdiction based on still other policy
motivations. These additional limitations, including amount in controversy
restrictions and a prohibition on general federal question jurisdiction in the
federal courts, are explored below.
A.

Amount in ControversyLimitation

The Judiciary Act of 1789 also limited federal court jurisdiction to those
diversity cases in which over five hundred dollars was in dispute.130
Members of Congress were well aware that the amount in controversy limit
in the Judiciary Act of 1789 would prohibit constitutional issues from being
decided in federal court. During the debate on the amount in controversy
limitation, one senator remarked on the fact that the limitation would
preclude federal court review of significant constitutional cases if the sums
involved were less than five hundred dollars. According to Paterson's notes

128. See GEORGE E. MOWRY, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 21516 (1946) (citing Theodore Roosevelt, Judges and Progress,100 Outlook 42 (Jan. 6, 1912)).
129. Interestingly, Justice Holmes, at the time of the proposed 1914 amendment, introduced yet
another possible means of altering that balance. While supporting the proposal that federal courts be
granted expanded jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of state statutes, Holmes also indicated
that he did not believe dire results would follow from preventing federal courts from reviewing the
constitutionality of federal legislation, stating, "I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New
York (February 15, 1913), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 147 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1997).
130. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1257) ("[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five
hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.").
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of the Senate debate on the issue, that senator remarked, "If a small Sum [is
at issue], it may involve a Question of Law of great Importance ....
Hambden [sic], his a Cause of 20 s/ [shillings]."'' The reference was to
John Hampden's refusal to pay Charles I's ship money tax in which only
twenty shillings were involved, but led to litigation testing the King's
constitutional authority to rule England without Parliament.132
As William Casto has observed, the five hundred dollar amount in
controversy limitation effectively also acted to bar virtually all tort actions at
common law from review in the federal courts on any grounds.'33 As Casto
points out, Oliver Ellsworth would have understood that the amount in
controversy limitation would be a significant barrier to tort claims, as he had
served on the highest appellate court in Connecticut for four years, and
presided over tort claims, none of which involved amounts over five
hundred dollars, and most of which involved sums of less than one hundred
dollars.134
The amount in controversy limitation was also grounded in a policy
designed to make it much more difficult for yet another class of cases to be
decided by federal courts, namely those brought by British citizens to collect
debts owed to them by Americans. Collectively, Americans owed British
merchants over four million pounds at the start of the American
Revolution,'35 and throughout the war state courts refused to hear debt cases
brought
against
Americans. 136
As
Casto
has
written,

131.

Casto, First Congress's Understanding,supra note 73, at 1110, 1138 (reprinting Paterson's

Notes in Appendix C) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See id. at 1111 n.76 ("If [Ship Money] could be established as a regular tax which the King
was entitled to collect without Parliamentary consent, the fundamental constitutional issue of the
century would be decided in favor of the Monarchy.") (quoting C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF
REVOLUTION 55 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
133. See id. at 1113 ("During the closed Senate debates, the apparent point was made that the
lower courts' jurisdiction would extend to 'Money. Merchadize. Land bought and sold... .Where
Titles are held under different States, each State will endeavor to protect its own Grant. [T]hey
should be tried in the federal Court.' Tort actions are notably absent from this list.") (quoting
Paterson's Notes, at 1138 (Appendix C)).
134. See id at 1113 & n.93 (citing cases).
135. See MATrHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY AND ELLSWORTH, THE FIRST COURTS: JUSTICES,

RULINGS, AND LEGACY 130 (2008) ("[Clolonial planters often financed their crops on credit. British
merchants provided the sums necessary for seed and other supplies with the expectation that the
loans thus extended would be repaid after the harvest. By the time of the American revolution,
therefore, American indebtedness to British merchants was in excess of four million pounds ....
During the course of the peace negotiations, the British repeatedly insisted that Americans make
good on debts owing to British subjects.").
136. See id. at 19 ("Throughout the confederation period, Congress was unable to induce the states
to open their courts to the recovery of British debts.").
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"[WJidespread ... opposition to the collection of British debts had played a
major role in persuading the Congress to place a five-hundred dollar amount
in controversy limitation on the circuit courts' jurisdiction." 3 7
Congress passed the amount in controversy provision despite the fact
that Article IV of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Revolutionary War in
1784, provided that "[i]t is agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted."' 38 As Casto has
observed, Oliver Ellsworth understood that making it easy for British
creditors to recoup their debts from Americans, despite the requirement
imposed by Article IV of the Treaty of Paris, "would engender powerful
opposition," and consequently he "agreed to compromise . . . effective
enforcement of Article IV of the peace treaty" to facilitate passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.139 Although the five hundred dollar amount in
controversy limit did not entirely preclude British debt cases from making
their way into federal court, the vast majority of them did not meet the
criteria required for federal judicial review,140 as they did not involve more
than five hundred dollars, and, at that time, smaller claims could not be
joined together to meet the monetary jurisdictional requirement. 141
In still other ways, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made an appeal to the
Supreme Court practically impossible, even when it granted the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to hear the case.142

137. CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 98.
138. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82. As William
Casto has written, "the amount in controversy limitation effectively precluded a significant group of
British creditors from having a federal court vindicate rights secured by the most important treaty in
United States history." Casto, First Congress's Understanding,supranote 73, at 1112 & n.86.
139. CASTO, CREATION, supra note 62, at 72.
140. See CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 47 ("In theory, Supreme Court appellate
review was available to correct errors in the tremendous number of British claims relegated to the
mercy of the state judiciaries. In practice, however, an appeal all the way to the Supreme Court
would have been prohibitively expensive in comparison to the size of the claim.").
141. CASTO, CREATION, supra note 62, at 72-73 ("In the late twentieth century, five hundred
dollars does not seem a very significant limitation, but it was a substantial sum two hundred years
ago... . The five hundred-dollar limitation would have its most significant impact upon the British
debt cases. Although the total debt owed to British creditors was high, the great majority (for some
British firms, over 90 percent) of the individual debts was for sums of less than five hundred dollars.
Moreover, the technical legal rules that regulated the joinder of claims (common-law pleading) did
not permit a plaintiff to try multiple claims in one lawsuit. Therefore, as a practical matter, the
amount in controversy limitation barred the great majority of British claims from the new federal
courts.").
142. The case of West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 401 (1791), for example, entailed the following
circumstances. West lost a lawsuit brought in the Rhode Island circuit court, and he subsequently
attempted to file an appeal in the Supreme Court. HARRINGTON, supra note 135, at 88. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 required that for such an appeal to be perfected, a writ of error would have to
be issued by the clerk of the Supreme Court within ten days of the lower court's decision. See id.
That requirement was practically impossible for West to meet, considering the difficulties of swift
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B.

The Absence of a Grantof GeneralFederalQuestion Jurisdiction

More significantly, Congress also provided the federal courts with no
general federal question jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789,14' and
without such jurisdiction large numbers of cases would never be subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court. As William Casto has observed, "The Senate
considered granting the district courts 'complete [jurisdiction] ...
extend[ing] to all Cases at Law and in Equity.' . . . The bill reported by the
[Senate] committee, however, did not vest the federal courts with general
civil federal question jurisdiction."' Instead, the federal circuit courts were
vested with jurisdiction according "to the nature of the parties rather than the
nature of the dispute[,]"l 4 5 as the Judiciary Act of 1789 ultimately provided:
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in
dispute exceeds ... the sum ... of five hundred dollars, and the
United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought,
46
and a citizen of another State.1
As a result of the Act, "[i]f the United States had a small civil claim against
a citizen, [even] the national government was barred from its own courts." 47

travel between Rhode Island and Philadelphia in 1791. Id Consequently, West obtained a writ of
error from the clerk of the Rhode Island circuit court instead. Id. The case became the first ever to
be appealed to the Supreme Court, but it was dismissed. Id. Despite the practical impossibility of
complying with the ten-day rule, the Court held that it was the job of Congress, not the Court, to
amend the statute to provide for a more reasonable period of time in which a writ of error could be
issued. See id In dismissing the case, Justice Iredell noted that "[An] inconvenience does indeed
exist. It is a very weighty one, and I heartily wish it was in the power of the Court .. . to remove it:
but I think it is not." Id.; 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, at 20 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998). Justice Wilson agreed, noting that any such
inconvenience "must be removed by another power," as the federal courts "act in the judicial,not in
the legislative department."

THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES, 1789-1800, supra at 25. Justice Cushing also remarked that "[i]f inconveniences should
arise, in carrying [the legislature's] laws into effect, with them lies the power of correcting the
inconveniences, and not with us." Id. at 26.
143. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 17, at 33 (stating that in the Judiciary Act of 1789, "Congress
provided no general federal question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts").
144. Casto, First Congress's Understanding, supra note 73, at 1116 (citing Paterson's Notes at
1138 (Appendix C)).
145. Id
146. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
147. Casto, First Congress's Understanding, supra note 73, at 1117.
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Another consequence was that federal criminal cases could not be
appealed to the Supreme Court. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the lower
federal courts were given general jurisdiction to try federal crimes, 148 but the
Supreme Court itself had no appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal
cases.149
IX.

EARLY SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS REGARDING CONGRESS' POWER
TO LIMIT FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

Given the scant jurisdiction Congress had given federal courts in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the consensus view that Congress had the
constitutional power to provide any degree of jurisdiction, or none at all, to
the federal courts excepting only the Supreme Court's constitutionally
required original jurisdiction,'50 it is not surprising that the early Supreme
Court unhesitatingly recognized that power when cases were brought to it
over which it had no Congressionally authorized jurisdiction.
The early justices of the Supreme Court, including Oliver Ellsworthwho became the third Chief Justice of the United States-clearly viewed
Congress as having plenary authority over federal court jurisdiction,
excluding only the Supreme Court's constitutionally prescribed original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls, and cases in which a State was a party.s'5 In Wiscart v. D'Auchy,15 2
Chief Justice Ellsworth upheld a denial of Supreme Court jurisdiction,
stating broadly that:
The Constitution, distributing the judicial power of the United
States, vests in the Supreme Court, an original as well as an
appellate jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction, however, is
confined to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. In all other
cases, only an appellate jurisdiction is given to the court; and even
148. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9, 1 Stat. at 76-77 ("[T]he district courts shall have,
exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or
upon the high seas.").
149. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79 ("That the circuit courts shall have ..
exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States,
except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein.").
150. See U.S. CONST. art III, §2.
151. Indeed, as one historian has written recently, "Rather than viewing the [Supreme] Court as a
check on the powers of government, it appears that most of the early justices [including Ellsworth]
believed that their role was to uphold and support the national government against efforts to weaken
its powers." HARRINGTON, supra note 135, at 167.
152. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
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the appellate jurisdiction is, likewise, qualified; inasmuch as it is
given "with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the

Congress shall make. " Here then, is the ground, and the only
ground, on which we can sustain an appeal. If Congress has
provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an
appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart
from it. The question, therefore, on the constitutional point of an
appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether Congress has established
any rule for regulating its exercise? 53
Chief Justice Ellsworth added:
[I]f an appellate jurisdiction can only be exercised by this court
conformably to such regulations as are made by the Congress, and if
Congress has prescribed a writ of error, and no other mode, by
which it can be exercised, still, I say, we are bound to pursue that
mode, and can neither make, nor adopt, another. The law may,
indeed, be improper and inconvenient; but it is of more importance,
for a judicial determination, to ascertain what the law is, than to
speculate upon what it ought to be. 54
In Turner v. Bank of North-America,'55 the Supreme Court upheld the
provision of the Judiciary Act that provided:
that no District or Circuit Court "shall have cognizance of any suit
to recover the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in
action, in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might have been
prosecuted in such Court, to recover the said contents, if no
assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of
exchange.' 56
As counsel noted, Congress passed the Act of 1789 to prevent citizens of the
same state from establishing, through collusion, federal court diversity
jurisdiction simply by forcing one party of a contract to assign the benefits
of a promissory note to a citizen of another state or to an alien.s 7 During

153.
154.
155.
156.
U.S.C.
157.

Id. at 327 (second emphasis added).
Id. at 328.
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
Id. at 9 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28
§ 1257)).
See id ("Congress knew, that the English courts had amplified their jurisdiction, through the
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oral argument, Chief Justice Ellsworth incredulously asked the counsel who
was arguing that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, "How far is it meant to
carry the argument? Will it be affirmed, that in every case, to which the
judicial power of the United States extends, the federal courts may exercise a
jurisdiction, without the intervention of the legislature, to distribute, and
regulate, the power?"'18 Justice Chase agreed with this sentiment, stating:
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal Courts
derive their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but
the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power, (except
in a few specified instances) belongs to congress. If congress has
given the power to this Court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if
congress has not given the power to us, or to any other Court, it still
remains at the legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound,
and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of
the federal Courts, to every subject, in every form, which the
constitution might warrant.159
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, confirmed that

"the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is almost wholly under the
control of the regulating power of congress,"'60 the sole exception being the
Supreme Court's limited original jurisdiction.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions similarly included language
recognizing Congress's plenary power over federal court jurisdiction. Those
decisions are set out in Appendix A provided at the end of this article.
Some of the most prominent scholars of recent years have continued to
recognize Congress's plenary power over federal court jurisdiction.'61 Many

medium of legal fictions; and it was readily foreseen, that by the means of a colourable assignment
to an alien, or to the citizen of another state, every controversy arising upon negotiable paper, might
be drawn into the federal Courts.") (argument of counsel).
158. Id. at 10 n.1.
159. Id. In Turner, the issue was whether an endorsement of a note to a citizen of another state
would create diversity when the citizenship of the original parties to the note would not. Id. at 9-10.
The Constitution indicated diversity might result, as it granted the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
controversies "between Citizens of different States," which could include controversies between an
original party and an endorsee of a different state. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. But the Judiciary Act of
1789 explicitly specified that such a situation did not create diversity. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ I1. 1 Stat. at 78-79. In Turner, Chief Justice Ellsworth deferred to the Act of Congress even after
strong opposing argument for diversity jurisdiction. Counsel arguing that there was in fact diversity
jurisdiction as granted by the Constitution stated, "[C]ongress can no more limit, than enlarge, the
constitutional grant.
In the [Second] section of the [Third] article, the constitution
contemplates ... if the existing controversy is 'between citizens of different states,' the judicial
power of the United States expressly extends to it." Turner,4 U.S. at 10.
160. 3 STORY, supra note 33, § 1768.
161. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts,
27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1038 (1982) ("If the Constitution means what it says, it means that Congress
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have also continued to note that the Constitution allows Congress to restrict
federal court jurisdiction for virtually any reason, including explicit hostility
to the decisions of the federal courts.162 Congress could potentially exceed
6
this authority only by violating some independent constitutional provision. 1
Even so, Congress can remove jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, even in
a pending case that has been appealed to it, without violating the
Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld a statute removing
jurisdiction from it in a pending case.'6
can make the state courts. .. the ultimate authority for the decision of any category of case to which
the federal judicial power extends."); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 914
(1984) ("Those who read the exceptions clause broadly with respect to the Supreme Court and who
accept the widely held view about broad congressional control of lower federal court jurisdiction
find it hard to see anything in article III that would bar congressional action, as a matter of sheer
constitutional power, to remand federal constitutional issues for final state court adjudication. Such
a scheme seems consistent with the constitutional language and the Framers' intent . . . ."); Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1965) ("Congress has
the power by enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the
jurisdiction of the lower courts and of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.").
162. See Wechsler, supra note 161, at 1005-06 ("Congress has the power by enactment of a
statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction of the lower
courts and of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.... [E]ven a pending case may be excepted
from appellate jurisdiction.. . . There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues ... that the
supremacy clause or the due process clause of the fifth amendment would be violated by an
alteration of the jurisdiction motivated by hostility to the decisions of the Court. I see no basis for
this view and think it antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the courts-which was quite
simply that the Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how far judicial
jurisdiction should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as 'the supreme
Law of the Land .. . .'); see also Gunther, supra note 161, at 920 ("In my view, the basic structure
of article III affords precisely that power to Congress, and that power may even be exercised, as
Herbert Wechsler argued years ago, to express disaffection with Court decisions.").
163. See Gunther, supra note 161, at 910, 916 ("[E]ven if Congress can withdraw jurisdiction
from the federal courts in a whole class of cases, it cannot allow a federal court jurisdiction but
dictate the outcomes of cases, or require a court to decide cases in disregard of the Constitution....
Congress [also] could not limit access to the federal courts on the basis of race or of wholly
irrelevant criteria such as a litigant's height, weight, or hair color."); Martin H. Redish,
Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions
Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900, 923 (1982) ("Although
Congress may possess authority to remove completely from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction substantive areas of law, it may not instead provide the Court with jurisdiction but direct
it to act in an unconstitutional manner or require that the Court interpret the Constitution in a
particular way."). Similarly, if Congress enacted a jurisdictional statute barring access to the federal
courts based on race or gender, it would be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Bator, supranote 161, at 1034 ("[A] statute which
said that whites only may resort to the district courts would be invalid."). Also, Congress cannot
remove cases from the Supreme Court's constitutionally prescribed original jurisdiction.
164. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-15 (1868) (holding that repeal of the Act
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X.

THE PROCESS ACT OF 1789 AND FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE

The First Congress not only severely limited the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, but it also dictated what procedures the federal courts would
employ, allowing them no wiggle room to deviate. And as the federal courts
have said many times, the specific procedural rules employed can often
dictate substantive results. 165
The Judiciary Act of 1789, as crafted by Oliver Ellsworth and as
adopted by Congress, contained many procedural provisions applicable to
"all the said courts of the United States." 6 Those provisions related to the
granting of new trials, the administration of oaths, the punishment of
contempt by fine or imprisonment, and provisions "to make and establish all
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts,
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." 67
The latter clause appeared to provide the federal courts with nearly unlimited
of February 5, 1867 deprived the Supreme Court of hearing an appeal of a lower court decision in a
pending habeas case) ("It is quite true, as was argued by the counsel for the petitioner, that the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is not derived from acts of Congress. It is, strictly speaking,
conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred 'with such exceptions and under such regulations
as Congress shall make.' . . . The provision of the act of 1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction of
this court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly repealed [by the Act of Congress under
consideration]. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception. We are not
at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under
the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given
by express words. What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us? We cannot
doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. And this is not less clear upon authority than upon
principle.... It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this
case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by
declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws
confer.").
165. See, e.g., Olympic Sports Prods., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 914 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("[A] court should note that every procedural rule may, at some point in litigation, be
outcome-determinative . . . ."); Jones v. W.J. Services, Inc., 970 F.2d 36, 37 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The
interplay of several procedural rules determines the outcome of this case."); In re Parr, 165 B.R. 677,
682-83 ("It is obvious that, at times, procedural rules can have substantive, even outcomedeterminative, results .... ).
166. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
For detailed accounts of the Judiciary Act's legislative history, see CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra
note 59, at 27-53; 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, AT 457-508 (1971).
167. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. at 83. Other provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789 granted all courts of the United States the "power to issue writs of scirefacias,habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law," § 14, 1 Stat. at 8182, as well as the power to require, upon motion, that parties produce pertinent books and writings in
actions at law. § 15, 1 Stat. at 82. The Act also established the conditions under which depositions
could be taken and used at trial, § 30, 1 Stat. at 88-90, and the process for appealing from district,
circuit, and state court judgments. §22, 1 Stat. at 84-85; §25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
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discretion over their own procedures. The Senate ultimately was reluctant to
allow the courts such control,' 68 and five days after passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress promptly approved the Process Act of 1789.169
A.

The ProcessAct of 1789

The Process Act removed federal court discretion over its procedures
and required each federal trial court in actions at common law to adopt the
"modes of process" then in effect in the state courts of the state in which the
federal court was situated. The Process Act provided, in pertinent part:
That until further provision shall be made, and except where by this
act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided, the
forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of
process and rates of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and
district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each
state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts
of the same. 7 o
Federal courts interpreted the Process Act to require them to follow state
court rules not only in the form of the processes they issued but also in the
procedures they employed."'
Again, Oliver Ellsworth was the primary architect of both the Judiciary
and Process Acts of 1789,172 and the Process Act was the work of the same
committee that drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which included
Ellsworth.17 1
In its original form, the Process Act was much more detailed in its
regulations, specifying the manner in which parties could commence actions,
the forms of summonses, the method of and time for service, the length of
time defendants had to answer, the entry of default judgments, and the

168. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 166, at 537 ("It is clear .. . that the Senate was not prepared to
permit the regulation of process to be settled by the [federal] courts pursuant to the rule-making
power conveyed by section 17 of the Judiciary Act.").
169. Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93. The Judiciary Act was approved on September 24,
1789, see ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, and the Process Act was approved on September 29, 1789, see ch. 21, 1
Stat. 93.
170. Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. at 93.
171. See I GOEBEL, supra note 166, at 514, 575.
172. See CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supranote 59, at 27-53; CURRtE, supra note 59, at 47.
173. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 166, at 509.
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means of issuing executions.17 4 However, the Process Act as ultimately
enacted came to reflect the compromise of having each federal court strictly
follow the procedure of the state in which it sat.175 Those who favored the
adoption of state procedure ultimately prevailed over those who favored a
standardized code of uniform federal procedure.' 76
That Congress was understood to have plenary power over federal court
procedure as well as federal court jurisdiction was made clear by Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 83, in which he wrote Congress's "power to
constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial ... .

The

Process Act of 1789, probably not coincidentally, uses a similar term,
"modes of process," to describe the range of court procedures covered. 78
During the state ratification conventions, Abraham Holmes of
Massachusetts declared that "the mode of criminal process is to be pointed
out by Congress, and they have no constitutional check on them, except that
the trial is to be by a jury . . .""'
Thomas Dawes, also of Massachusetts,
explained that the Constitution did not provide for jury trials because "[t]he
several states differ so widely in their modes of trial . .. [and thus] the
[Constitutional] Convention have very wisely left it to the federal legislature
to make such regulations as shall, as far as possible, accommodate the
whole." 80 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson, one of the most influential
Framers and, along with Ellsworth, one of five members of the
Constitutional Convention's Committee of Detail,' t ' stated that "the power
of making regulations with respect to the mode of trial may certainly be
placed in the legislature" and noted that "the Convention [left] it to the
future Congress to make regulations on this head." 82 In South Carolina,
Charles Pinckney stated, "[T]he laws which are to regulate trials must be

174. See id. at 514-35; see also CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 51.
175. See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 166, at 510-31 (describing Judiciary Committee's proposal to
regulate federal procedure in detail and the Senate's rejection of it).
176. Id. at 510-11, 539-40 (arguing that the legislative history of the Process Act reveals a
struggle between those who favored a consolidated national government and those who favored
resting more control with the states). Ellsworth's initial effort to impose congressionally crafted
uniform rules of procedure makes clear he believed Congress also had plenary legislative control
over court procedure. That Ellsworth's original process provisions were eventually superseded by
the Process Act was the result of a preference for requiring federal courts to follow state court
procedures, not a belief that Congress was encroaching on a judicial function in regulating court
procedure. See CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 51; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 166, at 537.
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
178. Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.
179. 2 THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 84, at I10.
180. 2 id.at 114.
181. Max Farrand has written that "Second to Madison and almost on a par with him was James
Wilson. In some respects he was Madison's intellectual superior.
MAX FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (1913).

182. 2 THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supranote 84, at 488.
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made by the representatives of the people chosen as this house are, and as
amenable as they are for every part of their conduct."' 83
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretationof the ProcessAct and Its
Recognition of Congress'sPower Over FederalCourtProcedure
Joseph Story's Commentarieson the Constitution concludes:

[I]n all cases where the judicial power of the United States is to be
exercised, it is for Congress alone to furnish the rules of proceeding,
to direct the process, to declare the nature and effect of the process,
and the mode in which the judgments consequent thereon shall be
executed.184
The Supreme Court, like Congress, recognized as much in its early days and
found that the regulation of court procedure falls within the legislative
function. The Court has noted that Congress's power over federal court
procedure derives from both its power to constitute the lower federal
courts' and also from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which provides
that Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." 86
The Process Act was considered by the Supreme Court in Wayman v.
8 In Wayman, a judgment debtor challenged Congress's authority
Southard.'1
to regulate the manner in which U.S. marshals executed federal court
judgments in actions between private parties.'88 The debtor did not even
contend that such regulation should be left to the judiciary,' 89 and instead
183. 4id.at308.
184. 3 STORY, supra note 33, § 1758.
185. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.") (emphasis added).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause is the broader of the two
sources of authority, for it provides Congress with the power to regulate the procedures of the
Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts, whereas the Article III power to ordain and
establish the lower federal courts grants Congress the power to impose procedures only on the lower
federal courts. Congress could also assert authority over the procedures governing the Supreme
Court's appellate procedures pursuant to Article Ill's Exceptions and Regulations Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.").
187. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
188. Id at 2.
189. Id. at 21.
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claimed that state legislatures retained complete authority over the execution
process.190 In Wayman, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the phrase "forms
and modes of proceedings in suits" as used in the Process Act "embraces the
whole progress of the suit, and every transaction in it, from its
commencement to its termination"' 9 ' and that "[t]he term is applicable to
writs and executions, but it is also applicable to every step taken in a
cause."l 92 Earlier in the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall clearly indicated his
belief in plenary legislative power over federal court procedure, citing the
Necessary and Proper Clause.' 93 Discussing how Congress could delegate
procedural rulemaking authority to the judiciary if it so chose, Marshall
wrote:
Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the
legislature may rightfully exercise itself. Without going farther for
examples, we will take that, the legality of which the counsel for the
defendants admit. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act, and the 7th
section of the additional act [a successor to the Judiciary Act of
1789 that granted federal courts more autonomy to formulate their
own court rules], empower the Courts respectively to regulate their
practice. It certainly will not be contended, that this might not be
done by Congress. The Courts, for example, may make rules,
directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of
declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same
description. It will not be contended, that these things might not be
done by the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts; yet it
is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the judicial

department. 194

In Bank of the United States v. Halstead,'" the Court identified a second

congressional power over court procedure. Halsteadinvolved a dispute over
the proper procedures to be followed by U.S. marshals in executing a
judgment obtained in the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky.196 The
Court stated, "It cannot certainly be contended ... that Congress does not
possess the uncontrolled power to legislate with respect both to the form and
effect of executions issued upon judgments recovered in the Courts of the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 27.
See id. at22.
Id. at 43.
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825).
Id. at51-52.
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United States."'0 7 In addressing the question of Congress's power over such
matters, Justice Thompson, writing for the Court, asserted that "[t]he
authority to carry into complete effect the judgments of the Courts,
necessarily results, by implication, from the power to ordain and establish
such Courts," as well as from the express authority located in the Necessary
and Proper Clause.198
Quotes from some of the Supreme Court's subsequent cases describing
Congress's power over federal court procedure are set out in Appendix B at
the end of this article. The Process Act of 1789 constitutes the First
Congress's recognition that with the greater power to create the lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction comes the
lesser power of directing what procedures those court will follow. The
Supreme Court has agreed.' 99
XI.

THE CRIMES ACT OF 1790 AND THE REMOVAL OF FEDERAL JUDGES

The First Congress also passed a third statute affecting all judges in the
federal judiciary. This one, the Crimes Act of 1790, defined the nation's
first federal crimes.200 One provision in the Act required that all federal
judges, upon a conviction in court for bribery, "forever be disqualified to
hold any office of honour, trust or profit under the United States."20' The
197. Id. at 53.
198. Id. at 53-54.
199. See infra Appendix B.
200. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
201. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. at 117. The constitutionality of the removal
provision of the Crimes Act of 1790 has never been tested in court. In June 1991, Judge Robert F.
Collins, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, was convicted on charges including
accepting a bribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(2). Elizabeth B. Bazan, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report for Congress 92-905A, Disqualification of Federal Judges Convicted of
Bribery - An Examination of the Act of April 30, 1790 and Related Issues at 1 (Nov. 27, 1992)
(citing United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1992)). Section 201 is the most recent
version of the Crimes Act of 1790. As reported by the Congressional Research Service:
The Collins case appears to have been the first instance where a federal judge was
prosecuted under Section 201 or any of its precursors.. . . However, this case does not
afford an opportunity for consideration of the constitutional sufficiency of the
disqualification provision in Section 201 as applied to federal judges, because
disqualification was not included in the sentence imposed upon Judge Collins after his
conviction.
Id. at 4-5. More recently, the Judicial Conference of the United States has called for the
impeachment of one federal district judge for actions involving bribery, but the prospects of the
House's acting on that call for impeachment remain unclear. See Richard Rainey, Court Slams
Porteousas Impeachment Move Stalls, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 11, 2008), available
at http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/09/porteousdo not.publish.html.
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Crimes Act of 1790 indicates that, beyond its plenary power over federal
court jurisdiction and procedure, the First Congress believed it had the
constitutional power to make conviction by a court an alternative means of
removing a federal judge, outside the impeachment context, and it sheds
light on the First Congress's understanding of its own powers to discipline
federal judges. This is so despite the fact that "[i]t is a virtually
unquestioned assumption among constitutional law cognoscenti that
impeachment is the only means of removing a federal judge."202
A. Good Behavior,Impeachment, and the ConstitutionalText

Again, it is worth beginning any inquiry into Congress's power to
remove federal judges with the constitutional text.
Regarding federal judges and their service during good behavior, Article
III, Section 1, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour." 20 3 Unlike the impeachment clauses, 204 the good behavior
provision appears in Article III and clearly applies only to judges.
Regarding the impeachment of all civil officers, which include not only
federal judges but a large number of other federal officials of all sorts,
Article II, Section 4, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 20 5 The Impeachment Clause was included
as part of the Constitution because if this power had not otherwise been
made clear, the House and Senate would not have had the quasi-judicial and
quasi-executive powers to indict, prosecute, and try officers in the other two
branches via the impeachment process. 206 Instead, the House and Senate
would have been confined to exercising purely legislative powers.207

The Supreme Court has cited the federal anti-bribery statute that applies to federal judges without
remarking on its constitutionality. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1960) ("Barring
convicted felons from certain employments is a familiar legislative device to insure against
corruption in specified, vital areas. Federal law has frequently and of old utilized this type of
disqualification .... [A] large group of federal statutes disqualify persons 'from holding any office
of honor, trust, or profit under the United States' because of their conviction of certain crimes,
generally involving official misconduct." (citing the federal bribery statute among others)).
202. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a FederalJudge, I16 YALE L.J. 72,
74 (2006).
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 7, art. II, §4;.
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
206. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 202, at 81-82.
207. Id.
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Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, of the Constitution also provides that:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.208
This latter provision simply provides that if someone is impeached by the
House, but not convicted by the Senate, the fact of their prior impeachment
shall not immunize them from any subsequent prosecution in court.2 09
Just as the federal judiciary itself was the subject of scant discussion at
the Constitutional Convention, there was no discussion at all indicating that
"judicial officers" were to be uniquely subject to removal solely through the
mechanism of impeachment. That impeachment as a sole means of removal
was not meant to apply uniquely to judges is indicated by the placement of
the impeachment clauses outside Article 111.210 It is also indicated from the
context of the debate regarding the impeachment clauses at the
Constitutional Convention. Indeed, the insertion of the words "civil
officers" into the impeachment clause during the Constitutional Convention
was:

an unarticulated afterthought, tucked away in the last-minute
insertion [of] "civil officers," which itself was added without
comment to the Executive Department Article II provision for
impeachment of the President....
The almost absent-minded inclusion of judges among "civil
officers" undercuts the assumption that the Framers designed
impeachment to enforce judicial "good behavior." 211

208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
209. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal
Judges, 76 KY. L. J. 643, 666-72 (1988).
210. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some
PossibilitiesUnder the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REv. 870, 898 (1930) ("The impeachment clauses
are not found in the article dealing with the judicial branch, but in the articles dealing with the
legislative and executive branches; and the power to impeach therein defined affects not judges in
particular, but all civil officers alike. There is therefore no warrant whatever, either in the language
of the impeachment clauses, or in their relation to other parts of the Constitution, for treating
impeachment as an exclusive method of removing judges, as distinct from other federal officers.").
211.

RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 153-54 (1974) (citation

omitted); see also Raoul Berger, Impeachmentfor "High Crimes andMisdemeanors," 44 S. CAL. L.
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B.

The Crimes Act of 1790

Just as Oliver Ellsworth was the leading hand behind the Judiciary Act
of 1789 and the Process Act of 1789, the Senate committee that drafted the
1790 Crimes Act was likely chaired by Oliver Ellsworth.2 12
Section 21 of the Act of 1790, as ultimately enacted, provided in
relevant part:
That if any person shall, directly or indirectly, give any sum or sums
of money, or any other bribe, present, or reward, or any promise,
contract, obligation or security, for the payment or delivery of any
money, present or reward, or any other thing to obtain or procure
the opinion, judgment or decree of any judge or judges of the
United States, in any suit, controversy, matter or cause depending
before him or them, and shall be thereof convicted, such person or
persons so giving, promising, contracting or securing to be given,
paid or delivered, any sum or sums of money, present, reward or
other bribe as aforesaid, and the judge or judges who shall in any
wise accept or receive the same, on conviction thereof shall be fined
and imprisoned at the discretion of the court; and shall forever be
disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust or profit under the
United States. 213

As Raoul Berger has written, "the 1790 statute must be regarded as a
construction that the impeachment clause does not constitute the 'only'
means for the disqualification of judges."21 4 To be disqualified to "hold

REV. 395, 441 (1971) ("One thing is clear: in the impeachment debate the Convention was almost
exclusively concerned with the President. The extent to which the President occupied the center of
the stage may be gathered from the fact that the addition to the impeachment clause of 'the Vice
President and all Civil officers' only took place on September 8th, shortly before the Convention
adjoumed.") (citation omitted).
212. See 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 108 (Jan. 26, 1790)
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1820) (recording composition of committee and that Ellsworth
reported the bill to the Senate "on behalf of the committee"); see also Senate Calendar entry of Jan.
26, 1790, reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, at 1741

(Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) ("Committee to prepare appointed (Ellsworth,
Johnson, Strong, Paterson, and Hawkins); Ellsworth presented a bill defining the crimes and offences
that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, and their punishment, which was
read.").
213. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (emphasis added).
214. BERGER, supra note 211, at 156 ("As with 'disqualification' so with 'removal,' for the two
stand on a par in the impeachment provision."). Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7, of the Constitution
provides that "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States," indicating that removal and disqualification would be considered the standard dual
punishment for serious misbehavior. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
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any" office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States, is surely to be
disqualified from holding one's current office.
The notion that impeachment is not the only means of removing a
federal judge may be jarring to the modem ear, but in the 1930's, the
American Bar Association supported provisions to allow federal judges to
remove other federal judges, and such a proposal was apparently
uncontroversial at the time.215 More recently, in 1994, the Report of the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal rejected the
notion that removal upon conviction is a legitimate alternative to
impeachment, although it stated it was a "most difficult question."2 16
However, the report of the National Commission's conclusion was based on
a false contradiction.2 17 The Report stated:
The most difficult question in this connection is whether
Congress may provide for removal as a criminal punishment.
Congress has broad power to impose penalties for crimes. Indeed, a
statute enacted by the First Congress in 1790 provided that a judge
convicted of bribery would be disqualified from holding office.
Arguably, this would effect removal if the judge were still serving.
Moreover, neutral criminal laws do not threaten judicial
independence. They are not adapted to retaliate against courts or
judges for judicial decisions. Finally, there are strong policy
considerations in favor of removal as a criminal sanction. Many
crimes, especially criminal breaches of the public trust, warrant
removal from public office as part of the punishment.
Nevertheless, the Commission concludes that Congress may not
provide for removal as a criminal penalty. If removal may lawfully

215. In 1936, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 2271, that would have
created a "new tribunal for the trial and, upon conviction, for the removal from office of federal
judges" when such judges fall short of "good behavior." Merrill E. Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It
Constitutional?, 7 KAN. CITY L. REv. 3, 10, 12 (1938). The American Bar Association, in 1937,
approved a resolution stating:
Resolved, That the Association approve H.R. 2271 providing a method for the removal of
district judges, provided it be amended so as to provide for a court of seven circuit
judges, and to allow an appeal in all cases on questions of law [and] fact where there is
dissent by any member of the court.
Id at 12 (quoting resolution adopted by the American Bar Association in the meeting of the
Assembly of the Association in Kansas City on Sept. 29, 1937). Debate regarding the resolution
occupied less than twelve minutes. See id at 13.
216. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, reprinted in 152
F.R.D. 265, 288 (1993).
217. See id.
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follow on conviction for a federal judge, then it may do so for the
Vice President of the United States or perhaps even the President.2 18
Such a conclusion, however, points to a false contradiction because only
federal judges, and not officials of the executive branch, serve during "good
behavior," making federal judges uniquely subject to the enforcement of
"good behavior" discipline by the judicial branch. Further, while there
would be serious separation of powers concerns with a process by which
executive branch officials were removed from office upon conviction by
another branch, such concerns do not arise with processes that provide for
the removal of federal judges by members of their own judicial branch.2 19
C. Early Treatises on Good Behavior

A review of legal treatises in use during the Founding Period confirm
that "good behavior" tenure was understood to be terminable upon
conviction in court.
As Raoul Berger has written, "A grant 'during good behavior' is simply
an estate on a condition subsequent, which is defeated or forfeited by
nonperformance of the condition." 220 The justification for removing officers
218. Id.
219. On this point, a discussion in the First Congress between Vice President John Adams and
Senator Oliver Ellsworth is instructive. Vice President Adams and Senator Ellsworth addressed the
question of how impeachment relates to the criminal prosecution of a sitting President during one
sidebar in a congressional coatroom. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON

SENATE DEBATES 168 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). When it came to the
President, they told a colleague in the first Senate, "You could only impeach him ... and no other
process [w]hatever lay against him." Id. A Senate colleague asked whether this meant that a
President could "commit[] [m]urder" and remain free until impeachment. Id The answer from
Ellsworth was: "[w]hen he is no longer President, [y]ou can indict him." Id. To support their view
that this correctly interpreted the impeachment clause, the two pointed out that otherwise every
judge and justice in the country could "exercise any [a]uthority over [the President] and [s]top the
[w]hole [m]achine of Government." Id. Thomas Jefferson agreed, concluding that if it were
otherwise, the executive branch would be subordinate to the judicial branch. Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 1807), in 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404 (Paul L. Ford
ed., 1905), quoted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 n.31 (1982). In 1807, Jefferson wrote
"would the executive be independent of the judiciary ... if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him
entirely from his constitutional duties?" Id. However, such statements do not contradict the notion
that federal judges can be removed by means other than impeachment, as an entire branch of the
federal government does not rely on the service of any single judge. Also, judges could not
generally be indicted when their judgeships ended if they served for life and were only subject to
impeachment. In addition, the removal of federal judges by other federal judges would not violate
the separation of powers because the process would occur within the same branch of government.
See Robert R. Davis, Jr., The Chandler Incident and Problems of JudicialRemoval, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 448, 461 (1966-67) ("Removal by judicial action is not inconsistent with the separation of
powers concept, for the proceedings would remain entirely within the judiciary.").
220. BERGER, supra note 211, at 139.
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due to abuse of the public trust, including bribery specifically, was derived
from the English idea of an office as a grant of an estate upon an "implied
condition" of good behavior.221 In his famous Commentaries,in the chapter
entitled "Of Estates upon Condition," Blackstone wrote: "As if a grant be
made to a man of an office, generally, without adding other words; the law
tacitly annexes hereto a secret condition that the grantee shall duly execute
his office, on breach of which condition it is lawful for the grantor .. . to
oust him .

...

"

According to Blackstone, then, removal from office need

not even be specifically codified as a punishment for misbehavior during the
course of a grant of tenure during "good behavior," as removal from office
for misbehavior was inherent in the grant. In the very next section of his
treatise, Blackstone specifically uses the example of taking a bribe to
illustrate the forfeit of a grant of "good behavior" tenure by "misuse,"
writing, "For an office, either public or private, may be forfeited by misuser
or nonuser, both of which are breaches of this implied condition.... By
misuser, or abuse; as if a judge takes a bribe. . . ., 223 Blackstone also made
clear that removal from office could follow from either impeachment or a
separate court process, writing that a corruption offense "when prosecuted,
either by impeachment in parliament, or by information in the court of

king's bench ... it is sure to be severely punished with forfeiture of their
offices ....

11224

Oliver Ellsworth was certainly familiar with Blackstone's writings.
Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania wrote that Ellsworth "brought
forward Judge Blackstone, and read much out of him" during the debates in
the Senate on the bill that became the Judiciary Act of 1789.22s One of
Ellsworth's biographers also noted the existence of a copy of the first
American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries with Ellsworth's name and
the year 1774 inscribed on the flyleaf 22 6
The same concepts described by Blackstone are contained in the works
of other English authorities that were standard reference works of the sort
221. Id. at 130-31.
222. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 915, §204 (William
Carey Jones ed., 1915).
223. Id. § 205. Blackstone also wrote that the English Parliament had provided that a judge
convicted of receiving a bribe would "be discharged from the king's service for ever." 4 id at 140,
§ 17.
224. Id. at 140-41, § 21 (emphasis added).
225. William Maclay Diary Entry (June 29, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND

OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 92 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
226. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 22.
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cited in early American cases. In Coke's Commentary upon Littleton, Coke
wrote that "for offices in any wise touching the administration or execution
of justice," any holders of such offices who:
bargaine or sell any of the said offices ... or take any money or
profit, or any promise, covenant, bond, or assurance, to have any
money or reward for the same . .. shall not only forfeit his estate

but also ... be adjudged a disabled person to have or enjoy the
same office or offices.227
John Adams quoted Coke for the proposition, also articulated by
Blackstone, that removal of an estate for bad behavior would be implied,
even if not explicitly stated, in the grant of an office "for life."228 Adams
wrote that if an:
office is granted to him quamdiu se bene gesserit,wherein he hath a
more fixed estate (it being an estate for life) . .. quamdiu se bene

gesserit must be intended in matters concerning his office, and is no
more than the law would have implied if the office had been granted
for life. 229
And Jeremy Bentham, writing at the very time of the ratification debates
on the American Constitution in 1787, also described a grant of "good
behaviour" tenure in England as being subject to forfeit following legal

227. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, L. 3, C. 5, § 378 (Philadelphia,
Robert Small 1853). In his treatise, William Hawkins also wrote:
I take it to be agreed, that in the grant of every office whatsoever, there is this condition
implied by common reason, that the grantee ought to execute it diligently and faithfully;
for since every office is instituted, not for the sake of the officer, but for the good of some
other, nothing can be more just than that he who either neglects or refuses to answer the
end for which this office was ordained, should give way to others, who are both able and
willing to take care of it.
1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 27, § 1, at 412 (London, S.
Sweet 1824). Bacon's Abridgement further explained:
If an Office be granted to a Man to have and enjoy so long as he shall behave himself
well in it; the Grantee hath an Estate of Freehold in the Office; for since nothing but his
Misbehavior can determine his Interest, no man can prefix a shorter Time than his Life;
since it must be his own Act (which the Law does not presume to foresee) which only can
make his Estate of shorter Continuance than his Life ....
3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, "OFFICES AND OFFICERS" 733 (London
4th ed. 1778).
228. 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 524-25 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C.
Little & James Brown 1851).
229. Id. (quoting 4 COKE, supranote 227, at 117) (emphasis added); see also 4 COKE, INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (Lawbook Exchange 2002). "Quamdiu se bene gesserint" means
"As long as they shall conduct themselves properly. The term refers to a holding of an office [that]
could continue until death or improper conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (8th ed. 2004).
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process. 230 He wrote of government officers that "unless specific instances
of misbehavior, flagrant enough to render his removal expedient, be proved
on him in a legal way, he shall have it for his life." 23 1
D. The Views of the Founders

Support for the proposition that judges may be removed from office by
conviction in court as an alternative to impeachment is also supplied by
several statements made by prominent members of the Constitutional
Convention.
John Adams understood criminal prosecutions to be the appropriate
mechanism to enforce the good behavior of judges. In 1773, Adams, in the
course of a debate regarding the status of Massachusetts judges, stated his
understanding that if Massachusetts judges served at the pleasure of the
King, a judge could be removed "without a trial and judgment for ill
behavior" and "without a hearing and judgment that he had misbehaved,"'232
but that if Massachusetts judges were appointed during good behavior, such
judges could be removed only upon a "hearing and trial, and an opportunity
to defend himself before a fuller board, knowing his accuser and the
accusation."23
Evidence that good behavior could be enforced through criminal
prosecution is also found in a speech made in the Continental Congress.
While serving as Secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas
Paine was accused of having revealed secrets regarding negotiations with the
French, and Congress had to decide whether to remove Paine from his
office.234 Gouverneur Morris, a delegate from Pennsylvania, thought this
was unnecessary to allow Paine to plead his case in court because Paine did
not hold his office during good behavior.235 Morris argued:
Gentlemen exclaim Do not deprive Mr. Payne of his Office without
giving him a Copy of the Charge! Do not punish a Citizen unheard!
I ask on what Tenure he holds that Office?

Is it during good

230. JEREMY BENTHAM, Letter IX, reprinted in JEREMY BENTHAM: THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS

51 (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995).
231. Id. (all but last emphasis added).
232. 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supranote 228, at 556, 559.
233. Id.at 571.
234. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 202, at 106.
235. Gouverneur Morris, Address to Congress (Jan. 7, 1779), in 11 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS 426 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1985).
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Behaviour? If it be he must be convicted of Malconduct before he
can be removed. But we are not the proper Court to take
Cognizance of such Causes. We have no criminal Jurisdiction.

Clearly then he ought not to be heard before us. But he does not
hold his Office during good Behavior it is during Pleasure that he
holds it.236
Morris thereby confirmed his understanding that good behavior tenure
required a trial before removal. Like John Adams, he understood that good
behavior tenure could be terminated following a judicial judgment of
misbehavior.
This understanding, presumably obtained in the First Congress,
followed the understanding expressed in early legal treatises discussed in the
previous section. 237 Although in 1802 Representative Rutlege of South
Carolina claimed to be stating the view of James Madison that "[t]he Judges
are to be removed only on impeachment, and conviction before
Congress," 238 the congressional record notes Madison as stating in a much
more noncommittal manner that he "did not conceive it was a proper
construction of the constitution to say[] that there was no other mode of
removing from office than that by impeachment," and regarding federal
judges specifically, he stated that their removal by impeachment alone only
"might be the case." 239 Further, Madison also indicated he believed
impeachment was a "supplemental"-not an exclusive-means of removing
misbehaving officers, stating that "the declaration in the constitution was
intended as a supplemental security for the good behavior of the public
officers."240
Alexander Hamilton stated that federal judges:
are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of
Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be
dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other. This
is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one

236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Raoul Berger has stated that "[w]hen the Framers employed 'good behavior,' a common law
term of ascertainable meaning, with no indication that they were employing it in a new and different
sense, it might be presumed that they implicitly adopted the judicial enforcement machinery that
traditionally went with it." BERGER, supra note 211, at 136 (citing Madison as stating "where a
technical word was used all the incidents belonging to it necessarily attended it" in 3 THE DEBATES
INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 84, at 531 (June 18, 1788)).
238. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
239.

1 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 87-88 (D.

Appleton & Co. 1857) (May 19, 1789) (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
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which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own
judges.24 1
However, as has been pointed out by Saikrishna Prakash and Steven D.
Smith, "[t]oo much has been made of this ambiguous statement[,]" 242 as:
many have erroneously read the second clause as a reference to the
Federal Constitution. Yet Hamilton could not have been referring
to the proposed Constitution when he used the phrases "our own
Constitution" and "our own judges" primarily because the proposed
Constitution was no one's constitution [yet] and because there were
no federal judges [at the time]. In fact, Hamilton was referring to
the New York Constitution and not the proposed Federal
Constitution. We must never forget that Hamilton was writing "To
the People of the State of New York" and often compared the two
constitutions for the benefit of New Yorkers.243
Second, Hamilton himself recognized at least one circumstance in which
judges could be removed by a means other than impeachment, namely the
circumstances in which they had gone insane.244 Therefore even Hamilton
saw that at least one exception from the necessity of removal by
impeachment existed "without any formal or express provision" at all in the
Constitution.245
Thomas Jefferson famously bemoaned the lack of an elective check on
the federal judiciary.24 6 Even so, he recognized that the federal judiciary

241. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
242. Prakash & Smith, supra note 202, at 119.
243. Prakash & Smith, supra note 202, at 119 n.178.
244. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that "insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a
virtual disqualification" from continuing to be a federal judge).
245. Id. Of course, Hamilton's views regarding the exact meaning of the Constitution regarding
its tenure in office provisions have been shown to be in error in other contexts. In Federalist No. 77,
he wrote that the Senate's advice and consent power extended not only to the confirmation of such
officials, but also that "consent of that body would be necessary to displace [an executive official
from office] as well as to appoint." THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 196). Subsequent debates, of course, and the Supreme Court's decision in Myers v.
UnitedStates, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), established that executive officials could be removed from office
by the President alone.
246. He urged that "[wihen the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, they
are responsible to the people in their elective capacity," adding that "[t]he exemption of the judges
from that is quite dangerous enough. I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society but the people themselves." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept.
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was removable by members of the judicial branch itself, writing that judges
"are irremovable, but by their own body, for any depravities of conduct,"247
clearly indicating he believed judges could be removed by the judicial
branch.
Some Members of the First Congress did express the notion that
impeachment is the sole means of removing federal judges, 2 48 but they did so
in a context in which the removal of judges was not specifically at issue.
However, as Raoul Berger has written, "[w]hat the First Congress did when
it had to deal with 'disqualification' of judges [that is, the First Congress's
enactment of the Crimes Act of 1790] thus speaks against reliance upon
some earlier utterances by a few of its members when the removal of judges
was not involved."24 9 Indeed, when one Member of Congress in 1802 did
explicitly describe the removal powers of Congress in a context specifically
regarding its power over federal judges, the conclusion was plain.
Congressman David Stone, of North Carolina, said at length:
[I]t being declared, by the first section of the third article of the
Constitution, that the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts
shall hold their office during good behaviour. They doubtless
shall ... be removed from office by impeachment and conviction;
but it does not follow that they might not be removed by other
means.... [A]lthough a judge, guilty of high crimes and
misdemeanors, is always guilty of misbehaviour in office, yet that
of the various species of misbehaviour in office, which may render
it exceedingly improper that a judge should continue in office, many
of them are neither treason, nor bribery, nor can they properly be
dignified by the appellation of high crimes and misdemeanors ....
To what source, then, shall we resort for a knowledge of what
constitutes this thing, called misbehaviour in office?
The
Constitution, surely, did not intend that a circumstance so important
as the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, should be
incapable of being ascertained. Their misbehaviour certainly is not
an impeachable offense; still it is the ground upon which the judges
are to be removed from office. The process of impeachment,
therefore, cannot be the only one by which the judges may be
28, 1820), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
247. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in HENRY S. RANDALL,
3 THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 648 (1858) (emphasis added).
248. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 579 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ("The judges are appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but they are only removable by
impeachment.") (statement of Rep. Baldwin); id. at. 828 ("The judges are to hold their commissions
during good behavior, and after they are appointed, they are only removable by impeachment. . . .
(statement of Mr. Smith of South Carolina).
249. BERGER, supra note 211, at 157.

900

[Vol. 37: 847, 2010]

Congress's Power to Regulate the FederalJudiciary
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

removed from office, under, and according to the Constitution. I
take it, therefore, to be a thing undeniable, that there resides
somewhere in the Government a power to declare what shall
amount to misbehaviour in office, by the judges, and to remove
them from office for the same, without impeachment.2 50
E. The State Laws Consultedby the Draftersof the Crimes Act of 1790

The Senate committee charged with drafting the Crimes Act of 1790
made a request to see the state laws of Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, when they began the drafting
process. 251 Laws in each of those states included provisions that prohibited
judges who engaged in bribery from holding office.
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided that "[a]ll courts shall
be open.. .. And if any officer shall take greater or other fees than the law
allows him, either directly or indirectly, it shall ever after disqualify him
from holding any office in this state."252 The terms "holding," as used in the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and "hold," as used in the Crimes Act of 1790,253
would seem by their plain meaning to apply to offices contemporaneously
held as well as future offices. 25 4
The Massachusetts Constitution similarly prohibited any person
convicted of bribery from being allowed to "hold" any office of public
trust. 255 And a Massachusetts criminal statute, entitled "An Act to Prevent

250. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 72-73 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks made during the course of
House debate on the repeal of the Act for a New Organization of the Judiciary System).
251. See Letter from Otis to Roger Alden (July 1, 1789), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791:

LEGISLATIvE HISTORIES, at 1720 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
252. 2 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1546 (2d ed. 1972).

COLONIAL

253. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117 ("shall forever be disqualified to hold any
office of honour, trust or profit under the United States").
254. Johnson's Dictionary, first published in 1755 and one of the most influential dictionaries of
the English language, defined "hold" as "to keep." JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 165 (Charles J. Hendee
ed., 1836).
255. See I POORE, supra note 252, at 972 (containing language of the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780, art. 1I, cl. 5, as follows: "And no person shall ever be admitted to hold a seat in the
legislature, or any office of trust or importance under the government of this commonwealth, who
shall in the due course of law have been convicted of bribery or corruption in obtaining an election
or appointment."). Johnson's Dictionary defined "Admit" to include "to allow . .. a position."
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 8 (Charles J. Hendee ed., 1836). If one uses the definitions of "admit" and
"hold," as defined by Johnson's Dictionary, the relevant phrase in the Massachusetts Constitution
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Bribery and Corruption," provided that anyone who received a bribe in any
office of trust "shall, on the conviction, be disabled from holding the [office
of trust], and be forever after [such conviction] incapable of sustaining any
office or place of trust, within this Province." 25 6
South Carolina's anti-bribery statute also provided that "[flor the
avoiding of corruption which may hereafter happen to be in the officers and
ministers of those courts, places, or rooms wherein there is requisite to be
had the true administration of justice or services of trust," 257 anyone who
was found "to receive, have or take any money, fee, reward or any other
profit directly or indirectly . .. shall . . . loose and forfeit all his . . . right,

interest and estate which such person ... shall then have of, in, or to .. . any
of the said office or offices."258
A Virginia statute enacted in 1792, not too long after the enactment of
the Crimes Act of 1790, prohibited bribery and required that a convicted
judge "shall be amerced and imprisoned at the direction of a jury, and shall
be discharged from his office forever." 25 9
Beyond the states whose laws were requested by the drafters of the
Crimes Act of 1790, other states at the time provided for the removal of
judges from office upon conviction in court for bribery. The Maryland
Constitution of November 11, 1776 provided:
[t]hat if any ... Judge ... shall receive, directly or indirectly, at any
time, the profits, or any part of the profits of any office, held by any
other person, during his acting in the office to which he is
appointed; his ... appointment ... (on conviction in a court of law
by oath of two credible witnesses) shall be void; and he shall suffer
the punishment for wilful and corrupt peijury, or be banished this
State forever, or disqualified forever from holding any office or
place of trust or profit, as the court may adjudge.2 60

would read, "[N]o person shall ever be allowed to keep ... any office of trust or importance under
the government of this commonwealth, who shall in the due course of law have been convicted of
bribery or corruption . . . ."
256. 3 PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 1780 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1800, at 213
(misnumbered as 113) (. Thomas & E. T. Andrews eds., 1801).
257. THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM ITS FIRST ESTABLISHMENT AS
A BRITISH PROVINCE DOWN TO THE YEAR 1790, INCLUSIVE, at 146 (John F. Grimkaee ed.,
Philadelphia, R. Aitken 1790).
258. Id.
259. ABRIDGMENT OF THE PUBLIC PERMANENT LAWS OF VIRGINIA 22 (Edmund Randolph ed.
Richmond, Augustine Davis 1796). This relatively contemporaneous statute may indicate a
commonality of thought on this issue that existed at the time.
260. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LIII. As one historian has written, "Maryland constitution
established good behavior as the duration of judicial tenure, but it left judges far from independent.
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The Maryland Constitution also granted good behavior tenure to some
officers, including judges, that would be enforced in court, by providing that
"all Judges ... shall hold their commissions during good behaviour,
removable only for misbehaviour, on conviction in a Court of law." 261
Delaware's Constitution also granted officers good behavior tenure and
provided that "all officers shall be removed on conviction of misbehaviour at
common law or on impeachment, or upon the address of the General
Assembly." 262 Under that clause of the Delaware Constitution, good
behavior tenure was terminable upon a finding of misbehavior in court, and
impeachment was simply an alternative means of removal.263 And the New
Hampshire Constitution of June 2, 1784 provided that "[n]o person shall
ever be admitted to hold ... any office of trust or importance under this
government, who in the due course of law, has been convicted of bribery or
corruption, in obtaining an election or appointment." 264
F. Analogous Provisionsin OtherLaws Passedby the First Congress

At least three statutes passed by the First Congress, other than the
Crimes Act of 1790, contained clauses disqualifying federal officers
engaging in improper behavior. They included an Act to Regulate the
Collection of the Duties, enacted on July 31, 1789;265 an Act to Establish the
Treasury Department, enacted on September 2, 1789;266 and an Act Laying
Duties on Distilled Spirits, enacted on March 3, 1791.267 Taken in context,
these enactments of the First Congress also indicate that the Crimes Act of
1790 was intended to provide for the removal of federal judges from office
upon conviction of bribery in court.

The chancellor and common-law judges could be removed for misbehavior [by] conviction in a court
of law . . . ." See Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution. English and
American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 135, 142 (1969).
261. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XL.
262. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII.
263. See id. ("The president ... and all others offending against the State, either by
maladministration, corruption, or other means, by which the safety of the Commonwealth may be
endangered, within eighteen months after the offence committed, shall be impeachable by the house
of assembly before the legislative council . . . .").
264. THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A SOURCEBOOK AND GUIDE TO
THE IDEAS, TERMS, AND VOCABULARY USED BY THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION 108 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting New Hampshire Constitution of June 2,
1784).
265. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
266. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
267. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199.
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1. Act of July 31, 1789 (Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties)
James Madison introduced the Act to Regulate the Collection of
Duties.268 The Act created various customs officials, and section 35 of the
Act imposed a penalty upon "any officer of the customs" who received "any
bribe ... or recompense for conniving, or shall connive at a false entry of
any ship or vessel, or of any goods, wares or merchandise."269 Upon
conviction under the Act, the officer would incur a fine of two hundred to
two thousand dollars for each offense and would be "forever disabled from
holding any office of trust or profit under the United States."270 Conviction
under the Act, like the Crimes Act of 1790, disabled one from "holding any"
covered office, which would, again, include one's current office.27 1
Although the statute did not explicitly provide for the removal of the
convicted customs officers, disqualification without removal would have
made little sense in the case of a corrupt customs official, just as it would
have made little sense in the case of a corrupt federal judge because it would
have allowed an official who breached the public trust to remain a federal
official and continue to be charged with raising revenue, or making rulings,
under the authority of the state. Further, section 35 of the Act to Regulate
the Collection of Duties did not provide for imprisonment as a penalty, so a
convicted officer would not have been defacto removed from office unless
removal were part of the punishment provided for by statute.272
Consequently, it is likely it was understood by the Act's drafters that a
federal official convicted under the Act would be immediately removed
from office.
2. Act of September 2, 1789 (Act to Establish the Treasury
Department)
The House of Representatives next took up a bill to create the
Department of the Treasury.273 That prompted a great debate on May 19,
1789, among members of the House regarding the constitutionality of
legislation granting the President the power to remove executive officers.274
The House resolved the debate in favor of the President's power to remove
the officers, with Madison arguing that authorizing the President to remove

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
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Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
Act ofJuly 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 383-84 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
See id. at 384-412, 473-608, 614-31, 635-39.
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lower executive officers would beneficially increase the President's own
accountability for the actions of those officers.275
The Act of September 2, 1789, provided for creation of "the following
officers, namely: a Secretary of the Treasury, to be deemed head of the
department; a Comptroller, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Register." 276 All of
these officers were appointed by President George Washington and
confirmed by the Senate.277 Consequently, as officers of the United States,
the people serving in each of those positions were subject to potential
impeachment. Yet the Act also forbade these officers from participating in a
wide range of financial self-dealing, including bribery. Section 8 of the Act
provided:
And be it further enacted, That no person appointed to any office
instituted by this act, shall directly or indirectly be concerned or
interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce, or be
owner in whole or in part of any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself,
or another in trust for him, any public lands or other public
property, or be concerned in the purchase or disposal of any public
securities of any State, or of the United States, or take or apply to
his own use, any emolument or gain for negotiating or transacting
any business in the said department, other than what shall be
allowed by law . ..

27

Classifying the crime as a "high misdemeanor" to be prosecuted in the
federal courts, the Act stipulated not only the punishment of a fine, but also
that the offender "shall upon conviction be removed from office, and forever

275. See id. at 387 (Madison said, "I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have
the power of removing from office; it will make him, in a peculiar manner, responsible for their
conduct, and subject him to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with impunity
high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so
as to check their excesses. On the constitutionality of the declaration I have no manner of doubt.").
The same argument, of course, could support the removal of federal judges by other judges, as such
removal mechanisms would "make [federal judges], in a peculiar manner, responsible for [other
federal judges'] conduct, and subject [them] to impeachment ... if [they] suffer[ federal judges] to
perpetrate with impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or neglect[] to
superintend their conduct, so as to check their excesses." Id.
276. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65, 65.
277. On September 11, 1789, President Washington submitted the nominations to the positions of
Secretary of the Treasury, Comptroller, Treasurer, Auditor, and Register. See U.S. Congress, Senate
Exec. Journal Ist Cong., Ist sess. (Sept. 11, 1789) at 25. The first three of these nominations were
confirmed by the Senate on the same day, and the other two were confirmed the following day. See
id. at 25-26.
278. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. at 67.
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thereafter incapable of holding any office under the United States." 279 The
"conviction" referred to was clearly a conviction in court, as the Act further
provided for an additional incentive for people other than prosecutors to
come forward with information leading to a "prosecution and conviction."
To that end, the Act provided "[t]hat if any other person than a public
prosecutor shall give information of any such offence, upon which a
prosecution and conviction shall be had, one half the aforesaid penalty of
three thousand dollars, when recovered, shall be for the use of the person
giving such information."280 Consequently, the Act made federal officials
removable by criminal conviction in court as well as by impeachment and by
removal by the President.
The Act to establish the Treasury Department was the first statute to
explicitly include "removal" in addition to disqualification as the
punishment for certain acts of official misbehavior. The Crimes Act of 1790
and the Act of July 31, 1789 employed the broader term "hold[ing] any
office," which encompasses both current and future office. 281 The terms
used by the Act of September 2, 1789, also applied to both current and
future offices, but it did so by applying one term for current offices, and
another for future offices, as in "removed from [current] office," and
"forever thereafter incapable of holding any [future] office."282
Why the drafters made explicit in the Act of September 2, 1789 what
was implicit in the Act of July 31, 1789 can be explained by the temporal
fact that the former Act to establish the Treasury Department was drafted
immediately after the comprehensive House debate on the removal powers
of the President. When the Act of September 2, 1789, was drafted, the
concept of removal and the President's removal powers were at the front of
the drafters' minds, and the concept of removal likely would have been
specifically included for clarity's sake. Indeed, section 8, providing for
removal of officers following criminal prosecution, immediately follows the
clause explicitly acknowledging the President's power to remove Treasury
officers.
If the Act to establish the Treasury Department had not explicitly
provided for removal upon conviction in court, it may have been feared that
the statute could be construed to allow removal by the President (which the

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 112, 117; Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1
Stat. 29, 46. .
282. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. at 67.
283. See id. ("And be it further enacted, That whenever the Secretary shall be removed from
office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy in the office of
Secretary, the Assistant shall, during the vacancy, have the charge and custody of the records, books,
and papers appertaining to the said office.").
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Act made explicit, following the extensive House debate on the subject), and
by impeachment, but not by courts as well.
In addition, it is worth noting that, unlike the provision in the Act
authorizing the removal of federal officers by the President, the provision for
the removal of officers following criminal conviction resulted in no debate
whatsoever, providing good reason to believe Congress considered the
removal of federal officers following criminal conviction to be a legitimate
alternative to impeachment.284
3. Act of March 3, 1791 (Act Laying Duties on Distilled Spirits)
Congress also enacted the Act of March 3, 179 1,285 which contained in
section 49 penalties for revenue officers or supervisors who entered "into
any collusion with any person or persons for violating or evading any of the
provisions of this act, or the duties hereby imposed," or who "embezzle[d]
the public money or otherwise [were] guilty of fraud in his office." 286 if
convicted of these offenses, section 49 provided that such supervisor or
other officer "shall forfeit his office, and shall be disqualified for holding

284. This Act and the Constitution appear to recognize the possibility of the removal of federal
officers by impeachment, removal by the President, or conviction in court under the Act's section 8.
Oliver Ellsworth, during the debates during the First Congress regarding whether the President alone
could remove executive officials, argued that because removal was an executive power, only the
President could remove them, making the following analogy:
I buy a Square Acre of land. I buy the Trees. Waters & every thing belonging to it.
[T]he executive power belongs to the president. [T]he removing of officers is a Tree on
this Acre. [Tihe power of removing is therefore, his, it is in him, it is no where else.
[T]hus we are under the necessity of ascertaining by implication where the power is ....
Diary Entry of William Maclay (July 15, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND
OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 3, 113 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). A

slightly different account of the same statement in the Senate comes from Senator William Patterson,
who described Ellsworth's comments as follows:
To turn a man out of office is an exercise neither of legislative nor ofjudicial power; it is
like a tree growing upon land that has been granted [to the President]. The advice of the
senate does not make the appointment; the president appoints: there are certain
restrictions in certain cases, but the restriction is as to the appointment and not as to the
removal.
2 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 192 (1882). Both of these statements are consistent with the view that a federal judge
could also be removed through a process, such as conviction in a federal court, implemented by the
judicial branch itself, as both the removed judge and his removers would occupy the same "land,"
namely that occupied by the judicial branch.
285. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199.
286. Id. § 49, 1 Stat. at 210.
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any other office under the United States." 2 87 This provision also separately
provides for the officer's removal from current office. It also clearly
provides that the offices concerned were to be filled by those appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate under section 4 of
the Act, 288 meaning such officers would also be subject to impeachment.
Consequently, this Act also indicates impeachment and removal by the
President could not have been understood by the drafters of the Act of
March 3, 1791, as the sole means of removing federal officers from office.289
G. Congress'sAllowing CourtRemoval of a TerritorialJudge in 1796

There is also strong evidence that Congress, in 1796, must have thought
that the courts' enforcement of good behavior tenure could be an alternative
to impeachment, based on its experience involving territorial judge George
Turner.
The Northwest Ordinance granted territorial judges tenure during good
behavior.290 When the Constitution was ratified, Congress made territorial
judges "civil officers of the United States," subjecting them also to potential
impeachment under the Constitution. Territorial judges were indeed subject
to impeachment2 9' as they, like federal judges, were "civil officers"

287. Id
That the President be authorized to
288. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 200 ("Be it further enacted ....
appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a supervisor to each district, and as many
inspectors to each survey therein as he shall judge necessary, placing the latter under the direction of
the former.").
289. Interestingly, another Act passed by the First Congress authorized the removal of mint
officers in the executive branch for nothing more than negligence, upon the certification of other
federal officials that included those outside the executive branch. Under the Act of April 2, 1792,
officers of the mint were to strike coins that met certain specified standards. See Act of Apr. 2,
1792, ch. 16, §§ 10-13, 1 Stat. 246, 248-49. Federal officials, including the Chief Justice, the
Secretaries of Treasury and State, and the Attorney General, were also required to periodically
determine whether randomly selected coins had met the minimum statutory requirements. See id.
§ 18, 1 Stat. at 250. If these officials found that the coins were of inferior quality, the Act provided
that "the officer or officers of the said mint whom it may concern shall be held excusable; but if any
greater inferiority shall appear, it shall be certified to the President of the United States, and the said
officer or officers shall be deemed disqualified to hold their respective offices." Id.
290. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a.
291. See House Rules Manual, 109th Congress (108th Cong., 2d Sess.) (House Document No.
108-241) ("Proceedings for the impeachment of territorial judges have been taken in several
instances." (citing 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 2486-2488)); see also EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN:
INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1789 TO 1992, at 25 n.79 (1993) ("Judge Turner's case is of

interest because it was dealt with during a period when Congress was still treating territorial judges
in the same manner as Article III judges for the purposes of removal .... Territorial judges were the
subject of a number of House investigations until the Supreme Court ruled in 1828 that territorial
courts are legislative, not Constitutional Courts .. ., and the House Judiciary Committee concluded
in 1833 that a territorial judge 'is not a proper subject of trial by impeachment . . . .'.) (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, of interest here is how the members of the First Congress treated territorial
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confirmed by the Senate.292 Yet, territorial judges also served under a term
of good behavior.293
There is at least one instance in which a territorial judge was subject to
impeachment proceedings which were later discontinued in favor of
prosecution and removal by a local territorial court: in 1796, the House
discontinued the very first impeachment proceedings it ever initiated,
proceedings against a territorial judge, on the assurance that he would be
prosecuted in the courts. 294
On April 25, 1796, a petition was presented to the House of
Representatives by the inhabitants of St. Clair County, in the Territory
northwest of the Ohio River, alleging judicial misconduct.295 The petition
catalogued Judge Turner's misconduct as follows:
[Y]our petitioners find themselves heavily aggrieved by the
unexampled tyranny and oppressions used in this county by the
honorable George Turner, one of the judges in and over this
Territory, whilst on his circuit.
First, by holding a court unknown to and contrary to the laws of
this Territory, and at the extremity of the of the population of the
county, and compelling a great number of the good people of this
county to attend thereat, as well suitors as jurors and civil officers of
the county, thereby absenting themselves from their abodes, and
exposing many families to the ravages of the hostile Indians, and to
the great loss and damage of the good people by heavy charges that
attend the majority travelling sixty-six miles to attend that court.
By heavy fines set and levied by the said court; by forfeitures
incurred of the property of citizens quietly traveling on the Ohio;
and the people grieved in various other ways, by suits and
prosecutions in the same court, attended with very heavy charges.

judges for purposes of removal: they treated them as Article III judges.
292. The Act of August 7, 1789 provided that "the President shall nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint all officers which by the said [Northwest] ordinance
were to have been appointed by the United States in Congress assembled." Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch.
8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 53.
293. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the
river Ohio provided that "[tihere shall also be appointed a court to consist of three judges ... and
their commissions shall continue in force during good behaviour." Id. at 51 n.a.
294.

1 AM. STATE PAPERS (MISC.) 151-52 (1834).

295. Id
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By compelling the register to transport the office to the extremity
of the population of the county, thereby rendering it unsafe, as well
as inconvenient for the people to have recourse to the office.
By denying us, as we conceive, the rights reserved to us by the
constitution of the Territory, to wit, the laws and customs heretofore
used in regard to the descent and conveyance of property, in which
the French and Canadian inhabitants conceive the language an
essential.
By taking possession of intestate estates, converting part thereof
into ready money, to the great damage of the heirs and creditors,
and carrying the same money away with him; the remaining goods
left in a loose manner, without any account whatever to satisfy
those who have claims.
We therefore pray that your honorable House will take into
consideration the injuries we have sustained by the conduct of the
honorable George Turner, in this county, and provide us such
remedy as you, in your wisdom, may judge expedient ... .296
Interestingly, these charges sound of abuse of power generally rather
than violations of specific statutory law. The House referred the petition to a
committee, and the matter was subsequently referred to the Attorney General
for his opinion.297 On May 9, Attorney General Charles Lee transmitted his
opinion, as follows:
That the charges exhibited in the petition against Judge Turner,
and especially the first, second, and fifth, are of so serious a nature
as to require that a regular and fair examination into the truth of
them should be made, in some judicialcourse ofproceeding; and if
he be convicted thereof, a removalfrom office may and ought to be

a part of the punishment. His official tenure is during good
behavior: and, consequently, he cannot be removed until he be
lawfully convicted of some malversation in office. A judge may be
prosecuted in three modes, for official misdemeanors or crimes: by
information, or by indictment before an ordinary court, or by
impeachment before the Senate of the United States. The last mode,
being the most solemn, seems, in general cases, to be the best suited

296. Id
297. 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES § 2486, at 982 (noting the committee was composed of Theophilus Bradbury of
Massachusetts, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania, John Heath
of Virginia, and Alexander D. Orr of Kentucky). Nicholas Gilman, one of the members of the
committee, was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. See JOSEPH C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF
THE GREAT DEBATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
114 (Greenwood Press 2006).
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to the trial of so high and important an officer; but, in the present
instance, it will be found very inconvenient, if not entirely
impracticable, on account of the immense distance of the residence
of the witnesses from this city [Philadelphia, the nation's capital at
the time].
.. .

[T]he Attorney General is of the opinion that it will be more

advisable, on account of the expense, the delay, the certain
difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining the attendance here of
the witnesses who reside in the Territory northwest of the Ohio ...
that the prosecution should not be carried on by impeachment, but
by information or indictment before the supreme court of that
Territory, which is competent to the trial .... 29 8
Attorney General Lee described the complaints regarding Judge Turner
as charges "of oppression and gross violations of private property, under
color of his office." 2 99 The reference to oppression and gross violations of
private property "under color of his office" indicates that the complaints
related to "oppressive" decisions regarding private property handed down as
part of the judge's official duties. Attorney General Lee's reference to the
''second" charge also refers specifically to the charge relating to the
imposition of heavy fines and ordered property forfeitures.
The Attorney General also wrote that the charges:
have been lately transmitted to the President of the United States
[and] the Secretary of State has been by him instructed to give
orders to Governor St. Clair [the Governor of the Ohio territory] to
take the necessary measures for bringing that officer to a fair trial,
respecting those charges, before the court of that Territory.3 oo
George Washington was the President in 1796.
The report of the Attorney General was referred back to the House
committee on May 10, 1796, which was directed to "examine the matter
301
thereof, and report the same, with their opinion thereupon, to the House."
And, on February 27, 1797, that committee reported its opinion that the case
should be heard before a court in the Territory.302

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

1 AM. STATE PAPERS (Misc.) 51 (1834) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE (First Session, 4th Cong.), at 522.
6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2320 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ("Mr. Bradbury, from the committee to
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XII. THE VIEWS OF MADISON, JEFFERSON, LINCOLN, AND OTHER
PROMINENT POST-FOUNDING FIGURES ON THE MOST LEGITIMATE MEANS
OF CORRECTING CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS

It may be striking to the modem reader that the First Congress enacted
statutes severely limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It did so in a
way that favored upholding federal laws, that gave it complete control over
procedure in federal courts, and that provided a means by which federal
judges could remove other federal judges in addition to the means of
congressional impeachment. But that is all less surprising when one
understands that the Founders, and some of the most prominent American
leaders who followed them, did not view the federal courts as the most
legitimate means of correcting constitutional errors.
James Madison saw popular elections, not judicial review, as the most
legitimate means of correcting constitutional errors. Madison wrote that
constitutional disputes could not ultimately be resolved "without an appeal
to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone
declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance." 30 3 Madison also wrote
in Federalist No. 51 that "[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government."3 0 Madison responded to the question
"what is to controul Congress" when it exceeds its constitutional authority
with the answer: "Nothing within the pale of the Constitution but sound
argument & conciliatory expostulations addressed both to Congress & to
their Constituents." 305 And Madison observed that among the most
important devices for securing the sovereignty of the People, matched only
by "a circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people," was
"Representatives going from, and returning among every part of them."3 06
Thomas Jefferson lamented that:
the germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the
constitution of the federal judiciary; an irresponsible body, (for
impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow,) working like gravity by

whom was referred the petition of Judge Turner; also that of some inhabitants of the Northwestern
Territory, with the report made last session thereon, reported. The committee recommended that the
case should come to a hearing before the Court of that Territory, where the Judge would have an
opportunity to defend himself against the charges brought against him."). It appears that Judge
Turner resigned his judgeship shortly thereafter in the winter of 1797-1798. F.E. SCOBEY & E.W.
DOTY, THE BIOGRAPHICAL ANNALS OF OHIO 144 (1905).
303. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
304. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
305. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in MADISON: WRITINGS 772,
774 (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999).
306. James Madison, Public Opinion, NAT'L GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 1791), reprinted in 14 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 179 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) (emphasis omitted).
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night and by day, gaining a little to-day and a little to-morrow, and
advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of
jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped ... 307
Responding to the argument that federal judges are the final interpreters of
the Constitution, Jefferson wrote:
You seem to consider the [federal] judges as the ultimate arbiters of
all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and
one that would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our
judges are as honest as other men are and no more so. They have
with others the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege
of their corps.... [T]heir power is more dangerous as they are in
office for life, and not responsible, as the otherfunctionaries are, to
the elective control.3 0 8

Jefferson strongly denounced the notion that the federal judiciary should
always have the final say on constitutional issues:
If [such] opinion be sound, then indeed is our Constitution a
completefelo de se [act of suicide]. For intending to establish three
departments, co-ordinate and independent, that they might check
and balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to
one of them alone, the right to prescribe rules for the government of
the others, and to that one too, which is unelected by, and
independent of the nation.... The constitution, on this hypothesis,

307. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond (Aug. 18, 1821), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 331-32 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1903). It is also interesting to note that
Alexander Hamilton apparently believed that the "usurpation" of power by federal judges could be
an impeachable offense. According to Hamilton,
There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the
authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with
it, while this body [the legislature] was possessed of the means [impeachment] of
punishing their presumption by degrading them from their stations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added). It therefore appears that Hamilton believed the "usurpation" of power by federal judges
would be a legitimate cause for impeachment. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
404 (1821) (Marshall, J.) (stating that the Supreme Court "ha[s] no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.") (emphasis added). Today, of course, there is scant prospect of
impeachment when federal judges overstep their authority.
308. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (1820), in S.E. FORMAN, THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (2d ed., 1900) (emphasis added).
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is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may
twist and shape into any form they please.309
As early as 1823, Jefferson observed:
At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were
supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the
government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they
were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the
means for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in
office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors
only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these
decisions, nevertheless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little
and little, the foundations of the constitution, and working its
change by construction, before any one has perceived that that
invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in
consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for
life, if secured against all liability to account.3"0
Abraham Lincoln said in his first inaugural address in 1861:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court ... the
people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that
extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that
eminent tribunal."
More recently, Judge Learned Hand rejected rule by nine "Platonic
Guardians," 312 writing, "Ifwe do need a third [legislative] chamber it should
appear for what it is, and not as the interpreter of inscrutable principles." 3t 3
As Larry Kramer has written in his book The People Themselves, the
Supreme Court was never intended to be the ultimate authority on
constitutional issues, and only in recent decades has the notion that the
Supreme Court is the final authority on constitutional issues taken hold in
popular opinion. As Kramer describes it:

309. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
310. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 486-87 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
311. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
312. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
313. Id. at 70.
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[The Founders'] Constitution remained, fundamentally, an act of
popular will: the people's charter, made by the people.

. .

. [I]t was

"the people themselves"-working through and responding to their
agents in the government-who were responsible for seeing that it
was properly interpreted and implemented. The idea of turning this
responsibility over to judges was simply unthinkable.
This modem understanding [of judicial review] is ... of
It reflects neither the original
surprisingly recent vintage.
conception of constitutionalism nor its course over most of
American history.
It was the original understanding that
[n]o one of the branches [of government] was meant to be superior
to any other, unless it were the legislature, and when it came to
constitutional law, all were meant to be subordinate to the
people . . . [I]n a regime of popular constitutionalism it was not the

judiciary's responsibility to enforce the constitution against the
legislature. It was the people's responsibility: a responsibility they
discharged mainly through elections ....
It was the legislature's delegated responsibility to decide
whether a proposed law was constitutionally authorized, subject to
oversight by the people.m
Explaining why there is not any mention of judicial review in the
Constitution, Kramer writes:
Judicial review was not the question before the [Constitutional]
Convention. The question was how best to prevent the enactment
of unwise and unconstitutional federal legislative measures. The
answer was an executive veto. (And not just a veto, either.
Additional checks on the risk of bad legislation included federalism,
bicameralism, and the likelihood that "the best men in the
Community would be comprised in the two branches of
[Congress].") Some delegates were afraid that the executive might

314. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (2004).

AND

315. Id. at 58-59.
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be too weak, but a solid majority felt otherwise and were concerned
not to involve judges in the lawmaking process. That settled, there
was simply no need to say or do anything more.
... This is why courts and judicial review were so rarely
featured during ratification: members of the Founding generation
had a different paradigm in mind. The idea of depending on judges
to stop a legislature that abused its power never even occurred to the
vast majority of participants in the debates.' 16

As Kramer has described modem history, however:
[A]s Warren Court activism crested in the mid-1960s, a new
generation of liberal scholars discarded opposition to courts and
turned the liberal tradition on its head by embracing a philosophy of
broad judicial authority. ...
... [T]he main body of liberal intellectuals put aside misgivings

about electoral accountability, frankly conceding that judicial
review might be in tension with democracy while justifying any
trade-off on the ground that courts could advance the more
important cause of social justice."
XIII.

THE EARLY AND LONG-ENDURING PRINCIPLE THAT ONLY CLEARLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES SHOULD BE STRUCK DowN

As federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have come to understand
the scope of their authority in increasingly broad ways, they have also come
to deviate wildly from a principle that had long prevailed among the
Founders and the early federal courts. That principle was that judges should
not exercise the jurisdiction they were granted by Congress to strike down
statutes unless such statutes were unconstitutional "beyond dispute." That
this principle of self-restraint prevailed was one of the reasons that the
Founders understood the federal judiciary as by far the weakest branch, and
it explains why they found it unnecessary to devote any significant time to
debating the powers of the federal judiciary at the Constitutional
Convention.
That principle is reflected in The FederalistPapers,in which Alexander
Hamilton wrote that it is the duty of federal judges only to declare void "acts

316. Id. at 77, 91 (quoting Elbridge Gerry, Federal Convention delegate, Comments at the Federal
Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 98).
317. Id. at 223.
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contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution.""' It is also reflected in
the views expressed by those on the early Supreme Court, where even early
supporters of the concept of "judicial review," such as James Iredell,39
conceded that when the courts, including the Supreme Court, were to decide
constitutional issues regarding legislation, "[i]n all doubtful cases . .. the
Act ought to be supported" and that "it should be unconstitutional beyond
dispute before it is pronounced such."320 As Larry Kramer has described it,
"This limiting principle instantly became an article of faith among the
supporters of judicial review, accompanying virtually every statement of the
doctrine." 321 The "doubtful case" rule also explains why judges invariably
illustrated their practical understanding of judicial review by using examples
of obviously unconstitutional laws.322

318. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
According to noted historian Gordon Wood:
Even those who agreed that many of the laws passed by the state legislatures in the
1780s were unjust and even unconstitutional nevertheless could not agree that judges
ought to have the authority to declare such legislation void. For judges to declare laws
enacted by popularly elected legislatures as unconstitutional and invalid seemed
flagrantly inconsistent with free popular government....
Most Americans, even those deeply concerned with the legislative abuses of the 1780s,
were too fully aware of the modem positivist conception of law (made famous by
Blackstone in his Commentaries of the Laws of England), too deeply committed to
consent as the basis of law, and from their colonial experience too apprehensive of the
possible arbitrariness and uncertainties of judicial discretion to permit judges to set aside
laws made by the elected representatives of the people. "This," said a perplexed [James]
Madison in 1788, "makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the Legislature,
which was never intended and can never be proper."
Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the Founding, in IS THE SUPREME COURT THE
GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 158 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993).

319. See HARRINGTON, supranote 135, at 177-78.
320. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 GRIFFITH JOHN
McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 175 (1857).
321. KRAMER, supra note 314, at 65.
322. See, e.g., Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 309 (1795) ("If the
Legislature had passed an act declaring, that, in future, there should be no trial by Jury, would it have
been obligatory? No: It would have been' void for want of jurisdiction, or constitutional extent of
power."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) ("It is declared [in the
Constitution] that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.' Suppose a duty
on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to
be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the
law. The constitution declares that 'no bill of attainder or ex postfacto law shall be passed.' If,
however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court
condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve? 'No person,' says the
constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court.' Here the language of the constitution is addressed
especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from.
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Justice Iredell also recorded Justice Wilson and Judge Peters agreeing
on circuit in United States v. Ravara32 3 that "tho' an Act of Congress plainly

contrary to the Constitution was void, yet no such construction should be
given in a doubtful case." 324 Justice Chase similarly announced in Calder v.
Bull 3 25 that "if I ever exercise the jurisdiction [to review legislation,] I will
not decide any law to be void, but in a very clearcase,"3 26 reiterating a point
he had made previously in Hylton v. United States.327 Justice Bushrod
Washington said much the same thing in Cooper v. Telfair328, noting that
"[t]he presumption, indeed, must always be in favour of the validity of laws,
if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated."3 29 William Paterson, who, next
to Ellsworth, was a principal drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the First
Congress, 330 and who also became a Supreme Court Justice, agreed,
observing in the same case that "to authorise this Court to pronounce any
law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication." 3 '
Indeed, as Larry Kramer has written, for most of the earlier part of
American history:
Judges did not typically intervene unless the unconstitutionality of a
law was clear beyond doubt, which as a practical matter left
questions of policy and expediency to politics. They also shied
away from divisive social conflicts-at least in their constitutional
jurisprudence, and in sharp contrast to their handling of private

If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court,
sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act? From these,
and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution
contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.").
323. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297,27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 16,122).
324.

CASTO, EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 59, at 223 (quoting Iredell).

325. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
326. Id. at 395.
327. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171, 173, 175 (1796).
328. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14 (1800).
329. Id. at 18. Years earlier, George Washington had complained to his nephew Bushrod (before
he became a Supreme Court Justice) about the stubborn unwillingness of Anti-Federalists to
recognize how the Constitution places in the legislative body the ultimate authority to uphold
constitutional norms. Washington wrote, "The power under the Constitution will always be in the
People.
It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to
representativesof their own chusing . . . ." Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington
(Nov. 10, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

154 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (emphasis added). Years later, Justice
Bushrod Washington would also state that "[i]t is but a decent respect due to . .. the legislative body,
by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the constitution
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
330. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, supra note 14, at 298.
331. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 19.
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law-striking laws down only in the situations where judicial
intervention was least likely to be controversial. Courts were
generally respectful of political outcomes, acting in a manner that
remained consistent with long-standing practices of popular
constitutionalism. 332
The early Supreme Court adhered strictly to this principle, as evidenced
by its sparse record of overturning federal statutes. Early on, it upheld a
federal tax law at the expense of a contrary provision of state law in Hylton
v. United States, and generally showed great reluctance to find even state
laws unconstitutional. The only case prior to the Civil War in which the
Court held a state law unconstitutional was Ware v. Hylton.334 During the
same period, the Supreme Court struck down only two federal statutes, one
in Marbury35 and the other in the notorious Dred Scott 36 decision, in which
the Court, striking down the Missouri Compromise, dubiously held that
Congress could not prohibit slavery in a territory because to do so would
violate the Fifth Amendment's protections of private property.3 As Dean
Kramer has written:
Dred Scott stuck out like a sore thumb partly because it was so
unprecedented for the Supreme Court to assert its will over and
against Congress....
...

Having found only two federal laws unconstitutional during

the entire antebellum period (in Marbury and Dred Scott), the Court
[then] struck down four federal statutes in the 1860s alone, followed
by seven in the 1870s, four more in the 1880s, and five in the 1890s.
While these numbers seem small by comparison to today (the Court
struck down thirty federal laws between 1990 and 2000, for
example, the most in its history), the change was striking enough to

332. KRAMER, supra note 314, at 150 (citations omitted).
333. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
334. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
335. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (upholding the relatively
uncontroversial position that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be enlarged by statute).
336. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
337. Id. at 450.
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convince some commentators that it was only in this period that
judicial review "really" became established.
XIV. THE RISKS POSED TO THE POPULAR LEGITIMACY OF THE SUPREME
COURT BY ITS MODERN TENDENCY TO STRIKE DOwN STATUTES BY
NARROW MARGINS

Charles Warren, in 1923, described a situation that seems alien to those
of us who today live an era in which split 5-4 decisions regarding the
constitutionality of statutes are commonplace in the Supreme Court.339
Warren described the much different judicial norms that prevailed then as
follows:
One ... factor which has strengthened the [Supreme] Court in
popular confidence and which has greatly served to lessen the
chances of friction between the component parts of the Federal
system of government has been the voluntary limitation upon the
exercise of its own power which the Court has adopted as a rule of
practice. This limitation . . . was first set forth by Judge Iredell in
1798, when he stated that, as the authority to declare a statute void
"is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that
authority, but in a clear and urgent case."340
The modem Supreme Court appears to have largely abandoned that
"rule of practice," as it has demonstrated an increasing tendency to strike
down federal statutes in narrow 5-4 decisions. When the Court strikes down
legislation with a bare majority of votes, it is clearly not comporting with the
maxim that statutes should only be struck down when they are "contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution," 341 because in such cases forty-four
percent of the Justices in the case cannot see what should be a "manifest"
constitutional violation.

338. KRAMER, supra note 314, at 213 (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (1998)).

339. More generally, in the 2006-2007 term, a full third of the Supreme Court's decisions were
decided by 5-4 margins. See Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved
Right, N.Y TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al.. A single Justice-Anthony Kennedy-was in the majority
in every case decided 5-4. See id.
340.

1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 23-24 & 24 n.l

(1923) (string citing cases supporting the proposition that legislation should only be struck down in
clear cases of unconstitutionality).
341. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added). Johnson's Dictionary, first published in 1755 and one of the most influential
dictionaries of the English language, defined "manifest" as "plain, evident, clear." JOHNSON'S
DICTIONARY 209 (Charles J. Hendee ed., 1836).
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The Supreme Court did not strike down a statute as unconstitutional by
a vote of 5-4 until its 1849 decision in the PassengerCases,3 4 2 which struck
down a New York and a Massachusetts law. It continued to do so relatively
infrequently, until just after Charles Warren wrote the article quoted above
in 1923.343 Starting in the mid-1920s and accelerating after the 1960s, the
Supreme Court, with much greater frequency, has struck down as
unconstitutional, on narrow 5-4 margins, federal and state statutes, and local
ordinances and state constitutional provisions, as illustrated by the graph
below3 " The x-axis shows the number of statutes, ordinances, or state
constitutional provisions struck down, and the y-axis shows the year in
which the Supreme Court struck them down.

7

5
4
3
2

1
0.
1810 1832 1854 1876 1898 1920 1942 1964 1986 2008
0 Statutes, Ordinances, or State

Constitutional Provisions the
Supreme Court Struck Down as
Unconstitutional by Votes of 5-4

To take just two examples from its October 2007 term, the traditional
rule that the Supreme Court should only strike down a statute as

342. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
343. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
344. For a full listing and description of the cases summarized in the graphic, see Appendix C to
this Article.
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unconstitutional in clear cases was certainly not followed by the Court's 5-4
majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush.345 In that opinion, written by
Justice Kennedy, a key portion of the Military Commissions Act was struck
down as unconstitutional, and unlawful enemy combatants, for the first time
in history, were granted habeas litigation rights to challenge their detention
in federal court.34 6 Five Justices struck down balanced legislation on the
subject, even though the majority admitted in its opinion that it was
operating under a "lack of historical evidence on point" 347 and that "the
cases before us lack any precise historical parallel."34 8
The rule was also abandoned in the Court's decision in Kennedy v.
Louisiana,34 9 in which it held, 5-4, that a Louisiana statute that imposed the
death penalty for the rape of a child was unconstitutional. 350 As Justice Alito
pointed out in his dissent:
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of raping
a child. This is so, according to the Court, no matter how young the
child, no matter how many times the child is raped, no matter how
many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how sadistic the
crime, no matter how much physical or psychological trauma is
inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator's prior criminal
record may be.*
More important from the perspective of popular legitimacy, however,
was that the majority decision in the Kennedy case rested in large part not on
evidence it deemed lacking or off-point, as it did in its Boumediene decision,
but on evidence that was subsequently found to be demonstrably false. The
majority decision was based largely on its determination that Congress had
not imposed the death penalty for the rape of a child, and thus, there was no

345. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
346. See id. at 2277.
347. Id at 2251.
348. Id. at 2262. For an analysis of the constitutional and historical precedents to which the
majority gave short shrift or ignored in its Boumediene decision, and for a review of the provisions
crafted by Congress and the President that the Court struck down, see Paul Taylor, The Historical
and Legal Norms Governing the Detention of Suspected Terrorists and the Risks Posed by Recent
Efforts to Departfrom Them, 12 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 223 (2008).
349. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
350. Id. at 2646. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, so held even though, as he admitted, the
"crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt
and horror inflicted on his victim or to convey the revulsion society, and the jury that represents it,
sought to express by sentencing petitioner to death." Id.
351. Id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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evidence of a national consensus in favor of imposing the death penalty for
child rape.352 However, as was widely reported following the decision:
Three days after the decision was handed down, a military
reservist and lawyer who blogs on military justice issues pointed out
that in fact, contrary to what the Court had said, there is a federal
statute expressly authorizing capital punishment for child rape. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 is the law,
and in its revision of the sex crimes section of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice it explicitly authorizes the death penalty for soldiers
who commit child rape.
As it happened, not just the Kennedy majority failed to notice the
existence of this federal law. So did the four dissenting justices. So
did petitioner Kennedy and respondent Louisana [sic]. Moreover,
none of the 10 friends of the court in the case, not even one, cited
the law. Neither did the solicitor general's office, which represents
the government in the Supreme Court and on which the Court
counts to advise it regarding any federal interest (such as a federal
statute) that might be implicated in a case in which the government
is not a party. Indeed, the solicitor general didn't even file a brief in
Kennedy, a failure the Justice Department now regrets ....
This [was a] remarkably complete failure to take notice of an
.
obviously relevant federal law . ...
Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School wrote of that case:
[T]here was a problem with the court's understanding of the basic
facts. It failed to take account-because nobody involved in the

352. See id. at 2651-52 (majority opinion) ("The existence of objective indicia of consensus
against making a crime punishable by death was a relevant concern in [previous cases] and we
follow the approach of those cases here... . As for federal law, Congress in the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 expanded the number of federal crimes for which the death penalty is a
permissible sentence, including certain nonhomicide offenses; but it did not do the same for child
rape or abuse."). The Court ultimately concluded that "[biased both on consensus and our own
independent judgment, our holding is that a death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child,
and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 2650-5 1.
353. Terry Eastland, Supremely Screwed Up, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2008, at 12. Section
552(b)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3136, 3263 (2006), specifies maximum sentences as follows: "For an offense under subsection
(a) (rape) or subsection (b) (rape of a child), death or such other punishment as a court-martial may
direct."
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case had noticed-that in 2006 no less an authority than Congress,
in the National Defense Authorization Act, had prescribed capital
punishment as a penalty available for the rape of a child by
someone in the military.
...

[The Court's] credibility depends on both candor and

correctness when it comes to the factual predicates of its rulings.354
Ironically, in Kennedy, the Court not only abandoned the longstanding rule
designed to protect statutes enacted by duly elected legislatures, but it did so
by relying on the absence of another duly enacted statute that it neglected to
recognize existed.
The analysis of the national "consensus" relied on by the Court suffered
further with the results of polls showing that a majority of Americans
supported the availability of the death penalty for child rape. For example, a
Quinnipiac poll conducted in July 2008, asked: "The Supreme Court has
recently ruled that a mandatory death penalty for child rape is
unconstitutional. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons
convicted of child rape?" Fifty-five percent responded "Favor," and only
thirty-eight percent responded "Oppose."3 55
The Kennedy case reveals a startling breakdown in the system of
Supreme Court review in which a basic and arguably crucial fact related to
its method of analysis failed to be caught by every cog attached to the
judicial machinery, from the lawyers, to the judges on both sides, and to all
the other parties that contributed their views on the issue at each stage of the
judicial process. It reminds us again that the entire process by which courts
decide cases is not the optimal means for developing informed public policy.
Larry Kramer has described what may have been the reaction of
previous generations of Americans to the situation that exists today:
Neither the Founding generation nor their children nor their
children's children, right on down to our grandparents' generation,
were so passive about their role as republican citizens. They would
not have accepted-did not accept-being told that a lawyerly elite
had charge of the Constitution, and they would have been
incredulous if told (as we are often told today) that the main reason
to worry about who becomes president is that the winner will
control judicial appointments. Something would have gone terribly
wrong, they believed, if an unelected judiciary were being given

354. Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court Is Wrong on the Death Penalty, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2008, at A13.
355. See Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, But They Don't Want Government to Ban It (July 17,
2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x I 295.xml?ReleaselD= 1194.
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that kind of importance and deference. Perhaps such a country
could still be called democratic, but it would no longer be the kind
of democracy Americans had fought and died and struggled to
create. 5
Today, following a much greater frequency of controversial 5-4
decisions handed down by the Court, it is not surprising that the public's
general approval of the Supreme Court has dramatically declined over the
last several years, such that its approval rating in 2008 was only 39%, down
from 56% five years previously in 2003.357 The Gallup organization has also
reported that only 32% of those surveyed in 2008 had a "great deal" or
"quite a lot" of confidence in the Court, down from 44% in 1973, when
Gallup conducted its first poll of the reputation of the Court among the
public. 5 Whether this trend will result in a renewal of the understanding of
earlier generations, as Larry Kramer describes, remains to be seen.
XV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has declared itself the "ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution,"3 9 which implies that it is also the ultimate arbiter of the
constitutional powers of Congress over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. If
that is true, then the Court alone is the master of its own domain. The
Supreme Court has also stated, albeit in dicta, that Article III courts are
"presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by
impeachment."3 60 Both statements are, in many ways, placed in doubt by the
enactments of the First Congress and the actions of the former members of
the Constitutional Convention who served in it.
Even before the First Congress, a constitutional provision was rejected
that would have given the Supreme Court veto power over legislation on the
grounds that even that proposal gave too much power to the Court, even
when the provision under consideration would have given Congress the

356. KRAMER, supranote 314, at 228.
357. See http://www.pollingreport.com/court2.htm (Quinnipiac poll of 3,097 registered voters)
(July 8-13, 2008).
358. See Gallup, Confidence in Institutions (June 14-17, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
1597/Confidence-Institutions.aspx.
359. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969) ("[I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.");
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution.").
360. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (emphasis added).
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power to override any veto by the Court. " Instead, a judiciary provision
was supported that James Madison understood to provide courts with the
power to decide cases only "of a Judiciary Nature," something much
narrower than the power to expound on all cases that could arise under the
Constitution.3 62 And the only cases the Constitution required any federal
court to have jurisdiction over were those involving ambassadors and in
which a state was a party.363 That Constitution was defended in the
FederalistPapers on the grounds that the federal courts it allowed were
"next to nothing," and, in any case, the Constitution allowed Congress to
remove any "inconveniences" the federal courts should present in order to
"best answer the ends of public justice and security."364
The First Congress, whose expressed understanding of the Constitution
should hold great weight, overwhelmingly enacted the Judiciary Act of
1789, which prohibited review in any federal court of state court decisions
that upheld federal provisions, even when federal constitutional claims were
raised, significantly restricting federal court jurisdiction in a way specifically
designed to increase the chances federal statutes would be upheld.365 It also
contained a significant amount in controversy limit on jurisdiction, and no
general federal question jurisdiction, leaving a huge variety of cases
involving, among others, constitutional, tort, and contract issues-including
those required to be heard under the Treaty of Paris-beyond the reach of
any federal court. The regime established by section 25 of the Judiciary Act
was only replaced when Congress amended the Act in 1914 to allow
Supreme Court review of state court decisions upholding federal provisions,
and Congress did so then simply to produce yet another substantive result,
namely the upholding of state workers compensation laws.
The Process Act of 1789, also enacted by the First Congress, dictated
precisely what procedures would govern in federal courts, a power Congress
was recognized as having under its legislative powers.367
And the Crimes Act of 1790 provided for a means of allowing federal
judges to remove other federal judges from office supplemental to and
independent of the impeachment process. 368 That independent removal
process was entirely consistent with the hornbook understanding at the time:
that life tenure subject to good behavior could be lost following convictions

361. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
364. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
supra Part IV.
365. See supra Parts VI.A-B.
366. See supra Part VII.
367. See supra Part X.A.
368. See supra Parts XL.A-B.
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in court.3 69 It was also consistent with the views of the most prominent
Founders,370 with the contemporaneous state laws requested to be reviewed
by the drafters of the Act,31' with similar statutes enacted by the First
Congress regarding the court removal of civil officers of the United
States, 372 and with the House of Representatives's decision to allow the
removal of a territorial judge through court process in 1796 following
allegations that the judge had abused his power.
Oliver Ellsworth, the driving force behind all three Acts and the man
dubbed the "father of the national judiciary," 374 was one of only five
members of the Committee of Detail who issued the first draft of the
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention. He was later appointed by
George Washington to be the third Chief Justice of the United States, 7 in
which capacity he supported Congress's broad powers over federal court
jurisdiction, the same view he held during the ratification debates.
The restrictions the First Congress placed on the federal courts, and
Congress's control over the federal judiciary generally, are entirely
consistent with Marbury v. Madison.3 77 Marbury established the principle of
judicial review and stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court is the
final decision-maker for issues within its original jurisdiction or under its
authority by express statutory grant. If a case does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts because Congress has not granted the
required jurisdiction, federal courts simply cannot hear the case. The author
of Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall, after he decided Marbury, himself
dismissed cases when Congress had not granted federal courts jurisdiction to
hear them under the Judiciary Act of 1789.378
369. See supra Part XI.C.
370. See supra Part XI.D.
371. See supra Part XI.E.
372. See supra Part XI.F.
373. See supra Part XI.G.
374. 1GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 63, at 335.
375. See BROWN, supra note 16, at 238.
376. See id. at 133.
377. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court found that under
Article III of the Constitution, a party within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction must be a
State or an ambassador and that neither Marbury nor Madison was a state or an ambassador. Id at
173-75. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
fixed by the Constitution, and it dismissed the case because Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority when it granted the Supreme Court, by mere statute, original jurisdiction to hear Marbury's
case in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id.
378. See Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268, 269-70 (1806) (dismissing case for lack of
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789) ("This court has no jurisdiction, under the 25th section
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Marbury stands for the relatively simple proposition that if the federal
courts perceive Congress or the President as acting beyond their lawful
authority, they may exercise their judicial power to decide the case in
conformity with the Constitution and declare the statute or offending action
unconstitutional. 37 9 The other branches, of course, have counteracting
powers as well. If the President believes Congress or the courts have
overstepped their constitutional bounds, the President may use the veto
power, or the pardon power, to counter them. 380 And if Congress believes
the Executive is exceeding its constitutional authority, Congress can use the
power of the purse to deny funding to the executive branch so it cannot
administer its unconstitutional actions.8 1
But if this system is to maintain a popularly and constitutionally
legitimate balance, it must contain an element in which, if Congress
perceives the Supreme Court to be exceeding its own constitutional
authority, Congress can use its legitimate powers to alter the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to place limits on those courts, including the Supreme
Court.382 Without such an element, the Supreme Court, alone among all
parts of the federal system, would be completely unchecked.
It alone

of the judiciary act of 1789, but in a case where a final judgment or decree has been rendered in the
highest court of law or equity of a state, in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn
in question, the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States,
and the decision is againsttheir validity, &c. or where is drawn in question, the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States,
and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption, specially set up or claimed by
either party, under such clause of the said constitution, treaty, statute or commission. In the present
case, such of the defendants as were aliens, filed a petition to remove the cause to the federal circuit
court, under the 12th section of the same act. The state court granted the prayer of the petition, and
ordered the cause to be removed; the decision, therefore, was not against the privilege claimed under
the statute; and, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction in the case. The writ of error must be
dismissed.").
379. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 172-80.
380. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (veto power); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (pardon power).
381. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
382. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (Supreme Court's original jurisdiction); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1, cl. I (Congress's power to create lower federal courts); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2
(Congress's power to make exceptions to all federal courts' appellate jurisdiction). Such
congressional power, of course, is subject to the check in which members of an overreaching
Congress may not be reelected by the people. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I (House Members
elected every two years); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (Senators elected every six years).
383. Unlike federal judges, of course, the vast majority of state judges have fixed terms and must
face periodic elections. Indeed, only three states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island-give judges what some call life tenure. See LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 19-20 (1981).
Judges in both
Massachusetts and New Hampshire face a mandatory retirement age of seventy. See MASS. CONST.
pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXVIII. New Jersey, which has no fixed term for judges
after an initial seven year appointment, also has a mandatory retirement age of seventy. N.J. CONST.
art. VI, § 6. In addition, in both Massachusetts and New Hampshire, judges may be removed by a
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would be the judge of its own constitutional powers, no matter how poorly
reasoned its decisions and no matter how dire the impact of those decisions,
because the writing of poorly reasoned opinions alone does not constitute an
Additionally, the
impeachable "high Crime [or] Misdemeanor[]." 3 84
doctrine of judicial immunity provides judges with vast protection from
lawsuits claiming their actions or inactions harmed the public health and
safety.
Such a system, constituting rule by five Justices, may be tolerated today,
but it is dramatically inconsistent with the balance struck by the Founders
and observed by many generations thereafter. 8 That inconsistency has
been greatly aggravated by the modem Supreme Court's frequent
abandonment of the formerly long-standing principle that even when the
courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims regarding federal
statutes, the courts should not strike down statutes enacted by duly elected
legislatures unless such statutes are unconstitutional, beyond dispute.387
Under that former consensus principle, only two federal statutes were struck
down by the Supreme Court in the first 67 years of its existence,388 a far cry
from the modem Court's string of controversial 5-4 decisions striking down
legislation, which have helped sink the Court's stature to new lows in the
estimation of the American public. 8
If the increasing number of 5-4 decisions by the Supreme Court can be
considered "political" decisions-in the sense that they result from sharp
ideological disagreements regarding policy-then Congress may, following
the First Congress, wish to increasingly restrict that Court's and other

vote of both houses of the legislature. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
LXXIII. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a provision allowing the Rhode Island
legislature to declare a judicial office vacant had been implicitly repealed in 1893, In re Advisory
Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1322 (R.I. 1986), making that state the only one in which
judges truly have life tenure.
384. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
385. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871) (holding that "[j]udges of courts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of theirjurisdiction,and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly")
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court defined the scope ofjudicial immunity even more broadly in
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978), holding that "[a] judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority . . . ."
386. See supra Parts XII-XIII.
387. See supra Part XIII.
388. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856); see also supra Part XIII.
389. See supra Part XIV.
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federal courts' ability to replace Congress's own political judgments with
the political judgments of unelected judges, and to limit the federal courts'
anti-democratic influence.
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APPENDIX A: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS AFTER 1799 REGARDING
CONGRESS'S POWER TO LIMIT FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268 (1806).

In Gordon v. Caldcleugh, the Court, through Chief Justice Marshall,
held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the
highest state court when such decision was in favor of the validity of a
federal law or an authority exercised under such law, stating that in the case
below "[t]he state court granted the prayer of the petition" and "the
decision ... was not againstthe privilege claimed under the statute.""o
Durousseauv. UnitedStates, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
Chief Justice Marshall, in Durousseau v. United States, wrote:

Had the judicial act created the Supreme Court, without defining or
limiting its jurisdiction, it must have been considered as possessing
all the jurisdiction which the constitution assigns to it. The
legislature would have exercised the power it possessed of creating
a supreme court as ordained by the constitution; and, in omitting to
exercise the right of excepting from its constitutional powers, would
have necessarily left those powers undiminished. The appellate
powers of this court are not given by the judicial act. They are
given by the constitution. But they are limited and regulated by the
judicial act, and by such other acts as have been passed on the
subject.
When the first legislature of the union proceeded to carry the
third article of the constitution into effect, they must be understood
as intending to execute the power they possessed of making
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They
have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They
have not declared that the appellate power of the court shall not
extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its
jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to
imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it.

390. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268, 270 (1806).
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The spirit as well as the letter of a statute must be
respected . . . .'

Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
In McIntire v. Wood, the Court stated:

But although the judicial power of the United States extends to
cases arising under the laws of the United States, the legislature
have not thought proper to delegate the exercise of that power to its
Circuit Courts, except in certain specified cases. When questions
arise under those laws in the State Courts, and the party who claims
a right or privilege under them is unsuccessful, an appeal is given to
the Supreme Court, and this provision the legislature has thought
sufficient at present for all the political purposes intended to be
answered by the clause of the constitution, which relates to this
subject.392

Cary v. Curds, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
In Cary v. Curtis, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a statute
that placed jurisdiction for all claims of illegally charged customs duties
with the Secretary of the Treasury. The Court stated that, under the statute,
"it is the [S]ecretary of the Treasury alone in whom the rights of the
government and of the claimant are to be tested."393 In a broad decision, the
Court upheld a federal statute that removed jurisdiction over all such claims
from both the state and federal courts and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction:
It is contended, however, that the language and the purposes of
Congress, if really what we hold them to be declared in the statute
of 1839, cannot be sustained, because they would be repugnant to
the Constitution, inasmuch as they would debar the citizen of his
right to resort to the courts of justice.... [I]n the doctrine so often
ruled in this court, that the judicial power of the United States,
391. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313-14 (1810).
392. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813) (emphasis added).
393. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 241; see also id at 242 ("To permit the receipts at the customs to
depend on constructions as numerous as are the agents employed, as various as might be the designs
of those who are interested; or to require that those receipts shall await a settlement of every dispute
or objection that might spring from so many conflicting views, would be greatly to disturb, if not to
prevent, the uniformity prescribed by the Constitution, and by the same means to withhold from the
government the means of fulfilling its important engagements.... We have no doubts of the objects
or the import of that act; we cannot doubt that it .. . has made the head of the Treasury Department
the tribunal for the examination of claims for duties said to have been improperly paid.").
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although it has its origin in the Constitution, is (except in
enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court)
dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of
its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the
sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court)
for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of
withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.
To deny this position would be to elevate the judicial over the
legislative branch of the government, and to give to the former
powers limited by its own discretion merely. It follows, then, that

the courts created by statute must look to the statute as the warrant
for their authority, certainly they cannot go beyond the statute, and
assert an authority with which they may not be invested by it, or
which may be clearly denied to them. This argument is in no wise
impaired by admitting that the judicial power shall extend to all
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Perfectly consistent with such an admission is the truth, that the
organization of the judicial power, the definition and distribution of
the subjects of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals, and the modes of
their action and authority, have been, and of right must be, the work
of the legislature. The existence of the Judicial Act itself, with its
several supplements, furnishes proof unanswerable on this point.
The courts of the United States are all limited in their nature and
constitution, and have not the powers inherent in courts existing by
prescription or by the common law.394
Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847).
In Barry v. Mercein, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]y the constitution
of the United States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any
case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred
be exercised in any other form, or by any other mode of proceeding than that
which the law prescribes." 395

394. Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added).
395. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847).
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Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
In Sheldon v. Sill, the Supreme Court stated:
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had ordained and
established the inferior courts, and distributed to them their
respective powers, they could not be restricted or divested by
Congress. But as it has made no such distribution, one of two
consequences must result, -either that each inferior court created
by Congress must exercise all the judicial powers not given to the
Supreme Court, or that Congress; having the power to establish the
courts, must define their respective jurisdictions. The first of these
inferences has never been asserted, and could not be defended with
any show of reason, and if not, the latter would seem to follow as a
necessary consequence. And it would seem to follow, also, that,
having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court
of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.
Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the
statute confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to
jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.
Such has been the doctrine held by this court since its first
establishment. To enumerate all the cases in which it has been
either directly advanced or tacitly assumed would be tedious and
unnecessary.
Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1868).
In Mayor v. Cooper,the Supreme Court held that:
How jurisdiction shall be acquired by the inferior courts, whether it
shall be original or appellate, or original in part and appellate in
part, and the manner of procedure in its exercise after it has been
acquired, are not prescribed. The Constitution is silent upon those
subjects. They are remitted without check or limitation to the
wisdom of the legislature.
As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal,
two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or
appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the
capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it.
Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. ...

396. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,448-49 (1850).
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It is the right and the duty of the national government to have its
Constitution and laws interpreted and applied by its own judicial
tribunals. In cases arising under them, properly brought before it,

this court is the final arbiter.3 97

Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
In Ex Parte Yerger, the Court acknowledged explicitly and
unequivocally that its appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction is given subject to
regulation by Congress, stating:
It is proper to add, that
any act of Congress ...
appellate jurisdiction in
abridge the jurisdiction

we are not aware of anything [relevant] in
which indicates any intention to withhold
habeas corpus cases from this court, or to
derived from the Constitution and defined

by the act of 1789. We agree that it is given subject to exception
and regulation by Congress .... 39 8
UnitedStates v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).

In United States v. Klein, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
purported to deny the lower U.S. Court of Claims and the Supreme Court the
authority to hear, on appeal, claims for property brought by those who were
pardoned by President Lincoln following the Civil War.399 The Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. 400 First, because the
statute made having received a pardon proof of disloyalty that effectively
denied the right to federal judicial review, it found that in forbidding the
Court "to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such
evidence should have" and directing the court "to give it an affect precisely
contrary," Congress had "inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power.'401
Second, the statute
unconstitutionally "impair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the
constitutional power of the Executive."4 02

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251-52 (1868) (emphasis added).
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102 (1869) (emphasis added).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871).
Id at 147.
Id
Id
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In the opinion, however, the Supreme Court stated, "It seems to us that
this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make
exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power." 403 Further, the
Court stated:
If [the challenged statute] simply denied the right of appeal in a
particularclass of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be
regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make 'such
exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction' as should seem to it

expedient. But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it
does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means
to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons
granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged
them to have.4 04
In other words, the denial of federal court jurisdiction would have been
upheld if it had not effectively acted to limit the President's constitutional
pardon power.
The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381 (1881).
In The "FrancisWright, " the Supreme Court stated:

[W]hile the appellate power of this court under the Constitution
extends to all cases within the judicial power of the United States,
actual jurisdiction under the power is confined within such limits as
Congress sees fit to prescribe.... What those powers shall be, and
to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been,
proper subjects of legislative control. Authority to limit the
jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority to limit the use of
the jurisdiction. Not only may whole classes of cases be kept out of
the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions may
be subjected to re-examination and review, while others are not.4 05
Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
In Plaquemines TropicalFruit Co. v. Henderson, the Court stated, "It is

for Congress to say how much of the judicial power of the United States
shall be exercised by the subordinate courts it may establish from time to
,,406
time.

403.
404.
405.
406.
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Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
Id at 145 (emphasis added).
105 U.S. 381,385-86 (1881).
170 U.S. 511, 521 (1898).
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Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165 (1904).

In Stevenson v. Fain, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Supreme
Court alone 'possesses [original] jurisdiction derived immediately from the
Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it,' but the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts depends upon some act of Congress."407
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
In Kline v. Burke Construction Co., the Supreme Court stated:

Only the [original] jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived
directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the
general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the
authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict
such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended
beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.... The
Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take
jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of
Congress to confer it.... And the jurisdiction having been
conferred may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in
part .... A right which thus comes into existence only by virtue of
an act of Congress, and which may be withdrawn by an act of
Congress after its exercise has begun, cannot well be described as a
constitutional right.408
The Court also stated that every inferior court "derives its jurisdiction
wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or
restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution."4 09
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
In Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., the Supreme Court again upheld a

statute that placed limits on the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,
stating:
[T]he power of the court to grant the relief prayed depends upon the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the statutes of the United States.
407. 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904) (quoting U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812)).
408. 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (internal citations omitted).
409. Id.

937

Section 7 [of the Act] declares that 'no court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein
defined' [with certain exceptions] .... There can be no question of
the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the
410
inferior courts of the United States.
Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U.S. 182 (1943).

In Lockerty v. Phillips, the Supreme Court similarly held, in upholding a
statute limiting lower courts' jurisdiction over challenges to price controls,
that:
[b]y this statute Congress has seen fit to confer on the Emergency
Court (and on the Supreme Court upon review of decisions of the
Emergency Court) equity jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of
price orders under the Emergency Price Control Act. At the same
time it has withdrawn that jurisdiction from every other federal and
state court. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires
Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior
federal court. All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court,
derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to
"ordain and establish" inferior courts, conferred on Congress by
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution. Article III left Congressfree to
establish inferiorfederal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It
could have declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the
remedies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this
Court as Congress might prescribe. The Congressional power to

ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power "of investing
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and
of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."
In the light of the explicit language of the Constitution and our
decisions, it is plain that Congress has power to provide that the
equity jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of the Act, or of
regulations promulgated under it, be restricted to the Emergency
Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court.

410. 303 U.S. 323, 327, 329-30 (1938)
411. 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).

In Palmore v. United States, the Court stated, "[Congress] was not
constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts . . . Nor, if inferior
federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the
jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III.',412

412. 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973).
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APPENDIX B: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS AFTER 1825 REGARDING
CONGRESS'S POWER OVER FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE

Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835).
In Livingston v. Story, the Court reaffirmed Congress's power over
procedure, relying on Article III as the source of Congress's authority.413
The Court held that the district court in Louisiana was required to exercise
equitable jurisdiction in diversity cases, despite the absence of an equitable
practice in Louisiana state courts. In reaching that conclusion, Justice
Thompson wrote:
That Congress has the power to establish circuit and district
courts in any and all the states, and confer on them equitable
jurisdiction in cases coming within the constitution, cannot admit of
a doubt. It falls within the express words of the constitution. "The
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may, from time to
time, ordain and establish." And that the power to ordain and
establish, carries with it the power to prescribe and regulate the
modes of proceeding in such courts, admits of as little doubt.414
Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
In Riggs v. Johnson County, the Court stated:
Modes of process, and forms of process, were in use in the States
at that period, other than such as were known at common law as

understood in the English courts. Radical changes had been made
in some of the States, not only in the forms of mesne process, and
the rules of pleading, but in the modes of process in enforcing
judgment, as was well known to Congress when the Judiciary and
Process Acts were passed.
... Intention of Congress, in passing the Process Acts, was, that

the forms of writs and executions, and the modes of process, and
proceedings in common law suits, in the several Circuit Courts,
should be the same as they were at that time in the courts of the
respective States. Instead of framing the forms of process, and
prescribing the modes of process, Congress adopted those already

413. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 654-60 (1835).
414. Id. at 656 (citation omitted).
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prepared and in use in the respective States, not as State regulations,
but as the rules and regulations prescribed by Congress for use in
the several Circuit Courts. Adopted as they were, by an act of
Congress, they became the permanent forms and modes of
proceeding, and continue in force wholly unaffected by any
subsequent State legislation. Alterations can only be made by
Congress, or by the Federal courts, acting under the authority of an
act of Congress.4 15
Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U.S. 376 (1887).
In Lamaster v. Keeler, the Court wrote:

The first process act of Congress, passed September 29, 1789, (1
Stat. 93, c. 21), provided "that, until further provision shall be
made ... the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and
modes of process, . . . in the circuit and district courts, in suits at

common law, shall be the same in each State, respectively, as are
now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same."
Congress, which alone can determine the remedies which may be
pursued for the enforcement of judgments in the Federal courts, as
well as the procedure to be adopted in the progress of a suit, has
declared its will with respect to both.4 1 6
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., the Court stated that "Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts." 417
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).

In Hanna v. Plumer, the Court stated that "the constitutional provision
for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause)
carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts." 418

415.
416.
417.
418.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 190-91 (1867).
123 U.S. 376, 389-390 (1887) (first two alterations in original).
312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
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Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
In Mistretta v. United States, the Court stated that "rulemaking power
originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only
when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch.'A 9 By the same
reasoning, it would also become a judicial function only when delegated by
the legislature to the judicial branch.
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992).
In Willy v. Coastal Corp., the Court stated that "[fjrom almost the
founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that
Congress ... may enact laws regulating the conduct of [the lower federal]
courts.'A20

419. 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989).
420. 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992).
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APPENDIX C: 5-4 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS STRIKING DOWN
FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTES, OR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, AS VIOLATING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute
S

Year

Case

1849

Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283

1851

Woodruff v.
Trapnall,51
U.S. (10
How.) 190

S

1867

Ex parte
Garland,71
U.S. (4 Wall.)
333

F

Requirement of a test oath (disavowing
actions in hostility to the United States)
before admission to appear as attorney in
a federal court by virtue of any previous
admission was held invalid as applied to
an attorney who had been pardoned by
the President for all offenses during the
Rebellion as ex post facto, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and an interference with
the pardoning power, U.S. CONST. art. II,

1873

State Tax on
Foreign-Held
Bonds, 82
U.S. (15
Wall.) 300

S

A Pennsylvania law, insofar as it directed
domestic corporations to withhold on
behalf of the state a portion of interest
due on bonds owned by nonresidents,
impaired the obligation of contract and
denied due process by taxing property

1883

Kring v.
Missouri, 107

S

Subject
Collection by New York and
Massachusetts of per capita taxes on
alien and domestic passengers arriving in
the ports of these states violated
Congress's power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce pursuant to Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3.
A judgment debtor of the State of
Arkansas tendered, in satisfaction of the
judgment, banknotes in circulation at the
time of the repeal by the state of that
section of the said bank's charter
providing that such notes should be
received in discharge of public debts.
Under the Contracts Clause, the
legislative repeal could neither affect
such notes nor abrogate the pledge of the
state to receive them in payment of

Subject
Summary
Interstate
Commerce

Contracts
Clause

debts.

Ex Post
Facto and
Pardon
Power

§2, cl. 1.

Contracts
Clause and
Due
Process

beyond its jurisdiction.

U.S. 221

A Missouri law that abolished a rule
existing at the time the crime was

Ex Post
Facto

committed, under which subsequent

943

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

Subject

prosecution for first degree murder was
precluded after a conviction for second
degree murder has been set aside on
appeal, was void as an ex post facto law.
A Virginia act that terminated a privilege
accorded bondholders under prior law of
tendering coupons from said bonds in
payment of taxes impaired the obligation
of contract. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Tennessee statutes that levied taxes on a
railroad company enjoying tax
exemption under an earlier charter

Subject
Summary

1885

Virginia
Coupon
Cases, 114
U.S. 269

S

1894

Mobile &
Ohio R.R. v.
Tennessee,

S

1894

Covington &
Cincinnati
Bridge Co. v.
Kentucky, 154
U.S. 204
Fairbankv.
UnitedStates,
181 U.S. 283
The Robert W.
Parsons,191
U.S. 17

S

A Kentucky act regulating toll rates on
bridge across the Ohio River was an
unconstitutional regulation of interstate
commerce.

Interstate
Commerce

F

Taxes on
Exports

1905

Lochner v.
New York, 198
U.S. 45

S

1907

American
Smelting Co.
v. Colorado,
204 U.S. 103

S

Stamp tax on foreign bills of lading, was
held a tax on exports in violation of
Article 1, Section 9.
New York statutes giving a lien for
repairs upon vessels, and providing for
the enforcement of such liens by
proceedings in rem, were held void as in
conflict with the exclusive admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
A New York statute establishing a ten
hour workday in bakeries violated due
process because it interfered with the
employees' freedom to contract in
relation to their labor.
A Colorado statute stipulating that
foreign corporations, as a condition for
admission to do business, pay a fee based
on their capital stock whereupon they
would be subjected to all the liabilities
and restrictions imposed upon domestic
corporations amounted to a contract, the
obligation of which was invalidly
impaired by a later statute that imposed
higher annual license fees on foreign
corporations admitted under the
preceding terms than were levied on
domestic corporations, whose corporate

1908

The
Employers'
Liability

F

153 U.S. 486

1901

1903

Contracts
Clause

Contracts
Clause

impaired the obligation of contract.

S

Admiralty
and
Maritime
Jurisdiction

Due
Process and
Freedom of
Contract
Contracts
Clause

existence had not expired.

Cases, 207

944

Act providing that "every common
carrier engaged in trade or commerce in
the District of Columbia . .. or between
the several States .. . shall be liable to

Interstate
Commerce
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

Subject

Subject
Summary

any of its employees ... for all damages
which may result from the negligence of
any of its officers ... or by reason of any

U.S. 463

defect . . . due to its negligence in its

Galveston,
Harrisburg&
San Antonio
Ry. v. Texas,
210 U.S. 217
W Union
Telephone Co.
v. Kansas, 216
U.S. I

S

1913

City of
Owensboro v.
Cumberland
Telephone &
Telephone
Co., 230 U.S.
58

L

1918

Hammer v.
Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251

F

1908

1910

S

cars, engines ... roadbed," The
Employers' Cases, 207 U.S. at 490 n.1,
was held not supportable under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3 because it extended
to intrastate as well as interstate
commercial activities.
A Texas gross receipts tax insofar as it
was levied on railroad receipts that
included income derived from interstate
commerce unconstitutionally burdened
interstate commerce.
A Kansas statute imposing a charter fee,
computed as a percentage of authorized
capital stock, on corporations for the
privilege of doing business in Kansas,
could not validly be collected from a
foreign corporation engaged in interstate
commerce, and also violated due process
insofar as it was imposed on property,
part of which was located beyond the
limits of that state.
An ordinance of a Kentucky municipality
which required a telephone company to
remove from the streets poles and wires
installed under a prior ordinance granting
permission to do so, without restriction
as to the duration of such privilege, or, in
the alternative, pay a rental not
prescribed in the original ordinance
impaired an obligation of contract
contrary to Article I, Section 10.
The original Child Labor Law, providing
"[t]hat no producer. . . shall ship ... in
interstate ... commerce ... any article or
commodity the product of any mill ... in
which within thirty days prior to the
removal of such product therefrom
children under the age of fourteen years
have been employed or permitted to

Interstate
Commerce

Interstate
Commerce
and Due
Process

Contracts
Clause

Commerce
Clause

work . .. more than eight hours in any

day, or more than six days in any week,"
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1, was held
not within the commerce power of
Congress.

945

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Year

Case

1918

N. Y. Life
Insurance Co.
v. Dodge, 246
U.S. 357

S

1920

Eisner v.
Macomber,
252 U.S. 189

F

1920

Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253
U.S. 149

F

1921

Truax v.
Corrigan,257
U.S. 312

S

1923

Pennsylvania
v. West
Virginia, 262

S

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

Liberty of contract, as protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, precluded enforcement of
the Missouri nonforfeiture statute, which
prescribed how net value of a life
insurance policy was to be applied to
avert a forfeiture in the event the annual
premium is not paid. The statute
prevented a Missouri resident from
executing in the New York office of the
insurer a different agreement sanctioned
by New York law whereby the policy
was pledged as security for a loan and
later canceled in satisfaction of the

Contracts
Clause and
Due
Process

indebtedness.

Provision of the income tax law of 1916,
that a "stock dividend shall be
considered income, to the amount of its
cash value," Eisner, 252 U.S. at 200 n. 1,
was held invalid (in spite of the Sixteenth
Amendment) as an attempt to tax
something not actually income, without
regard to apportionment under Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3.
The amendment of §§ 24 and 256 of the
Judicial Code (which prescribe
jurisdiction of district courts)
"sav[ing] to claimants the rights and
remedies under the workmen's
compensation law of any State,"
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 253 U.S. at 156,
was held an unconstitutional attempt to
transfer federal legislative powers to the
states. The Constitution, by Article III,
Section 2, and Article 1, Section 8,
approved rules of general maritime law.
An Arizona statute that regulated
injunctions in labor disputes, which
exempted ex-employees when
committing tortious injury to the
business of their former employer in the
form of mass picketing, libelous
utterances, and inducement of customers
to withhold patronage, while leaving
subject to injunctive restraint all other
tortfeasors engaged in like wrongdoing,
deprived the employer of property
without due process and denied him

Taxation
and
Apportionment

Federalism

Due
Process and
Equal
Protection

equal protection of the law.

946

A West Virginia law that required pipe
line companies to fill all local needs
before endeavoring to export any natural

Interstate
Commerce
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

U.S. 553

Subject
gas extracted in West Virginia was void
as a prohibited interference with
interstate commerce.
A New York law that prohibited ticket
agencies from selling theatre tickets at
prices in excess of fifty cents over the
price printed on the ticket was void
because it regulated a business not
affected with the public interest and

1927

Tyson & Bro.
v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418

S

1928

Louisville Gas
& Electric Co.
v. Coleman,
277 U.S. 32

S

1928

Long v.
Rockwood,
277 U.S. 142

S

1928

PanhandleOil
Co. v.
Mississippi ex
rel. Knox, 277

S

A Mississippi law imposing tax on the
sale of gasoline was void as applied to
sales to federal instrumentalities such as
the Coast Guard or a Veterans' Hospital.
A Massachusetts law that imposed
succession taxes on all property in
Massachusetts transferred by deed or gift
intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment after the death of the grantor,
or transferred to any person absolutely or
in trust, could not, consistent with due
process or the Contracts Clause, be
enforced with reference to rights of
succession or rights effected by gift that
vested under trust agreements created
prior to passage of the act,
notwithstanding that the settlor died after
its passage.
A Minnesota law that authorized the
enjoinder of one engaged regularly in the
business of publishing a malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory newspaper
or magazine, as applied to publications

Subject
Summary

Due
Process

deprived such business of due process.

A Kentucky law that conditioned the
recording of mortgages not maturing
within five years upon the payment of a
tax of twenty cents for each $100 of
value secured, but that exempted
mortgages maturing within that period,
was void as denying equal protection of
the laws.
A Massachusetts income tax law could
not validly be imposed on income
received by a citizen as royalties for the
use of patents issued by the United

Equal
Protection

Patents and
State
Taxation

States.

State
Taxation of
Sales to
Federal
Entities

U.S. 218

1931

Coolidge v.
Long, 282
U.S. 582

S

1931

Near v.
Minnesota ex
rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697

S

I_

Contracts
Clause and
Due
Process

Freedom of
the Press

charging neglect of duty and corruption

947

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

Subject

Subject
Summary

on the part of state law enforcement
officers, effected an unconstitutional
infringement of freedom of the press as
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1932

Nixon v.
Condon, 286
U.S. 73

S

1935

Perry v.
UnitedStates,
294 U.S. 330

F

1935

R.R.
Retirement
Board v. Alton
Railway, 295
U.S. 330

F

1936

Ashton v.
Cameron
County Water
Improvement
District,298

F

1936

Morehead v.
New York ex
rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587

S

1937

Herndon v.
Lowry, 301
U.S. 242

S

Texas White Primary Law that
empowered the state executive
committee of a political party to
prescribe the qualifications of members
of the party and thereby to exclude
Negroes from voting in primaries
conducted by the party amounted to state
action in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Equal
Protection

Amendment.

Abrogation of gold clause in government
obligations was held a repudiation of the
pledge implicit in the power to borrow
money under Article I, Section 8, Clause
2 and a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Railroad Retirement Act,
establishing a detailed compulsory
retirement system for employees of
carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act, was held not to be a
regulation of commerce within the
meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
and a violation of the Due Process
Clause (Fifth Amendment).
Provision for readjustment of municipal
indebtedness, though "adequately
related" to the bankruptcy power, was
held invalid as an interference with state
sovereignty.

Borrowing
Power of
Congress

Interstate
Commerce
and Due
Process

State
Sovereignty

U.S. 513

A New York law requiring employers to
pay women minimum wages that would
be equal to the fair and reasonable value
of the services rendered and sufficient to
meet the minimum cost of living
necessary for health deprived employers
and employees of their freedom of
contract and thus violated due process of
law.
A Georgia insurrection statute, which
criminalized the solicitation of members
for a political party and conducting
meetings of a local unit of that party if
one of the doctrines of the party may be
said to embrace ultimate resort in the

948

Contracts
Clause and
Due
Process

Freedom of
Speech
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1937

Hartford
Steam Boiler
Inspection &
Insurance Co.
v. Harrison,
301 U.S. 459

S

1943

Jones v. City
of Opelika,
319 U.S. 103

L

1943

Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105

L

1944

McLeod v.
Dilworth Co.,
322 U.S. 327

S

1945

Thomas v.
Collins, 323
U.S. 516

S

Subject
indefinite future to violence against
government, invaded freedom of speech
as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A Georgia law that prohibited stock
insurance companies writing fire and
casualty insurance from acting through
agents who were their salaried
employees, but that permitted mutual
companies writing such insurance to do
so, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An Opelika, Alabama, ordinance
imposing licenses and taxes on various
businesses cannot constitutionally be
applied to the business of selling books
and pamphlets on the streets or from
house to house. As applied, the
ordinance infringes liberties of speech
and press and religion guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
An ordinance of the City of Jeanette
providing that all persons soliciting
orders for merchandise of any kind, or
persons delivering such articles under
such orders, must procure a license and
pay a fee, violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments when applied to
persons soliciting orders for religious
books and pamphlets, because "[a] state
may not impose a charge for the
enjoyment of a right granted by the
Federal Constitution." Murdock, 319

Subject
Subject
Summary

Equal
Protection

Freedom of
Speech,
Press, and
Religion

Freedom of
Speech

U.S. at 113.

The Commerce Clause prohibits the
imposition of an Arkansas sales tax on
sales to residents of the state that are
consummated by acceptance of orders in,
and the shipments of goods from, another
state, in which title passes upon delivery
to the carrier.
A Texas statute required union
organizers, before soliciting members, to
obtain an organizer's card from the
Secretary of State. As applied in this
case, the statute violates the First and

Interstate
Commerce

Freedom of
Speech and
Assembly

Fourteenth Amendments because it

949

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1947

Order of
United
Commercial
Travelers of
America v.
Wolfe, 331
U.S. 586

S

1948

Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S.
558

L

1949

Terminiello v.
City of
Chicago, 337
U.S. I

L

_____
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_______________________

Subject

imposes a prior restraint on free speech
and free assembly. The First
Amendment's safeguards apply to
business and economic activity, and
restrictions of these activities can be
justified only by clear and present danger
to the public welfare.
A South Dakota Law setting a six-year
statute of limitations for commencing
actions on contract and declaring void
every stipulation in a contract that
reduces the time during which a party
may sue to enforce his rights cannot be
applied to an action brought in South
Dakota for benefits arising under the
constitution of a fraternal benefit society
incorporated in Ohio and licensed to do
business in South Dakota. The claimant
is bound by the limitation prescribed in
the society's constitution barring actions
on claims six months after disallowance
by the society, and South Dakota is
required under the Federal Constitution
to give full faith and credit to the public
acts of Ohio.
A Lockport ordinance forbidding use of
sound amplification excepted public
dissemination, through loudspeakers, of
news, matters of public concern, and
athletic activities, provided that the latter
be done under permission obtained from
the Chief of Police. The ordinance is
unconstitutional on its face as a prior
restraint on speech, in violation of the
First Amendment, made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
No standards were prescribed for the
exercise of discretion by the Chief of
Police.
A Chicago ordinance proscribed the
making of improper noises or other
conduct contributing to a breach of the
peace. Petitioner was convicted of
violating said ordinance by reason of the
fact that he had addressed a large
audience in an auditorium where he had
vigorously criticized various political
and racial groups as well as the
disturbances produced by an angry and
turbulent crowd protesting his
appearance. At trial, the judge instructed
the jury that any behavior that stirs the

Subject
Summary

Full Faith
and Credit

Freedom of
Speech

Freedom of
Speech

______
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

1949

H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du
Mond, 336
U.S. 525

S

1951

Hughes v.
Fetter, 341
U.S. 609

S

1954

Miller Bros. v.
Maryland,347
U.S. 340

S

1954

Railway
Express
Agency v.
Virginia, 347

S

public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance, violates the ordinance. As
construed and applied by the trial court,
the ordinance violates the right of free
speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment and made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denial of a license under the New York
Agricultural and Market Law violated
the Commerce Clause and the Federal
Agricultural Marketing Act where the
denial was on the ground that the
expanded facilities would reduce the
supply of milk for local markets and
result in destructive competition in a

Interstate
Commerce

market already adequately served.

U.S. 359

The Wisconsin wrongful death statute,
authorizing recovery "only for deaths
caused in that State," Hughes, 341 U.S.
at 610, and thereby blocking recovery
under statutes of other states, must give
way to the strong unifying principle
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause which looks toward maximum
enforcement in each state of the
obligations or rights created or
recognized by the statutes of sister states.
Where residents of nearby Maryland
made purchases from appellant in
Delaware, some deliveries being made in
Maryland by common carrier and some
by appellant's truck, seizure of the
appellant's truck in Maryland and
holding it liable for the Maryland use tax
on all goods sold in Delaware to
Maryland customers is a denial of due
process. The Delaware corporation has
not subjected itself to the taxing power of
Maryland and has not afforded Maryland
jurisdiction or power to impose upon it a
liability for collections of the Maryland
use tax.
In addition to "taxes on property of
express companies," Virginia provided
that "for the privilege of doing business
in this State," express companies shall

Full Faith
and Credit

Due
Process

Interstate
Commerce

pay an "annual license tax" upon gross

951

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

1956

Slochower v.
Boardof
Education,
350 U.S. 551

L

1956

Griffin v.
Illinois, 351
U.S. 12

S

1957

Lambert v.
Calfornia,
355 U.S. 225

L

receipts earned in the state "on business
passing through, into or out of this
State." Ry. Express Agency, 347 U.S. at
362. The gross-receipts tax is in fact and
effect a privilege tax, and its application
to a foreign corporation doing an
exclusively interstate business violated
the Commerce Clause.
Section 903 of the New York City
Charter provides that whenever a city
employee invokes the privilege against
self-incrimination to avoid answering
inquiries into his official conduct by a
legislative committee, his employment
shall terminate. The summary dismissal
thereunder, without notice and hearing,
of a teacher at City College who was
entitled to tenure and could be
discharged only for cause and after
notice, hearing and appeal, violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Invocation of the privilege
to justify refusal to answer questions of a
congressional committee concerning
membership in the Communist Party in
1948-1949 cannot be viewed as the
equivalent either to a confession of guilt

Due
Process

or a conclusive presumption of perjury.

Illinois statutes provide that a writ of
error may be prosecuted on a "mandatory
record" kept by the court clerk and
consisting of the indictment,
arraignment, plea, verdict, and sentence.
The mandatory record can be obtained
free of charge by an indigent defendant.
In such instances review is limited to
errors on the face of the mandatory
record, and there is no review of trial
errors such as an erroneous ruling on
admission of evidence. No provision
was made whereby a convicted person in
a non-capital case could obtain a bill of
exceptions or report of the trial
proceedings. Petitioner was held to have
been denied due process of law and the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed

Due
Process and
Equal
Protection

by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Los Angeles Municipal Code made it
unlawful for a person who has been
convicted of a crime punishable in
California as a felony to remain in the
city longer than five days without

952

Due
Process
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1958

Trap v.
Dulles, 356
U.S. 86

F

1960

Shelton v.
Tucker, 364
U.S. 479

S

1963

Kennedy v.
MendozaMartinez, 372
U.S. 144

F

1963

NAACP v.
Button, 371
U.S. 415

S

Subject
registering with the Chief of Police.
Applied to a person who is not shown to
have had actual knowledge of his duty to
register, this ordinance violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.
A provision of the Aliens and Nationality
Code, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8), derived
from the Nationality Act of 1940, as
amended, that citizenship shall be lost
upon conviction by court martial and
dishonorable discharge for deserting the
armed services in time of war, was held
invalid as imposing a cruel and unusual
punishment barred by the Eighth
Amendment and not authorized by the
war powers conferred by Article I,
Section 8, Clauses II to 14.
An Arkansas statute requiring every
school teacher, as a condition of
employment in state-supported schools
and colleges, to file an affidavit listing
every organization to which he had
belonged or contributed within the
preceding five years deprived teachers of
associational freedom guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Section 401(J) of Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1940 (added in 1944)
and § 49(a)(10) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which deprive
an American of citizenship, without the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, for leaving
or remaining outside the country, in time
of war or national emergency in order to
evade military service, was held

Subject
Summary

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

Freedom of
Association

Selfincrimination and
Right to
Counsel

unconstitutional.

A Virginia law, which (1) expanded
malpractice by attorneys to include
acceptance of employment or
compensation from any person or
organization not a party to a judicial
proceeding and having no pecuniary
right or liability in it, and (2) made it an
offense for such person or organization

Freedom of
Speech and
Association

to solicit business for an attorney,

953

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1965

UnitedStates
v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437

F

1966

Elbrandtv.
Russell, 384
U.S. II
Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387
U.S. 253

S

1967

Keyishian v.
Boardof
Regents, 385
U.S. 589

S

1967

Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369

S

1970

Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112

F

1971

United States

F

Subject
violated freedom of expression and
association, as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when enforced against a
corporation, including its attorneys and
litigants, whose major purpose is the
elimination of racial segregation through
litigation that it solicits, institutes, and
finances.
A provision of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
making it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer
or, with the exception of clerical or
custodial positions, as an employee of a
labor union, was held to be

Subject
Summary

Bill of
Attainder

unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.

1967

F

An Arizona loyalty oath is
unconstitutionally overbroad and
inclusive.
A provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, providing for
revocation of United States citizenship of
one who votes in a foreign election, was
held unconstitutional under Section I of

Loyalty
Oaths and
Overbeadth
Citizenship

the Fourteenth Amendment.

A New York statute, requiring removal
of teachers for "treasonable or seditious"
utterances or acts, was held
unconstitutionally vague because it
apparently bans mere advocacy of an
abstract doctrine, and unconstitutionally
broad in that it makes Communist Party
membership prima facie evidence of
disqualification for teaching in public

Free
Speech and
Vagueness

schools.

954

A provision of the California
Constitution, adopted by a referendum
that repealed "open housing" laws and
prohibited state abridgement of a realty
owner's right to sell and lease, or to
refuse to sell and lease, as he pleases,
was held to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
A provision of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 that set a minimum
voting age qualification of eighteen in
state and local elections was held
unconstitutional because it was beyond
the powers of Congress to legislate.
Tax laws providing for the forfeiture of

Equal
Protection

Congress's
Legislative
Power

Self-
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

v. US. Coin &
Currency,401
U.S. 715

1972

Furman v.
Georgia,408
U.S. 238

S

1973

US.
Department of
Agricultural v.
Murry, 413
U.S. 508

F

1975

Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565

S

1976

Nationall
League of
Cities v.
Usery, 426
U.S. 833
(subsequently
overruled)

F

property used in violating internal
revenue laws may not be constitutionally
used in face of invocation of privilege
against self-incrimination to condemn
money in the possession of a gambler
who had failed to comply with the
registration and reporting scheme held
void in Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968).
Statutory imposition of capital
punishment upon criminal conviction
either at discretion of jury or of the trial
judge may not be carried out. In the
view of two Justices, Georgia's statute
was unconstitutional because the death
penalty is per se cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, while in
the view of three Justices, the statute was
unconstitutional as applied because of
the discriminatory or arbitrary manner in
which death was imposed upon
convicted defendants in violation of the

incrimination

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A provision of the Food Stamp Act,
disqualifying from participation in
program any household containing a
person eighteen years or older who had
been claimed as a dependent child for
income tax purposes in the present or
preceding tax year by a taxpayer not a
member of the household, was held to
violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
An Ohio statute authorizing suspension
without a hearing of public school
students for up to ten days for
misconduct denied students procedural
due process in violation of the

Due
Process

Due
Process

Fourteenth Amendment.

Sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act
that extended wage and hour coverage to
the employees of state and local
governments were held invalid because
Congress lacks the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate employee
activities in areas of traditional

Interstate
Commerce
and
Traditional
Governmental
Functions

governmental functions of the states.

of States

955

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute
S

Year

Case

1976

Woodson v.
North
Carolina, 428
U.S. 280

1977

Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199

F

1977

Moore v. City
ofEast
Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494

L

1977

Trimble v.
Gordon, 430
U.S. 762

S

1977

Roberts v.
Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633

S

1977

Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432
U.S. I

S

1977

Wolman v.
Walter, 433
U.S. 229,
overruled by
Mitchell v.
Helms, 530
U.S._793

S

Subject
A North Carolina statute making the
death penalty mandatory upon conviction
of first-degree murder violated the
Eighth Amendment, because
determination to impose death must be

Subject
Summary
Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

individualized.

Social Security Act provision awarding
survivor's benefits based on earnings of
a deceased wife to widower only if he
was receiving at least half of his support
from her at the time of her death,
whereas widow receives benefits
regardless of dependency, was held to
violate equal protection element of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
because of its impermissible sex
classification.
An East Cleveland zoning ordinance,
which limited housing occupancy to
members of single family and
restrictively defined family so as to
prevent an extended family (i.e., two
grandchildren by different children
residing with grandmother) from living
together, violated the Due Process
Clause.
An Illinois law allowing illegitimate
children to inherit by intestate succession
only from their mothers while legitimate
children may take from both parents
denied illegitimates the equal protection
of the laws.
A Louisiana statute imposing a
mandatory death sentence upon one
convicted of first-degree murder of
police officer engaged in performance of
his duties violated the Eighth
Amendment.
A New York statute barring from access
to state financial assistance for higher
education aliens who have not either
applied for citizenship or affirmed the
intent to apply when they qualify

Equal
Protection
and Sex
Classifications

Due
Process

Equal
Protection

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

Equal
Protection

violated the Equal Protection Clause.

956

Ohio's loan of instructional material and
equipment to nonpublic religious schools
and transportation and services for field
trips for nonpublic school pupils violated
the First Amendment religion clauses.

Establishment
Clause
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

A Massachusetts criminal statute that
banned banks and business corporations
from making expenditures to influence
referendum votes on any questions not
affecting the property, business, or assets
of the corporation violated the First

Freedom of
Speech

Statute
(2000).

1978

FirstNational
Bank v.
Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765

S

1979

Caban v.
Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380

S

1980

Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480

S

1980

Stone v.
Graham,449
U.S. 39

S

1982

Santosky v.
Kramer, 455
U.S. 745

S

1982

Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202

S

1982

Washington v.
Seattle School
Dist., 458 U.S.

S

Amendment.

A New York law permitting an unwed
mother but not an unwed father to block
the adoption of their child by
withholding consent is an impermissible
gender distinction violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A Nebraska statute, which authorized
authorities to summarily transfer a prison
inmate from jail to another institution if a
physician finds that he suffers from a
mental disease or defect and cannot be
given proper treatment in jail, violated
the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless the transfer is
accompanied by adequate procedural
protections.
A Kentucky statute requiring a copy of
Ten Commandments, purchased with
private contributions, to be posted on the
wall of each public classroom in the state
violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
A New York law authorizing termination
of parental rights upon proof by only a
fair preponderance of the evidence
violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A Texas statute withholding state funds
from local school districts for the
education of any children not legally
admitted into United States and
authorizing boards to deny enrollment to
such children denied equal protection of

Equal
Protection
and Gender
Distinctions

Due
Process

Establishment
Clause

Due
Process

Equal
Protection

the laws.

457

A Washington statute, enacted by
initiative vote of the electorate, barring
school boards from busing students for

Equal
Protection

racially integrative purposes, denied

957

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

equal protection of the laws.

1982

Enmund v.
Florida,458
U.S. 782

S

1983

Anderson v.
Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780

S

1983

Karcherv.
Daggett,462
U.S. 725

S

1984

FCC v.
League of
Women
Voters, 468
U.S. 364

F

1984

Secretary of
State of
Maryland v.
JosephH.
Munson Co.,
467 U.S. 947

S

1985

Metro. Life
Insurance Co.
v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869

S

1986

FEC v.
Massachusetts
Citizensfor
Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238

F

Florida's felony-murder statute,
authorizing the death penalty solely for
participation in a robbery in which
another robber kills someone, violated

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

the Eighth Amendment.

An Ohio statute requiring independent
candidates for President and VicePresident to file nominating petitions by
March 20 in order to qualify for the
November ballot was held
unconstitutional as substantially
burdening the associational rights of the

Freedom of
Association

candidates and their supporters.

New Jersey's congressional districting
statute, creating districts in which the
deviation between largest and smallest
districts was 0.7%, or 3,674 persons,
violated Article I, Section 2's "equal
representation" requirement because it
failed to result from a good-faith effort to

Equal
Representation

achieve population equality.

Communications Act provision banning
noncommercial educational stations
receiving grants from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting from engaging in
editorializing violated the First
Amendment.
Maryland's prohibition on charitable
organizations paying more than 25% of
solicited funds for expenses of
fundraising violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by creating an unnecessary
risk of chilling protected First
Amendment activity.
Alabama's domestic preference tax,
imposing a substantially lower gross
premiums tax rate on domestic insurance
companies than on out-of-state insurance
companies, violated the Equal Protection

Freedom of
Speech

Freedom of
Speech

Equal
Protection

Clause.

A provision of the Federal Election
Campaign Act requiring that independent
corporate campaign expenditures be
financed by voluntary contributions to a
separate segregated fund violated the
First Amendment as applied to a
corporation organized to promote
political ideas, having no stockholders,
and not serving as a front for a business
corporation or union.

958

Freedom of
Speech
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Federal

(F), State
Year

Case

1986

Philadelphia
Newspapers v.
Hepps, 475
U.S. 767

1986

Thornburgh v.
American
College of
Obstetricians
and
Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747,
overruledin
part by
Planned
Parenthoodv.
Casey, 505
U.S. 833
(1992).
Tashjianv.
Republican
Partyof
Connecticut,
479 U.S. 208

S

Booth v.
Maryland,482
U.S. 496,
overruled by
Payne v.
Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808

S

1986

(S), or
Local (L)
Statute
S

S

Subject

Subject

Subject
Summary

A Pennsylvania statute incorporating the
common-law rule that defamatory
statements are presumptively false
violated the First Amendment as applied
to a libel action brought by a private
figure against a media defendant;
instead, the plaintiff must bear the
burden of establishing falsity.
A Pennsylvania statute prescribing a
variety of requirements for performance
of an abortion, including informed
consent, reporting of various information
concerning the mother's history and
condition, and standard-of-care and
second-physician requirements after
viability, unconstitutionally violated a
woman's right to have an abortion under
Roe v. Wade.

Freedom of
Speech

A Connecticut statute imposing a "closed
primary" election under which persons
not registered with a political party may
not vote in its primaries violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by
preventing political parties from entering
into political association with individuals

Freedom of
Association

Abortion

of their own choosing.

1987

American
Trucking
Ass'ns v.
Scheiner,483

S

Pennsylvania statutes imposing lumpsum annual taxes on operation of trucks
on state's roads violated the Commerce
Clause as discriminating against

S

Texas' flag desecration statute,
prohibiting any physical mistreatment of
the American flag that the actor knows
would seriously offend other persons,

U.S. 266

1989

Texas v.
Johnson, 491
U.S. 397

Excessive
Punishment

trial.

(1991).

1987

A Maryland statute requiring preparation
of a "victim impact statement"
describing the effect of a crime on a
victim and his family violated the Eighth
Amendment to the extent that it required
introduction of the statement at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder

Interstate
Commerce

interstate commerce.

Freedom of
Speech

violated the First Amendment as applied

959

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

to an individual who burned an
American flag as part of a political
protest.

1990

UnitedStates
v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310

F

1990

Peel v.
Attorney
Registration
&
Disciplinary
Commission
ofIllinois, 496
U.S. 91
Hodgson v.
Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417

S

An Illinois rule of professional
responsibility violated the First
Amendment by completely prohibiting
an attorney from holding himself out as a
civil trial specialist certified by the
National Board of Trial Advocacy.

Freedom of
Speech

S

Minnesota's requirement that a woman
under eighteen notify both her parents
before having an abortion was held
invalid as a denial of due process
because it "does not reasonably further
any legitimate state interest." Hodgson,
497 U.S. at 450. However, an alternative
judicial bypass system saved the statute

Abortion

1992

Lee v.
Weisman, 505
U.S. 577

L

1992

Lee v.
International
Society for
Krishna
Consciousness

L

The Flag Protection Act of 1989,
criminalizing burning and certain other
forms of destruction of the United States
flag, violated the First Amendment.
Most of the prohibited acts involve
disrespectful treatment of the flag, and
evidence a purpose to suppress
expression out of concern for its likely

Freedom of
Speech

communicative impact.

1990

as a whole.

Providence, Rhode Island's use of
members of the clergy to offer prayers at
official public secondary school
graduation ceremonies violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.
The involvement of public school
officials with religious activity was
"pervasive," to the point of creating a
state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise in a public school;
officials not only determined that an
invocation and benediction should be
given, but also selected the religious
participant and provided him with
guidelines for the content of nonsectarian

Establishment
Clause

prayers.

, 505 U.S. 830

960

A regulation of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey banning the
sale or distribution of printed or written
material to passers-by within the airport
terminals operated by the facility
violated the First Amendment.

Freedom of
Speech
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute
S

1992

Foucha v.
Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71

1994

Department of
Revenue of
Montana v.
Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767

S

1995

U. S. Term
Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514
U.S. 779

S

1995

Miller v.
Johnson, 515
U.S. 900

S

1995

UnitedStates
v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549

F

Subject
A Louisiana statute allowing an insanity
acquittee no longer suffering from
mental illness to be confined indefinitely
in a mental institution until he is able to
demonstrate that he is not dangerous to
himself or to others violated due process.
Montana's tax on the possession of
illegal drugs, to be "collected only after
any state or federal fines or forfeitures
have been satisfied," Kurth, 511 U.S. at
770, constituted punishment and thus
violated the prohibition, derived from the
Double Jeopardy Clause, against
successive punishments for the same
offense.
An amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution denying ballot access to
congressional candidates who have
already served three terms in the House
of Representatives or two terms in the
Senate was held invalid as conflicting
with the qualifications for office set forth
in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 and
Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 (specifying
age, duration of U.S. citizenship, and
state inhabitancy requirements). Article
I sets the exclusive qualifications for a
United States Representative or Senator.
Georgia's congressional districting plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court's finding that race was
the predominant factor in drawing the
boundaries of the Eleventh District was
not clearly erroneous. The state did not
meet its burden under strict scrutiny
review to demonstrate that its districting
was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.
The Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which made it a criminal offense to
knowingly possess a firearm within a
school zone, exceeded congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. It
was "a criminal statute that by its terms
ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561. Possession of a gun at
or near a school "is in no sense an

Subject
Summary
Due
Process

Double
Jeopardy

Qualifications for
Federal
Office

Equal
Protection

Interstate
Commerce

961

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1996

Denver Area
Education
Telecommunic
ations
Consortium v.
FCC, 518
U.S. 727

F

1996

Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899

S

1996

Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952

S

1996

Seminole
Tribe of
Floridav.
Florida,517
U.S. 44

F

962

Subject

economic activity that might, through
repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at
567.
Section 10(b) of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, which required cable
operators to segregate and block indecent
programming on leased access channels
if they do not prohibit it, violated the
First Amendment. Section 10(c) of the
Act, which permits a cable operator to
prevent transmission of "sexually
explicit" programming on public access
channels, also violated the First
Amendment.
North Carolina's congressional
districting law, containing the racially
gerrymandered Congressional District 12
as well as another majority-black district,
violated the Equal Protection Clause
because, under strict scrutiny applicable
to racial classifications, creation of
District 12 was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.
Creation of District 12 was not necessary
to comply with either section 2 or section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, and the lower
court found that the redistricting plan
was not actually aimed at ameliorating
past discrimination.
Three congressional districts created by
Texas law constituted unconstitutional
racial gerrymandering under the Equal
Protection Clause. The district court
correctly held that race predominated
over legitimate districting considerations,
including incumbency, and consequently
strict scrutiny applied. None of the three
districts was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.
A provision of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act authorizing an Indian
tribe to sue a State in federal court to
compel performance of a duty to
negotiate in good faith toward the
formation of a compact violated the
Eleventh Amendment. In exercise of its
powers under Article I, Congress may
not abrogate States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court. Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas

Subject
Summary

Freedom of
Speech

Equal
Protection

Equal
Protection

Eleventh
Amendment and
State
Immunity
from Suit
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Federal
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(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), is overruled.

1997

Printz v.
UnitedStates,
521 U.S. 898

F

1997

Camps
Newfound/Ow
atonna v.
Town of
Harrison,520
U.S. 564

S

1998

Eastern
Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524
U.S. 498

F

1998

United States
v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321

F

Interim provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act that required
state and local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers were
inconsistent with the Constitution's
allocation of power between Federal and
state governments. In New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the
Court held that Congress may not
compel states to enact or enforce a
federal regulatory program, and
"Congress cannot circumvent that
prohibition by conscripting the States'
officers directly." Printz, 521 U.S. at

Prohibition
of Congress
Commandeering
State
Resources

935.

Maine's property tax law, which
contained an exemption for charitable
institutions but limited that exemption to
institutions serving principally Maine
residents, was held a form of
protectionism that violated the
"dormant" Commerce Clause as applied
to deny exemption status to a nonprofit
corporation that operated a summer camp
for children, most of whom were not
Maine residents.
The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit
Act of 1992 was held unconstitutional as
applied to the petitioner Eastern
Enterprises. Pursuant to the Act, the
Social Security Commissioner imposed
liability on Eastern for funding health
care benefits of retirees from the coal
industry who had worked for Eastern
prior to 1966. Eastern had transferred its
coal-related business to a subsidiary in
1965. Four Justices viewed the
imposition of liability on Eastern as a
violation of the Takings Clause, and one
Justice viewed it as a violation of
substantive due process.
Statute requiring full civil forfeiture of
money transported out of the United
States without amounts in excess of
$10,000 being reported violated the

Dormant
Commerce
Clause

Takings
Clause and
Substantive
Due
Process

Excessive
Fines

Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

1999

College
Savings Bank
v. Florida
Prepaid
Postsecondary
Education
Expense
Board, 527
U.S. 666

F

1999

Florida
Prepaid
Postsecondary
Education
Expense
Board v.
College
Savings Bank,
527 U.S. 627

F

1999

Alden v.
Maine, 527
U.S. 706

F

2000

United States
v. Playboy
Entertainment
Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803

F

Subject

Amendment when $357,144 was
required to be forfeited.
The Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act, which provided that states shall not
be immune from suit under the
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)
"under the eleventh amendment ... or
under any other doctrine of sovereign
immunity," Coll.Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at
670, did not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Congress lacks
power to do so in exercise of Article I
powers, and the TRCA cannot be
justified as an exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to be free from a business
competitor's false advertising is not a
"property right" protected by the Due

Subject
Summary

State
Sovereign
Immunity
and
Enforcement Power
under the
Fourteenth
Amendment

Process Clause.

The Patent and Plant Variety Remedy
Clarification Act, which amended the
patent laws to expressly abrogate states'
sovereign immunity from patent
infringemenet suits, was held invalid.
Congress lacks power to abrogate state
immunity in exercise of Article I powers,
and the Patent Remedy Clarification Act
cannot be justified as an exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 5 power is
remedial, yet the legislative record
reveals no identified pattern of patent
infringement by states and the Act's
provisions are "out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object."

State
Sovereign
Immunity
and
Enforcement Power
under the
Fourteenth
Amendment

Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 639.

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974 subjecting non-consenting states to
suits for damages brought by employees
in state courts violated the principle of
sovereign immunity implicit in the
constitutional scheme. Congress lacks
power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to suits for damages in

State
Sovereign
Immunity

state courts.

Section 505 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which required cable TV
operators that offer channels primarily
devoted to sexually oriented
programming to prevent signal bleed
either by fully scrambling those channels
or by limiting their transmission to

964

Freedom of
Speech
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Federal
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(S), or
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Statute

Subject

Subject
Subject
Summary

designated hours when children are less
likely to be watching, violated the First
Amendment. The provision is contentbased, and therefore, could only be
upheld if narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling governmental interest. The
measure was not narrowly tailored, as the
government did not establish that the less
restrictive alternative found in section
504 of the Act-that of scrambling a
channel at a subscriber's request-would
I

be ineffective.

_

2000

United States
v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598

F

2000

Kimel v.
FloridaBoard
of Regents,
528 U.S. 62

F

2000

Carmell v.
Texas, 529

S

U.S. 513

A provision of the Violence Against
Women Act that created a federal civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence exceeded congressional power
under the Commerce Clause and under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The commerce power does not authorize
Congress to regulate "noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce." Morrison,529
U.S. at 617. The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits only state action, and affords no
protection against purely private conduct.
Section 13981, however, was aimed at
private conduct, not the conduct of state
officials.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments of 1974, amending the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to
subject states to damages actions in
federal courts, exceeded congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Age is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection
Clause, and the ADEA is "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82 (quoting City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532
(1997)).
A Texas law that eliminated a
requirement that the testimony of a

Interstate
Commerce

Congress's
Enforcement
Authority
under
Section 5 of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment

Ex Post
Facto

sexual assault victim age fourteen years
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

2000

Apprendi v.
New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466

S

2000

Boy Scouts of
America v.
Dale, 530
U.S. 640

S

2000

Stenbergv.
Carhart,530
U.S. 914

S

or older must be corroborated by two
other witnesses violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 as
applied to a crime committed while the
earlier law was in effect. So applied, the
law fell into the category of an ex post
facto law that requires less evidence in
order to convict. Under the old law, the
petitioner could have been convicted
only if the victim's testimony had been
corroborated by two witnesses, while
under the amended law the petitioner
was convicted on the victim's testimony
alone.
A New Jersey "hate crime" statute,
which allowed a judge to extend a
sentence upon finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant, in committing a crime for
which he has been found guilty, acted
with a purpose to intimidate because of
race, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and
the Sixth Amendment's requirements of
speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury. Any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury and established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Application of New Jersey's public
accommodations law to require the Boy
Scouts of America to admit an avowed
homosexual as a member and assistant
scout master violated the organization's
First Amendment associational rights.
The general mission of the Scouts, to
instill values in young people, is
expressive activity entitled to First
Amendment protection, and requiring the
Scouts to admit a gay scout leader would
contravene the Scouts' asserted policy

Due
Process and
Speedy and
Public Trial
by an
Impartial
Jury

Freedom of
Association

disfavoring homosexual conduct.

Nebraska's statute criminalizing the
performance of "partial birth abortions"
was held unconstitutional under
principles set forth in Roe v. Wade and
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey. The
statute lacked an exception for instances
in which the banned procedure was
necessary to preserve the health of the
mother, and, because it applied to the

966

Abortion

[Vol. 37: 847, 2010]

Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)
Statute

2001

Legal Services
Corp. v.
Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533

F

2001

Boardof
Trustees of
University of
Alabama v.
Garrett, 531
U.S. 356

F

Subject

commonplace dilation and evacuation
procedure as well as to the dilation and
extraction method, imposed an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to an
abortion.
A restriction in the appropriations act for
the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
that prohibited funding for any
organization that participates in litigation
that challenges a federal or state welfare
law constituted viewpoint discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment.
Moreover, the restrictions on LSC
advocacy "distort [the] usual
functioning" of the judiciary, and are
"inconsistent with accepted separationof-powers principles." Velazquez, 531
U.S. at 543, 546. "An informed,
independent judiciary presumes an
informed, independent bar," yet the
restriction "prohibits speech and
expression upon which courts must
depend for the proper exercise of the
judicial power." Velazquez, 531 U.S. at

Subject
Summary

Freedom of
Speech and
Separation
of Powers

545.

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) exceeded
congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, and violated the
Eleventh Amendment by subjecting
states to suits brought by state employees
in federal courts to collect money
damages for the state's failure to make
reasonable accommodations for qualified
individuals with disabilities. Rational
basis review applied, and consequently
states "are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special
accommodations for the disabled, so
long as their actions towards such
individuals are rational." Garrett.531
U.S. at 367. The legislative record of the
ADA fails to show that Congress
identified a pattern of irrational state
employment discrimination against the
disabled. Moreover, even if a pattern of
discrimination by states had been found,

Congress's
Enforcement
Authority
under the
Fourteenth
Amendment

the ADA's remedies would run afoul of
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Year

Case

Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

the "congruence and proportionality"
limitation on Congress's exercise of
enforcement power. Id. at 372.

2001

Lorillard
Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525

S

2002

Thompson v.
W. States
Medical
Center,535
U.S. 357

F

2003

Stogner v.
California,
539 U.S. 607

S

968

Massachusetts's restrictions on outdoor
advertising and point-of-sale advertising
of smokeless tobacco and cigars violated
the First Amendment. The regulations
prohibited outdoor advertising within
1,000 feet of a school, park, or
playground, and prohibit "point-of-sale"
advertising placed lower than five feet
above the floor of retail establishments.
These restrictions did not satisfy the
fourth step of the Central Hudson test for
regulation of commercial speech. That
step requires a "reasonable fit" between
the means and ends of a regulation, yet
the regulations are not "narrowly
tailored" to achieve such a fit.
Section 127 of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of
1997, which adds section 503A of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
exempt "compounded drugs" from the
regular FDA approval process if
providers comply with several
restrictions (including that they refrain
from advertising or promoting the
compounded drugs) violated the First
Amendment. The advertising restriction
did not meet the CentralHudson test for
acceptable governmental regulation of
commercial speech. The government
failed to demonstrate that the advertising
restriction was "not more extensive than
is necessary" to serve its interest in
preventing the drug compounding
exemption from becoming a loophole by
which large-scale drug manufacturers
can avoid the FDA drug approval
process. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371.
There were several non-speech means by
which the government might achieve its
objective.
A California statute that permitted
resurrection of an otherwise time-barred
criminal prosecution for sexual abuse of
a child, and that was itself enacted after
the pre-existing limitations period had
expired for the crimes at issue, violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I,
Section 10, Clause 1.

Freedom of
(Commercial)
Speech

Freedom of
(Commercial)
Speech

Ex Post
Facto
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Federal
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(S), or
Local (L)

Subject
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Summary

Statute

2004

Blakely v.
Washington,
542 U.S. 296

S

2005

Granholm v.
Heald, 544
U.S. 460

S

2005

Roper v.
Simmons, 543
U.S. 551

S

2005

UnitedStates
v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220

F

2006

Randall v.
Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230
FEC v.
Wisconsin
Right to Life,
127 S. Ct.
2652

S

2007

F

Washington State's sentencing law,
which allows a judge to impose a
sentence above the standard range if he
finds "substantial and compelling
reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence," Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299,
violated the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury.
Michigan and New York laws that
allowed in-state wineries to sell wine
directly to consumers but prohibit or
discourage out-of-state wineries from
doing so discriminated against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause, and were not authorized by the
Twenty-first Amendment.
Missouri's law setting the minimum age
at sixteen for persons eligible for the
death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment as applied to persons who
were under eighteen at the time they
committed their offense.
Two provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act, one that makes the
Guidelines mandatory and one that sets
forth standards governing appeals of
departures from the mandatory
Guidelines, were held invalid. The Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial limits
sentence enhancements that courts may
impose pursuant to the Guidelines.
Vermont campaign finance statute's
limitations on both expenditures and
contributions violated freedom of speech.
In McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), the Court held that § 203 was not
facially overbroad, and, in Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. v. FederalElection
Commission, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), the
Court held that it had not purported to
resolve future as-applied challenges.
Here, the Court held § 203
unconstitutional as applied to issue ads
that mention a candidate for federal
office, when such ads are not the
"functional equivalent" of express

Trial by
Jury

Interstate
Commerce

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

Trial by
Jury

Freedom of
Speech
Freedom of
Speech

advocacy for or against the candidate.
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Federal
(F), State
(S), or
Local (L)

Year

Case

2007

Abdul-Kabir
v.
Quarterman,
127 S. Ct.
1654

S

2007

Brewer v.
Quarterman,
127 S. Ct.
1706

S

2008

Davis v. FEC,
128 S. Ct.
2759

F

2008

Kennedy v.
Louisiana,
128 S. Ct.
2641

S

2008

Districtof
Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783

S

2008

Boumediene v.
Bush, 128
S.Ct. 2229

F

Subject

Subject
Summary

Statute

Texas capital sentencing statute
impermissibly prevented sentencing
"jurors from giving meaningful
consideration to constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence." Abdul-Kabir, 127
S. Ct. at 1659.
"Texas capital sentencing statute
impermissibly prevented ... sentencing
jury from giving meaningful
consideration to constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence." Brewer, 127 S. Ct.
at 1709 (argument of counsel).
A subsection of BCRA, providing that if
a "self-financing" candidate for the
House of Representatives spends more
than a specified amount then his
opponent may accept more contributions
than otherwise permitted, violated the
First Amendment. A subsection with
disclosure requirements designed to
implement the asymmetrical contribution

Due
Process

Due
Process

Freedom of
Speech

limits also violated the First Amendment.

Louisiana's statute that permits the death
penalty for rape of a child under twelve
was held unconstitutional because the
Eighth Amendment bars "the death
penalty for the rape of a child where the
crime did not result, and was not
intended to result, in death of the

Cruel and
Unusual
Punishment

victim." Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.

A District of Columbia statute that
banned virtually all handguns, and
required that any other type of firearm in
the home be dissembled or bound by a
trigger lock at all times violated the
Second Amendment, which the Court
held to protect individuals' right to bear

Right to
Bear Arms

arms.

Holding that the Military Commissions
Act, which denied federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions
brought by enemy combatants held at the
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,
effected an unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.

970

Habeas
Corpus

